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Abstract 
The three essays in this dissertation examine questions related to the R&D boundaries of 
the firm and the governance of R&D alliances. The first essay draws on institutional theory to 
examine the history of corporate R&D in the U.S. since the mid-19
th
 century. Formal and 
informal institutional rules and constraints are shown to play a role in the initial rise of markets 
for technology in the 19
th
 century, their decline during the early-20
th
 century, and their eventual 
return at the end of the 20
th
 century. The influence of formal and informal institutions on the 
adoption of in-house R&D labs in the U.S. during the mid-20
th
 century is also examined. 
In the second essay, the focus shifts to an investigation of the discrete project-level R&D 
outsourcing decision. A framework for understanding the direct and indirect influence of 
strategic considerations and environmental factors is developed. The impact of project- and 
transaction-level characteristics on the R&D outsourcing decisions are also considered, 
highlighting the importance of integrating information possessed by managers from different 
levels of the firms. Finally, the second essay proposes that cross-level interactions may exist 
within the framework, which may help to explain why the decisions observed in some cases run 
counter to the predictions traditionally derived from theory. 
The third essay includes two empirical studies that examine different aspects of the 
contracts designed to govern R&D alliances. Using a unique set of contracts from the medical 
device industry, the studies in the final essay investigate the factors that influence the structure of 
R&D alliance contracts and the assignment of key decision and control rights in such contracts. 
In addition, the final essay investigates the impact of previous alliance experience on the 
relationship between the key factors identified and the structure of R&D alliance contracts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Research Topic: The R&D Boundaries of the Firm and R&D Alliances 
Technological creativity is often credited as an important driver of economic progress. In 
addition, technological creativity has enhanced living standards by improving clothing, 
healthcare, housing and nutrition. As Mokyr states, in the absence of technological creativity, 
‘we would all still live nasty and short lives of toil, drudgery, and discomfort’ (1990: vii). 
However, for most of human history, technological change could hardly be considered the result 
of an orderly research and development (R&D) process. Particularly in the U.S., technological 
creativity originated from sources other than corporate R&D laboratories until sometime 
between 1875 and 1900 (Hounshell, 1996). 
Today, corporate R&D occupies a central role in the advancement of technology and the 
development of new products. According to a recent study, companies spent $282 billion on 
R&D in the U.S. during 2009 (National Science Foundation, 2012). Approximately $225 billion 
of this funding originated from the companies’ own sources, while the federal government 
contributed approximately $40 billion of the $57 billion of R&D paid for by other sources. It is 
important to note, however, that these funds are not just allocated to R&D conducted internally 
(i.e., carried out solely by the companies’ own labs), but also to R&D conducted in collaboration 
with other entities. Among the 104 R&D managers surveyed by the Industrial Research Institute, 
external R&D collaboration continues to be an area of increased emphasis (Antcliff, 2012). 
Specifically, between 2007 and 2012, participation in R&D alliances and joint ventures 
consistently ranked at the top of the list of tools for external R&D collaboration in terms of 
investment. Survey respondents expect that such relationships will continue to be an important 
element of their firm’s technology/product development strategy in the future. 
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The R&D boundaries of the firm and R&D alliances have received a considerable 
amount of attention in the literature. Researchers have investigated a variety of topics, ranging 
from the choice between in-house and external sources of R&D in the face of technological 
change (e.g., Pisano, 1990) to how the value created by the members of an R&D alliance is 
divided (e.g., Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). The concept of ‘open innovation’, which suggests 
‘that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external 
paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology’ (Chesbrough, 2003: xxiv),  has 
particularly garnered interest in both academic and practitioner circles. Despite the wealth of 
research that has been conducted, there are several fruitful areas of inquiry and many questions 
yet to be answered about the R&D boundaries of the firm and R&D alliances. The three essays in 
this dissertation attempt to address a number of these opportunities. 
1.2. An Institutional Theory Investigation of U.S. Technology Development Trends since 
the Mid-19
th
 Century 
 
The first essay examines technology development trends in the U.S. since the mid-19
th
 
century. During the 19
th
 and early-20
th
 centuries, a market for technology flourished wherein 
firms obtained patents from individual inventors, independent labs and universities (Lamoreaux 
and Sokoloff, 1997, 1999). This market steadily declined during the 1920s to the point where the 
in-house R&D lab became the dominant mode of technology development for most firms for 
much of the 20
th
 century. However, a new market for technology emerged in the late-20
th
 century 
(Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001), along with the appearance of new forms of 
collaborative R&D such as joint ventures, alliances and research consortia. Just as importantly, 
firms did not simply replace internal R&D with external sources. Rather, many firms adopted a 
balanced approach to technology development that considers external sources of technology as 
complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the in-house lab (Arora and Gambardella, 1990). 
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These shifts bring to light several important questions. What factors gave rise to the 
initial market for technology in the 19
th
 century? Why did this market decline in the early-20
th
 
century, only to re-emerge at the close of the century? Why did the in-house R&D model 
become so dominant during the middle of the 20
th
 century? What gave rise to the relatively new 
collaborative organizational forms dedicated to technology development in the late-20
th
 century?  
Whereas previous research has drawn on firm-level theories (i.e., transaction cost 
economics, the capabilities perspective, the trust-based view) to help enhance our understanding 
of the choice between internal and contractual modes of technology development at the project 
level for discrete transactions, such theories have been less instructive when trying to explain the 
two distinct shifts in the history of technology development in the U.S. Institutional theory offers 
an alternative explanation that may account for the aggregate trends observed. Institutions 
include both informal relations and norms and formal laws and organizations that establish ‘the 
rules of the game’ and ‘how the game is played’ (North, 1990: 3). Institutions are considered to 
be highly persistent, thus a change in an institution often requires some catalyzing event (Sine 
and David, 2003; Geels, 2004) or the coalescence of individuals/organizations around the 
recognition that current institutions no longer address critical problems (Schön, 1971). 
Based on an inductive analysis of the history of technology development and corporate 
R&D in the U.S., the first essay shows that both formal and informal institutional rules and 
constraints played a role in the initial rise of markets for technology, their decline during the 
early-20
th
 century, and their eventual return at the end of the 20
th
 century. The influence of 
formal and informal institutions on the widespread adoption of in-house R&D labs in the U.S. 
during the mid-20
th
 century is also discussed. This essay draws on and integrates insights from 
institutional economics with those from the various branches of institutional theory rooted in 
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sociology. The adoption of a pan-disciplinary approach is particularly useful when analyzing 
historical phenomenon and shifts in trends across long time periods, such as those observed in 
the first essay. 
1.3. The R&D Outsourcing Decision: Environmental Factors and Strategic Considerations 
In the second essay, a framework for understanding the direct and indirect influence of 
various strategic considerations and environmental factors on the project-level R&D outsourcing 
decision is developed. Again, transaction cost economics has factored prominently into research 
that has examined this decision (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Ulset, 1996). Despite general support for the 
predictions based on transaction cost economics, individual project-level decisions often run 
counter to theory, suggesting that other factors may play a role. The second essay argues that 
environmental factors act as shift parameters that increase or decrease the costs of outsourcing. 
Seven prominent environmental factors that indirectly influence the project-level R&D 
outsourcing decision are discussed. Previous research by Prahalad (1998), Chesbrough (2003), 
and Gassmann (2006) that has investigated the erosion of the so-called ‘closed innovation’ 
paradigm shaped the list of factors examined in this essay. Importantly, these factors have not 
impacted all industries equally. However, in contexts where these environmental factors are 
prevalent, ‘open innovation’ models of technology development are more likely to be 
appropriate and feasible (Gassmann, 2006), making it more likely that R&D outsourcing is 
occurring. 
The second essay also suggests that it is important to consider firm-specific strategic 
considerations in addition to the project- and transaction-level characteristics that are typically 
the focus of an R&D outsourcing decision. This suggestion highlights the importance of 
integrating the information possessed by managers from different levels of the firm. For 
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example, the decisions made by an R&D manager are likely to be framed by their firm’s overall 
technology strategy, which is likely to be set by top management. One important dimension of a 
firm’s technology strategy is its technological aggressiveness. Previous research indicates that 
technologically aggressive firms (i.e., those that are considered technology pioneers) are usually 
less likely to acquire external technology (Brockhoff and Pearson, 1992). Rather, such firms 
focus on investing in the development of their internal R&D capabilities. 
The second essay suggests that a firm’s technological and relational capabilities are also 
important firm-specific characteristics that factor prominently into the project-level R&D 
outsourcing decision. Specifically, it is the strength of these capabilities at a given point in time 
that is likely to influence whether managers even consider the option to outsource viable. In 
addition, the conceptual model developed in the second essay examines several project-level 
characteristics that have not received as much attention in the literature previously. The second 
essay concludes with a discussion of the potential for cross-level interactions. An examination of 
such interactions underscores the importance of considering the context within which individual 
outsourcing decisions are made. Recognition of these interactions may help to explain why the 
decisions observed in some cases run counter to the predictions of transaction cost economics. 
1.4. An Empirical Examination of the Design of R&D Alliance Contracts in the Medical 
Device Industry 
 
Whereas the first two essays focus on questions related to the R&D boundaries of the 
firm, the third essay examines the actual contracts developed to govern R&D alliances after the 
decision to form a partnership has been made. A substantial body of research has examined the 
R&D boundaries of the firm, notably Pisano (1990), Ulset (1996), Robertson and Gatignon 
(1998) and Odagiri (2003). In contrast, the formal contracts that establish the terms and structure 
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of alliances have only recently gained much attention in the strategic management literature 
(Weber, Mayer, and Wu, 2009). 
Economic theories of contracting assert that more complex/complete contracts are 
necessary to deal with the hazards that plague transactions. Williamson (1985) suggests, 
however, that terms should only be included if they contend with a specific hazard that is present 
or likely to arise. As a result, while some terms may be widely applicable, others are likely to be 
context-specific. The first study in the third essay focuses on the hazards that are prominent in 
R&D alliances, and how partners deal with such hazards contractually. Specifically, 
communication and appropriation challenges, and the contractual solutions devised to contend 
with them, are examined. 
Economic theories of contracting also assume that managers and lawyers have the 
foresight to perceive hazards, or at least learn quickly from their experience, enabling them to 
develop contracts that appropriately deal with the hazards present. Evidence indicates, however, 
that managers and lawyers are not as farsighted as theory suggests (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 
2004; Lumineau, Fréchet, and Puthod, 2011). Thus, this assumption is relaxed in order to 
investigate if and how previous contract design experience impacts the development of R&D 
alliance contracts. The study also delves into whether all contracting experience contributes 
equally to the knowledge that managers and lawyers gain about designing alliance contracts. 
Specifically, the study examines whether experience with alliances that involve other value chain 
activities (i.e., marketing, manufacturing) helps managers and lawyers to draft R&D alliance 
contracts that contain the appropriate provisions. 
The second study in the third essay also examines issues revolving around contract 
design in R&D alliances, namely the allocation of decision and control rights. Such rights refer 
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to provisions in alliance contracts that provide, for instance, one partner with ownership over key 
alliance assets and the right to decide how they should be used. Research in this stream has 
primarily drawn on property rights theory (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990; Hart, 1995). Following in this tradition, this study examines the assignment of two specific 
rights: the ownership of foreground intellectual property and severe termination rights (i.e., those 
that can be invoked unilaterally and unconditionally). Recent research suggests that different 
rights matter to different partners (Ariño and Ring, 2010; Kloyer, 2011), and play different 
functions (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Thus, this study deviates from previous research by 
suggesting that different factors influence the assignment of rights that play different functions. 
The research questions posed in each study of third essay are investigated in the context 
of the medical device industry. Several factors make the medical device industry an ideal setting 
for examining questions related to the design of R&D alliance contracts: (1) it is highly R&D 
intensive, (2) the emergence of convergence products (i.e., those that bring together discrete 
areas of science/technology) presents a capabilities challenge to industry incumbents, and (3) 
most of the R&D alliances between large firms and their smaller, entrepreneurial partners are 
organized contractually. A unique data set comprised on 66 actual alliance contracts, drawn from 
Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database, was employed to test the hypotheses developed in 
each study. 
1.5. Conclusion 
In summary, organized R&D is a relatively recent phenomenon when the scope of human 
history is considered. However, in the U.S., the R&D boundaries of the firms shifted twice since 
the mid-19
th
 century. As a result, scholars have sought to explain why these boundaries have 
shifted at both the economy-wide and project level. The essays in this dissertation follow in this 
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tradition. Using the model of the economics of institutions developed by North (1990), and 
formalized by Williamson (1998, 2000), these essays can be organized as shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1. The three essays in relation to the model of the economics of institutions 
 
 
The focus of the first essay is on explaining aggregate trends related to the shifting R&D 
boundaries of the firm in the U.S. over a period of roughly one and half centuries through the 
lens of institutional theory. Thus, the first essay straddles the top three levels of the model, as the 
study conducted discusses how informal and formal norms established the rules by which 
governance decisions related to R&D evolved. The second essay is also shown to straddle the top 
three levels of the model. The distinct focus of this essay, however, is on explaining the project-
level R&D outsourcing decision. Again, informal and formal norms, as represented by several of 
the environmental factors discussed in this essay, are shown to play an important role as shift 
parameters in the governance decision represented by Level 3 of the model. Finally, the studies 
Level 1: 
Informal 
Institutions 
Level 2: 
Formal 
Institutions 
Level 3: 
Governance 
Level 4: 
Resource 
Allocation 
An Institutional Theory 
Investigation of U.S. 
Technology 
Development Trends 
since the Mid-19
th
 
Century 
The R&D Outsourcing 
Decision: 
Environmental and 
Strategic 
Considerations 
An Empirical 
Examination of the 
Design of R&D 
Alliance Contracts in 
the Medical Device 
Industry 
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conducted in third essay are shown to be linked to Level 3 of the model directly in recognition 
that decisions regarding contract structure represent choices made by managers that determine 
how an R&D alliance will be governed.  
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CHAPTER 2 
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY INVESTIGATION OF  
U.S. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TRENDS SINCE THE MID-19
th
 CENTURY 
2.1. Introduction 
The reliance on contractual modes of technology acquisition and development grew 
rapidly in the U.S. in the late-20
th
 century. Howells (1999) and Chesbrough (2001) suggest that 
this is something of a return to the norm for technology development that existed throughout the 
late-19
th
 and early-20
th
 centuries, before the advent of the in-house R&D lab. During much of 
that period, a market for technology flourished wherein firms obtained patents from individual 
inventors, independent labs and universities (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1997, 1999). However, 
the market declined in the 1920s, and in-house R&D became the dominant mode of technology 
development for much of the 20
th
 century. 
A new market for technology emerged in the late-20
th
 century (Arora, Fosfuri, and 
Gambardella, 2001). Licensing revenue in the U.S. increased from $3 billion in 1980 to $110 
billion in 2000 (Rigby and Zook, 2002). Firms also began to experiment with collaborative forms 
of organization dedicated to technology development. The number of new technology 
development partnerships formed annually surged from fewer than ten per year in the 1960s to 
approximately 500 in 1989 (Hagedoorn, 2002). While there were several fluctuations over the 
ensuing decades, the trend continued, reaching a peak of 750 new partnerships in 2004 
(Schilling, 2009). 
Despite the rapid growth in the reliance on contractual modes of technology development 
and acquisition, in-house R&D continues to play an important role for many firms. Funding of 
internal R&D has continued to grow in the early 21
st
 century (Grueber and Studt, 2009). 
However, it does appear that a more balanced approach to technology development has emerged, 
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wherein external sources of technology are complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the in-
house lab (Arora and Gambardella, 1990). 
These shifts bring to light several questions. What factors gave rise to the initial market 
for technology in the 19
th
 century? Why did the market for technology decline in the early-20
th
 
century, only to re-emerge at the end of the century? Why did the in-house R&D model become 
so dominant during the middle of the 20
th
 century? Was it merely ‘a temporary episode within a 
larger Smithian process of the division of labor,’ as Langlois (2003: 251) suggests? What gave 
rise to the relatively new collaborative organizational forms dedicated to technology 
development in the late-20
th
 century? Why has the licensing of technology grown so rapidly 
since the 1980s? 
To examine these questions, this essay adopts a pan-disciplinary view of institutional 
theory that draws on economics and sociology. Given the longitudinal nature of the questions 
examined in this essay, it is suggested that this approach is appropriate. As North (1990) notes, 
institutional theory is a particularly powerful lens for examining economic phenomenon both at a 
moment in time and over time. This feature is particularly valuable, as technology development 
practices in the U.S. have changed twice over the period examined in this study. It is important to 
recognize that the current period is not likely to be the determinative end-point in the evolution 
of these trends either; they are apt to change again at some time in the future. Thus, any theory 
employed needs to be able to account for the possibility of change and how change comes about. 
Recent work by scholars of institutionalism has focused on further developing the theory of 
change (e.g., Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006). 
Institutional scholars have long acknowledged that the institutional setting can influence 
the organizational options available to decision makers (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985, 1998; 
12 
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Nee, 1992). While institutional theory concepts have been relied on to explain societal and 
national trends, Ingram and Clay (2000) suggest that such concepts can be extended to 
investigate industry and firm-level trends as well. Thus, the institutional framework developed 
by North (1990) and formalized by Williamson (1998, 2000), which asserts that actors pursue 
their interests by making choices within constraints, serves as the starting point for the analysis 
conducted in this essay. This framework is extended by integrating North’s theory of informal 
norms with research on the role of science in industry and on managerial beliefs regarding 
internal control of innovation. The objective of this essay is not to test institutional theory per se, 
but rather to use institutional theory to further understanding of the major shifts that were 
observed. 
This essay is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief discussion of the 
literature that examines technology development and acquisition. In particular, firm-level 
theories that have been drawn upon to analyze project- and firm-level decisions are reviewed. 
The difficulties of relying on such theories alone to answer the questions that are posed in this 
essay are then discussed. Institutional theory is then introduced as an alternative lens that can 
help to further understanding of the aggregate trends observed. The history of technology 
development in the U.S. since the mid-19
th
 century is then examined through the lens of 
institutional theory. This historical examination is divided into three eras in which several formal 
institutions and informal norms and beliefs are identified. Finally, the implications of and 
conclusions from this analysis are discussed. 
2.2. The Technology Development Mode Decision 
As noted, the acquisition and development of technology via contractual arrangements 
dramatically increased in the late-20
th
 century. Initially, scholars were puzzled by this trend, 
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particularly the formation of technology development joint ventures. Conventional wisdom held 
that due to the inherent risk of spillovers and the sensitive nature of technology development, 
firms would simply exclude it from joint ventures (Hladik, 1985). Despite this concern, a variety 
of managerial motives for relying on the market for technology and contractual arrangements 
were uncovered including the shortening of innovation cycle times, the sharing of risk, and 
increased access to new markets (Powell, 1987; Hagedoorn, 1993).
1
 
As the trade of technology and the reliance on contractual modes of technology 
acquisition and development continued to grow, a large body of scholarly research studying this 
phenomenon emerged. Much of this research draws on transaction cost economics (TCE). In 
general, TCE suggests that conducting activities internally is preferred over spot market 
contracts and partnerships when transaction-specific investments are required or when demand 
or technological uncertainty is high (Williamson, 1975). Building on these central tenets, Teece 
(1988) was among the first to examine the reluctance of firms to rely on the market for 
technology through the lens of TCE. Noting that transferring information and technical 
specifications between firms is costly, time-consuming and fraught with hazards, Teece (1988) 
suggests that firms are likely to conduct technology development internally when it is difficult to 
write a complete contract with a prospective partner and enforce the agreed upon clauses. 
Empirical work generally provides support for TCE logic. For example, Pisano (1990) 
found that firms are less likely to rely on the market for technology when few suppliers are 
available, and when intellectual property rights are relatively weak and difficult to enforce. 
Robertson and Gatignon (1998) also found that firms are more likely to conduct technology 
                                                 
1
 It is interesting to note that many of the same rationales for choosing between in-house R&D and obtaining the 
services of an external partner were expressed much earlier by Nelles (1958). 
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development in-house when demand is relatively unpredictable, supplier performance is difficult 
to verify, and transaction-specific assets are required. 
Another stream in the firm-based literature suggests that technological capabilities impact 
the choice between internal and contractual modes of technology development (e.g., Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Argyres, 1996; Foss, 1996). In general, capabilities are inherently complex, 
casually ambiguous and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Connor and 
Prahalad, 1996). Firms are largely heterogeneous in terms of their technological capabilities as a 
result of past choices regarding which technologies to develop. Thus, a firm’s technological 
capabilities are likely to be inferior to those of potential suppliers who have invested to a greater 
degree in a specific technology. According to the logic of the capabilities perspective, it is often 
more efficient for a firm to obtain the capabilities that it lacks from an external source rather than 
to build them internally due to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
Conversely, when a firm has invested in certain technological capabilities, it should prefer to 
leverage them, especially if they are superior relative to those of potential suppliers. 
A parallel stream of the capabilities literature suggests that a firm’s skills related to 
selecting attractive partners, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and managing inter-firm 
relationships may also impact the choice between internal and contractual modes of technology 
development. Firms that frequently interact with other firms gain experience learning how to 
structure and manage inter-firm partnerships (Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002; Sampson, 2005). 
Thus, as firms develop ‘relational capabilities’, the probability of entering future contractual 
relationships is likely to increase (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
A final perspective that has been relied on is the trust-based view. According to this 
perspective, a firm is likely to enter into new contractual relationships with firms that it has 
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previously interacted with (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000). The rationale for this preference is 
that search and selection can be time-consuming and costly, making previous interactions with a 
particular firm valuable. Familiarity can help to establish trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), 
increasing the likelihood that a firm will form a new relationship with a trustworthy former 
partner rather than search more broadly for a new partner. 
Overall, firm-level perspectives have enhanced understanding of the choice between 
internal and contractual modes of technology development at the project level for discrete 
transactions. Yet, it is difficult to explain the two distinct shifts observed in the history of 
technology development in the U.S. using only firm-level theories. For example, according to 
TCE-logic, considerable variation in the mode of technology development during any time 
period should be expected owing to the unique characteristics of each transaction. However, 
during the middle of the 20
th
 century, internal technology development was the dominant mode. 
Thus, the explanatory power of firm-level theories alone appears to be limited in this particular 
case. 
What other factors may account for the aggregate trends observed? Williamson (1985, 
1998) contends that transactions are embedded in a larger social context that needs to be 
accounted for in governance decisions, such as the choice of technology development mode. 
Hagedoorn (2006) suggests that the decision to enter a technology partnership is likely to be 
impacted by country- and industry-specific characteristics, as well as changes in these 
characteristics over time. Thus, the choice of technology development mode may at least 
partially depend on exogenous factors that lay outside of the specific transaction. 
A potential solution to this problem may be to better understand the role of contextual 
factors on the observed trends. While there are several theories that can be called upon to explain 
16 
 
 
 
9
0
 
1
6
 
the impact of context, this essay adopts a pan-disciplinary approach that integrates ideas from the 
economics and sociological branches of institutional theory. Some of the underlying assumptions 
regarding the decision-making process differ between institutional scholars in economics and 
sociology. Whereas economists emphasize rationality and profit maximizations motives as the 
key drivers behind decisions, sociologists stress the role of behavioral and cognitive 
explanations. Despite these differences, both streams agree that formal rules and informal norms 
constrain the decision-making process (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Hodgson, 1998; Ingram and 
Clay, 2000). Simply put, institutions define ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 1990: 3; Williamson, 
2000: 598), and these rules are viewed as highly persistent. 
2.3. Methodology 
Due to their persistence, Barley and Tolbert (1997) suggest that changes to institutions 
can only be observed through historical longitudinal studies. Consistent with this suggestion, an 
inductive historical investigation of technology development by U.S. firms from the mid-19
th
 
century to the present is conducted in this essay. Adopting an approach similar to Hargadon and 
Douglas (2001), a well-documented history, where the facts are reasonably settled in order to 
offer an explanation for the shifts that were observed, was examined. Consequently, the 
contribution of this essay is not the discovery of previously unknown historical facts but an 
interpretation of technology development trends through the lens of institutional theory. 
The historical account in this essay starts in the mid-19
th
 century, as at that time a great 
wave of administrative innovations (e.g., the development of the line-and-staff organization, 
selective forward integration by manufacturers into distribution) triggered the evolution of 
business in the U.S. that gave rise to the modern corporation (Chandler, 1977). Particularly in the 
U.S., the latter half of the 19
th
 century witnessed the rapid and widespread adoption of these 
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organizational innovations (Chandler, 1962). In addition, the business practices and 
organizational forms in the U.S. before the mid-19
th
 century would be scarcely recognizable to a 
modern manager (Williamson, 1981). Thus, the mid-19
th
 century appears to be an appropriate 
starting point for this analysis. 
Many possible explanations could be offered for the shifts in technology development 
trends observed since the mid-19
th
 century in the U.S. Thus, care was taken to determine whether 
a potential cause coincided with the timing of a shift in the trend. For example, in looking for an 
explanation for why firms began to establish internal R&D labs in the early 20
th
 century, the 
obvious answer is the vigorous enforcement of antitrust regulation sanctioned by the Supreme 
Court in the Northern Securities ruling of 1904. This ruling clamped down on mergers and 
acquisitions, pressuring firms to diversify organically through product development driven by 
internal R&D. However, U.S. firms had already established internal R&D labs before the ruling. 
Consequently, the Northern Securities decision by itself appears as though it is not the sole 
driver of the internalization of R&D in the early-20
th
 century. As is suggested later in this essay, 
the Northern Securities ruling was just one of many events with an influence on this 
phenomenon. 
Several accounts of the trends in technology development by U.S. firms exist, making it 
possible to draw on considerable information from a wide range of sources. The works consulted 
include those of historians of science, technology, and management who compiled data on the 
R&D laboratories of specific firms including Alcoa, AT&T, DuPont, and GE (e.g., Reich, 1985; 
Hounshell and Smith, 1988; Graham and Pruitt, 1990). Histories of the evolution of technology 
development in the U.S. across a wide range of industries were also drawn upon (e.g., 
Rosenberg, 1969; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Mowery, 1992; Hounshell, 1996), as well as 
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the work of legal scholars that documents U.S. antitrust and intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
policy over the period of interest (e.g., Fisk, 1998, 2001; Hart, 2001). As a result, the analysis 
conducted in this essay relies on a rich history that is fragmented across various areas of the 
literature. Therefore, one contribution of this essay is to weave these individual accounts together 
in order to understand why distinct shifts in the trend are observed. In addition, by taking into 
consideration changes in the institutional environment over an extended period, generalizations 
based on a single snapshot in time are avoided (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). 
2.4. Institutional Rules, Informal Norms and Technology Development Mode 
The fundamental premise of this essay is that, in addition to the characteristics of any 
particular transaction, the institutional setting strongly influences the choice of technology 
development mode. Specifically, it is suggested that institutional theory can help to explain the 
larger, aggregate trends that have been observed from period to period, while firm-level theories 
explain some of the variance within a particular period. 
There are several advantages to adopting a pan-disciplinary approach to institutional 
theory in this essay. The economics branch (e.g., North, 1990; Williamson, 2000) does not offer 
a strong explanation for the origins of institutions and how they change. As noted, institutions 
are considered extremely persistent, potentially leading an institutional economist to conclude 
that the rules are fixed (Geels, 2004). In contrast, cognitive institutionalists (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and network theorists (Granovetter, 1985) contend that 
institutions are socially constructed and can change during the game due to the interaction of the 
actors playing the game. In addition, adopting a pan-disciplinary approach can help explain how 
lower-level institutions can catalyze change in higher-level institutions. While Williamson (1998, 
2000) acknowledges this possibility, institutional economists mainly neglect how these feedback 
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loops work. In contrast, scholars in the sociological branch suggest that in response to a 
triggering event that calls into question the logic behind the prevailing norms, actors and 
decision makers often exert an upward influence on the constraints that impact them in an 
attempt to restructure higher-level institutions (Ingram and Clay, 2000; Sine and David, 2003; 
Geels, 2004). 
A final advantage of integrating perspectives from economics and sociology is that a 
more comprehensive picture of how new practices become institutionalized can be obtained. The 
economics branch emphasizes that decision makers take into account the relative effectiveness of 
a practice, leading to its widespread adoption. However, the effectiveness of a practice is often 
unobservable by outsiders. Thus, the sociological branches of institutional theory suggest that 
due to bounded rationality, decision makers may simply adopt the practices implemented by 
powerful actors within their network (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Consequently, combining 
perspectives provides a more complete picture of how institutions work. 
Similar to Chacar and Hesterly (2008), this essay adapts the hierarchical model of 
institutions developed by Williamson (1998, 2000). Figure 2-1 identifies the specific institutions 
applicable to the context of this essay at each of the four levels in Williamson’s model. Level 1 
consists primarily of the informal relations and norms of the scientific and manufacturing 
communities in the U.S. Level 2 involves the formal rules such as IPRs, antitrust regulations and 
technology policy. Level 3 addresses governance structures and transactions, particularly the 
choice of technology development mode. Finally, Level 4 is concerned with the distribution of 
resources. As the primary focus of this essay is on the impact of formal rules and informal norms 
on the evolution of the market for technology and the choice of technology development mode, 
the analysis is limited to an examination of the influence of Levels 1 and 2 on Level 3. 
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Figure 2-1. Williamson’s four institutional levels and corresponding model for R&D partnerships 
 
Applying this framework to the history of technology development by U.S. firms 
suggests that there have been three distinct eras since the mid-19
th
 century. Over this time period, 
the formal and informal institutions changed twice. As shown in Figure 2-2, the first stage was a 
transitional period marked by the evolution of beliefs regarding the nature of invention. These 
informal norms (Level 1) combined with formal legal and financial institutions (Level 2) to 
begin the shift away from a reliance on the market for technology. 
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Figure 2-2. Institutional settings and impact on R&D partnerships in U.S. 
 
Dramatically different institutions are observed for the second or Internally Focused era. 
In this period, the U.S. government, through antitrust enforcement and the direct funding of 
research and technology development, was the major Level 2 institution shaping the formal 
rules. Informal norms (Level 1) regarding the value of science and systematic research and the 
optimal degree of internal control over innovation further reinforced the formal rules. These 
beliefs, which were adopted by leading policy-makers and industrialists alike, were greatly 
influenced by the events of World War II. 
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A different institutional setting is again observed in the current or Dual Path era. After the 
Level 1 norms started to change in reaction to the perception that the U.S. was facing an 
international competitiveness gap, the government instituted an unprecedented wave of new 
federal policies that directly and indirectly addressed technology development and diffusion. 
Concurrent to the implementation of these formal initiatives, new industries began to emerge, 
driven by radical technological breakthroughs. Collectively, the changes in both the Level 1 and 
Level 2 institutions, along with the emergence of new industries, not only encouraged firms to 
engage in collaborative research and technology development, but also provided incentives to do 
so. However, it is important to note that firms did not abandon their in-house efforts, opting 
instead to adopt a more balanced ‘dual path’ approach to technology development. 
In general, technology development trends differ considerably from period to period 
depending on the institutional setting. Informal norms shaping managerial beliefs regarding the 
nature of invention and the optimal degree of internal control over innovation play a particularly 
important role along with formal rules and regulations governing antitrust and IPRs. The 
following sections discuss each of the eras in greater detail and present the evidence supporting 
the findings. While previous researchers have divided their accounts into multiple eras based on 
major events (e.g., Mowery, 1992; Hounshell, 1996), the eras in this analysis are representative 
of different institutional settings. 
2.4.1. The Transition Era: The Mid-19
th
 Century-1915 
U.S. industry in the 19
th
 century was considered a ‘system of manufactures’ in reference 
to American leadership in the development of production technology and mechanical devices 
(Rosenberg, 1969). Yet during most of the transition era, firms did not engage in systematic in-
house R&D, instead relying on the market for technology in order to acquire new products and 
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processes. This practice was strongly supported by the formal institutions and informal norms in 
place, as few (if any) constraints restricted the trade of technology. Indeed, even in science-based 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, this practice was the norm until after World War I (Liebenau, 
1984; Swann, 1989). Not unlike today, individual inventors, independent labs and universities 
were all important developers and sources of new technology (Howells, 1999; Chesbrough, 
2001). However, as the formal institutions and informal norms began to change in the late-19
th
 
century, firms started to shift away from the ‘inventive marketplace’ to ‘administered 
innovation’ through in-house R&D (Usselman, 1999). 
2.4.1.1. Informal Norms and Beliefs in the Transition Era. A commonly held belief 
during much of the transition era was that invention was the domain of the solitary inventor who 
did not possess much formal technical training (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). According to 
Bartlett (1941), industrial research was for the most part an unorganized effort by individuals 
without scientific training. In many cases, inventors lacked the capabilities to commercialize 
their inventions, leading them to sell or license their patents to firms and other individuals who 
could (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1996). In other instances, inventors were hired to conduct work 
specifically related to a firm’s major processes and products (Mowery, 1983). Further 
propagating the notion that invention was the domain of untrained craftsman, prominent leaders 
in the scientific community expressed an interest in keeping pure science research independent 
of industrial research.
2
 As a consequence, individuals with formal scientific training were 
discouraged from seeking industrial employment. 
In the late 19
th
 century, the view of the solitary inventor tinkering away in his workshop 
came to be seen as anachronistic, as technologically complex, capital intensive, systems-based 
                                                 
2
  See for example Henry A. Rowland’s address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 
1883 (Rowland, 1902: 609) 
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industries began to emerge. Invention came to be viewed as a collective, employer-sponsored 
enterprise, particularly in these new industries. In addition, the process of invention shifted from 
a reliance on traditional craft knowledge and simple science, to the application of advanced 
scientific and technical knowledge. Whereas older industries such as textiles, primary metals and 
construction relied on trial-and-error techniques, newer industries including chemical processing 
and electronics heavily utilized the experimental method in product and process development 
(Birr, 1957). The relatively young photographic, telecommunications and railroad industries also 
relied on formal problem-solving methods in product and process development (Hounshell and 
Smith, 1988). 
Another informal belief held during most of the 19
th
 century was that science education 
in the U.S. lagged behind that of Europe (Guralnick, 1979). However, this view evolved as top 
colleges and universities including Johns Hopkins, Cornell, Harvard, and MIT vastly upgraded 
their natural science curriculum (Reich, 1985), establishing doctoral programs in the physical 
and biological sciences modeled on the German system (Hannaway, 1976; Walker, 1981). 
Several U.S. universities and colleges also launched leading programs in the relatively young 
disciplines of chemical, civil, electrical and mechanical engineering. With the emergence of new 
systems-based industries, employment opportunities outside of academia opened up for the 
graduates of these programs. Thus, as the state of science and engineering education improved 
and beliefs regarding the nature of invention evolved, pursuing a career in industry gained 
legitimacy in the scientific community. 
2.4.1.2. Formal Rules and Institutions in the Transition Era. For much of the 
transition era, few formal rules and regulations applied to business in general, let alone 
technology development. A prominent exception was the U.S. patent system, which provided the 
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institutional framework within which the 19
th
 century market for technology evolved 
(Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2002). In accordance with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
3
 
the patent system was designed to encourage inventive activity while also promoting the 
diffusion of new technology. In exchange for public discloser of inventions, the patent system 
grants exclusive property rights to inventors that protect them from the possibility that someone 
else can exploit their ideas without compensation. 
Patent law initially required patentees to be individuals, not firms. In addition, firms were 
not automatically entitled to own or use inventions developed by employees. Rather, during most 
of the transition era, the federal courts consistently ruled that regardless of the inventor’s status, a 
firm could only obtain the rights to an employee’s invention if that employee had acquiesced to 
its use (Fisk, 1998). Thus, the decision regarding how to exploit a patent was left to the inventor 
even if they were employed by someone else. In many cases, due to their lack of manufacturing 
and distribution capabilities, inventors sold or licensed their patents to firms or other individuals 
in order to financially benefit from their inventions. 
Robust trade of technology did not truly occur until the passage of the Patent Act of 
1836, which replaced the registration system with the more rigorous examination system that is 
still in use today (Khan and Sokoloff, 2001). Under the requirements of the examination system, 
each patent application is scrutinized by technically trained examiners to ensure that the 
invention is truly new, useful and non-obvious. Passage of the Act helped make patents rights 
more secure by increasing the likelihood that the validity of a patent would survive a court 
challenge, in turn making it easier for the inventor to sell or license the patented technology to an 
individual or firm with the complementary capabilities necessary to exploit it. In addition, the 
                                                 
3
 U.S. Constitution, Article 1, section 8, clause 8, ‘The Congress shall have Power… To promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.’ 
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Act led to an increase in the number of patent attorneys and patent agents, many of whom 
became specialized intermediaries and brokers that matched inventors with would-be buyers 
(Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2002). 
While substantial trade of technology occurred during the transition era, in some cases, 
patents were acquired for defensive rather than offensive purposes. Some firms assembled strong 
patent portfolios to block competitors from commercializing a similar product, even when there 
was no intention of bringing the patented invention to market (Hart, 2001). A strong patent 
portfolio could also be used as leverage when acquiring subsequent patented inventions from 
independent inventors (Hounshell, 1996). The federal courts reinforced the legitimacy of 
defensive patent portfolios in the 1890s (Mowery, 1992). Thus, for much of the transition era, 
firms had little incentive to conduct in-house technology development as long as patent law and 
the courts supported the trade and accumulation of technology. 
In the 1880s, a subtle change in the treatment of the employment relationship by the 
federal courts began to constrain the market for technology. As Fisk (1998) documents, the 
courts began to recognize that certain employees had been expressly hired to invent. In these 
very specific instances, the courts concluded that the employer was entitled to a shop right (i.e., a 
royalty-free license) to the employee’s invention because the employee was paid for his or her 
inventive efforts. While an important shift, the market for technology did not entirely disappear 
however. The courts applied a fairly narrow interpretation of who had been hired to invent. In 
addition, the fundamental requirement that the patentee be an individual did not change. 
Employees retained ownership of their patents even if they were found to have been hired to 
invent, and could thus still sell or license them to other firms and individuals. 
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According to Fisk (1998), a more dramatic shift in the treatment of the employment 
relationship occurred around 1910. The courts broadened their interpretation of who had been 
hired to invent, while also enforcing the validity of employment contracts including provisions 
explicitly assigning ownership of any inventions developed by employees to the firm. In 
addition, the courts expanded an employee’s obligation to guard trade secrets. Whereas 
protecting trade secrets had been viewed as an express duty only for employees doing inventive 
work for most of the 19
th
 century, it became implied for all employees by the early 20
th
 century. 
The courts also embraced the use of restrictive covenants, prohibiting an employee from 
revealing confidential, proprietary information after the termination of employment (Fisk, 2001). 
Thus, these shifts in the formal institutions governing intellectual property rights collectively 
contributed to the decline in the market for technology. 
Another formal institution that played a role in the shift from the ‘inventive marketplace’ 
to ‘administered innovation’ was antitrust policy. A belief held by some during the late 19
th
 
century was that expanding, diversifying firms posed a threat to basic American social and 
economic values (Thorelli, 1955; Page, 1991). The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890 to 
contend with this concern. Seeing opportunities for profits through ‘trusts’ limited by the 
Sherman Act, a wave of horizontal mergers took place from 1895 to 1904 (Mowery, 1992).
4
 As a 
result, ‘holding companies’ and ‘consolidated enterprises’ were formed that legally substituted 
for tacit price and output control agreements (Hart, 2001). Firms also used mergers as a means to 
acquire patents and diversify into new product markets. However, this merger wave created 
price-fixing concerns that were subsequently addressed by the Northern Securities decision in 
1904. The decision signified that consolidated firms would be considered monopolies and 
                                                 
4
 Horizontal mergers are those where activities at the same stage in the value chain are consolidated (e.g., the 
purchase of a manufacturer of bicycle gears by a rival manufacturer of bicycle gears).   
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dissolved (Mowery, 1992). Consequently, antitrust enforcement brought product diversification 
via merger under heavy scrutiny, creating the need to innovate internally. 
Outside of the government, another influential formal institution was the U.S. banking 
system. In the post-Civil War era, banks functioned as the financial arms of the extended kinship 
networks that dominated the economy, accumulating sizeable capital reserves by selling stock to 
individuals in surrounding communities (Lamoreaux, 1986). Many banks mobilized this capital 
during the merger wave occurring between 1895 and 1904, pursuing their own acquisition 
objectives. For example, J.P. Morgan took over ownership and operation of AT&T in 1907 
(Reich, 1980). As a major stakeholder, the banks pressured firms to rationalize their structure in 
order to achieve higher levels of efficiency and profit. As a result, many large U.S. 
manufacturing firms vertically integrated in the early 20
th
 century in order to achieve economies 
of scale and scope (Chandler, 1962; Fligstein, 1990). 
Innovation did not escape this rationalization, as companies began to realize that 
internalizing technology development, rather than relying on the market, could provide a supply 
of products, processes, patents and expertise to protect established markets, and a launching pad 
for diversification into new markets. In addition, as technology development became more 
complex and capital intensive, it became increasingly difficult for specialist inventors not 
associated with firms to acquire needed financing (Langlois, 2003). However, the large 
enterprises of the early 20
th
 century, through their connections to the banks, were well-positioned 
to raise the capital required to fund technology development. 
2.4.1.3. Summary of the Transition Era. In summary, the transition era marked the 
beginning of the shift from the ‘inventive marketplace’ to ‘administered innovation’, as several 
corporate labs were established. The appearance of internal R&D labs was largely influenced by 
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changes in the institutional setting during this period. When firms could acquire new technology 
and patents from external sources, they did, but when the formal rules and informal norms 
challenged this practice, firms began to internalize technology development.  
It is important to note that firms did not completely abandon the market for technology as 
the formal institutions and informal norms evolved. In particular, links to universities continued 
to play a central role in a firm’s ability to stay abreast of scientific advances. For example, 
AT&T maintained close ties with Boston-area universities through research director Hammond 
V. Hayes, a doctorate in physics from Harvard (Reich, 1980). Likewise, GE cultivated ties to 
MIT through research director Willis Whitney, a former faculty member prior to joining GE 
(Reich, 1985). In addition, Alcoa fostered relationships with the Columbia College of Mines, 
Cornell University, MIT and Lehigh University in the 1890s and 1900s (Graham and Pruitt, 
1990). 
2.4.2. The Internally Focused Era: 1915 – 1980 
With the decline of the ‘inventive marketplace’ and the founding of pioneering labs by 
prominent firms during the later years of the transition era, the stage was set for the widespread 
adoption of in-house R&D. Further contributing to the shift, the U.S. government created several 
agencies charged with providing direction and funding for industrial research during the interwar 
period. The government also instituted changes in antitrust and science policy, bringing the 
formal rules into alignment with the informal norms that had started to transform during the 
previous era. In addition, the founding of the Directors of Industrial Research (DIR) in 1923 
played an important role in shaping informal beliefs about the value of scientific research to 
competitive advantage. The DIR also provided a critical forum for research managers to share 
information about their practices, spreading informal norms regarding educational standards and 
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scientific publication (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). Overall, as the institutional structure 
continued to evolve during this era, firms began to rely more on ‘administered innovation’. 
2.4.2.1. Informal Norms and Beliefs in the Internally Focused Era. Breakthroughs 
such as nylon in 1939 (Hounshell and Smith, 1988) and the transistor in the late 1940s (Nelson, 
1962) led many firms to embrace the belief that basic scientific research could bring about an 
endless supply of new products. While this belief had started to transform during the transition 
era, it did not gain widespread acceptance until after the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
created the National Research Council (NRC) in 1916 to collect information about the early 
industrial labs. The reports distributed by the NRC highlighted the achievements and shared the 
management practices of the pioneering labs in various industries (Hounshell, 1996). In addition, 
prominent scientists within the ranks of the NAS played an instrumental role in promoting ‘best 
science’ as a solution to the emergence of global competition to U.S. industry following World 
War I (Kevles, 1978). 
Further propagating the view that scientific research was a key source of competitive 
advantage was the success of the GE Research Lab, which had come to be known as the ‘House 
of Magic’ (Wise, 1985). In addition, the DIR hosted one- and two-day tours of the facilities 
established by AT&T, DuPont, GE, and Kodak to promote the value of scientific research to 
industry. The tours were designed to provide research managers with evidence they could use to 
convince their firms to expand their R&D programs (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). During the 
1920s and 1930s, the NRC also sponsored a campaign to sell in-house R&D as a ‘royal road to 
riches,’ extolling the benefits of scientific research to industry (Kevles, 1978). 
The scientific and technological developments brought about by DuPont, GE, Union 
Carbide and Westinghouse during World War II served to confirm and further spread the belief 
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that basic scientific research was a key to competitive advantage. This informal belief was also 
reinforced by accounts portraying scientists as the main protagonists of the war effort (e.g., 
Baxter, 1946), which the scientific elite saw as an opportunity to achieve permanent support for 
scientific research from both industry and government (Hounshell, 1996). The champions of this 
effort within the NAS and the DIR found a strong advocate in Vannevar Bush, an electrical 
engineer known for his pioneering contributions to computing. 
During World War II, Bush served as head of the National Defense Research Council 
(later the Office of Scientific Research and Development or OSRD). Based on his experiences at 
OSRD during the war, Bush strongly believed that peace and prosperity could be brought about 
by basic scientific research (Zachary, 1997). Bush issued a report to the president characterizing 
basic scientific research as the source of the new knowledge used by applied science to develop 
new technologies (Bush, 1945). This linear or assembly line, science-based, technology 
development model was firmly embraced by U.S. industry and came to dominate R&D 
management in the years following World War II (Ruttan, 2001). 
2.4.2.2. Formal Rules and Institutions in the Internally Focused Era.
5
 The U.S. 
government took a direct role in setting an agenda for science in industry during this era, 
influencing the formal institutions and rules governing industrial R&D. Several organizations 
were created to oversee the direction and growth of industrial R&D in the U.S. including the 
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (1915), which had a major influence on the 
development of the fledgling aviation industry (Hounshell, 1996). Similarly, several agencies 
were created after WWII to support fundamental research in industry including the Atomic 
Energy Commission (1946), the National Science Foundation (1950), the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (1958), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (1958). 
                                                 
5
 Founding dates cited in this paragraph are from Ruttan (2001). 
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Beyond creating formal institutions to provide leadership and guidance, the U.S. 
government also assumed a central role in the funding of both public and private research during 
this era. The government’s share of total national R&D expenditures grew from less than 20% 
before WWII to over 80% in the 1960s (National Science Foundation, 1989). On the public side, 
several federally funded research labs were established, including Los Alamos, Lawrence 
Livermore, and Brookhaven, to conduct research directed towards military applications (Seidel, 
1983, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1994). On the private side, federal research contracts were awarded to 
EG&G, GE, DuPont and Raytheon for the development of new materials vital to nuclear energy 
and weapons technology (Hewlett and Anderson, 1962; Hewlett and Duncan, 1972; Hewlett and 
Holl, 1989; Furman, 1990). Overall, government funding of and involvement in both public and 
private sector R&D was pervasive during this era. 
The further evolution of antitrust policy also played a role in the shift to ‘administered 
innovation’. Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the deconcentrationist view had a major 
influence on policy (Hart, 2001). According to Joe Bain’s research, high market entry barriers 
posed by large corporations might deter innovation in some industries (Bain, 1992). Thurman 
Arnold, head of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, subscribed to this view. Under Arnold, 
antitrust policy was crafted to prevent innovation from being inhibited. To ensure this outcome, 
several new tools were employed including compulsory patent licensing and consent decrees 
banning firms from commercial activities outside of their primary markets (Hart, 2001). For 
example, AT&T was barred from competing outside of telecommunications in 1956 despite 
developing many of the pioneering advances in semiconductors (Mowery, 1992). Innovation 
concerns continued to figure prominently into antitrust cases for many years after Arnold’s 
departure from the DOJ in 1943 when he was appointed to the Court of Appeals (Waller, 2005). 
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2.4.2.3. Summary of the Internally Focused Era. The formal rules and regulations and 
informal norms and beliefs were brought into alignment during this era, particularly by the 
antitrust policy agenda set by Thurman Arnold during his tenure at the DOJ. In response to the 
changes in antitrust policy, many firms expanded in-house R&D efforts as they provided a 
legally defensible way to grow and to develop proprietary new products (Mowery, 1992). For 
example, after being charged with several antitrust violations by the DOJ in 1944, DuPont 
adopted an internally-focused innovation strategy. In the wake of these charges, DuPont 
executives decided that it would be prudent to turn away from acquiring technology from the 
‘inventive marketplace’ in favor of increasing in-house R&D efforts in order to develop 
breakthrough new products (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). 
It is important to note that the disappearance of markets for technology and the 
establishment of in-house R&D labs did not occur merely due to changes in the formal rules by 
the federal government. Many firms that established labs did so to conform to the informal 
norms established by the model of technology development advocated by Vannevar Bush. The 
dominant technology strategy adopted by many firms during this era exemplifies the classic push 
approach, where research efforts are undertaken without much upfront consideration for market 
need (Dosi, 1982). As the formal institutions and informal norms of the era became entrenched, 
managers had difficulty envisioning an alternative to ‘administered innovation’. Externally 
developed technology came to be viewed as inferior and treated with suspicion (Katz and Allen, 
1982), leading innovation efforts to become increasingly internally focused. 
2.4.3. The Dual Path Era: 1980 – Present 
With the economic downturn in the 1970s creating concerns that the U.S. was losing its 
industrial pre-eminence, the institutional context was primed for a change in the early 1980s. A 
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critical catalyst for change, which challenged the informal belief that externally-developed 
technology was inferior, was the emergence of industries based on new knowledge and 
technologies that disrupted the advantages held by incumbent firms. The formal rules and 
institutions from the previous era were also called into question, leading the U.S. government to 
experiment with initiatives consciously designed to encourage innovation and the trade of 
technology. In addition, a clarification to the policy governing pension fund investments played 
an important role in the rise of venture capital and the re-emergence of the market for 
technology. As a result, many firms in this era adopted a more balanced ‘dual path’ approach to 
technology development that utilizes both ‘administered innovation’ and the ‘inventive 
marketplace’. 
2.4.3.1. Informal Norms and Beliefs in the Dual Path Era. By the end of the internally 
focused era, many research managers had adopted the belief that ‘successful innovation requires 
control’ owing to the difficulty of judging the ‘quality, availability, and capabilities’ of external 
technology suppliers (Chesbrough, 2003: xx). As a result, externally developed technology came 
to be viewed as inferior. Katz and Allen (1982: 7) called this the Not-Invented-Here (NIH) 
syndrome, reflecting the belief held by long-standing R&D teams that they possessed ‘a 
monopoly of knowledge,’ leading them to reject new ideas developed by outsiders. However, as 
new industries based on technological discontinuities and radical breakthroughs began to 
emerge, managers were forced to re-examine their beliefs about the quality of technology 
developed outside of their own labs. 
Biotechnology is a prime example of a field that emerged that called into question the 
NIH mentality. Whereas pharmaceutical firms traditionally relied on their knowledge of organic 
chemistry for drug discovery and development, biotechnology introduced new methods based on 
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biochemistry, immunology, microbiology and molecular biology. For incumbents, this shift in 
the knowledge base was potentially competence-destroying. To quickly build a presence in 
biotechnology, many firms recruited star academic researchers to head their nascent programs. 
However, the academics shunned the major corporations in several cases, instead joining start-
ups (Hounshell, 1996). Thus, in order to obtain access to top academic talent and to keep pace 
with the radical breakthroughs coming from biotechnology, many managers recognized that they 
would have to relinquish some control over their technology development efforts and form 
collaborative relationships with universities and start-ups. 
2.4.3.2. Formal Rules and Institutions in the Dual Path Era. New policies governing 
technology development also played an important role in encouraging firms to once again 
explore the market for technology. Largely prompted by the perception that the U.S. was losing 
its industrial pre-eminence to foreign competition (Florida and Kenney, 1990), the U.S. 
government implemented an unprecedented wave of policy initiatives during the 1980s (Ham 
and Mowery, 1995). It is likely that the perceived success of the policies implemented by the 
Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) following World War II served as a model for 
these initiatives, particularly those related to technology transfer and commercialization. In 
addition, the policies implemented contributed to the growth of specialized technology suppliers, 
particularly in the new industries that emerged during the 1980s (Arora, Fosfuri, and 
Gambardella, 1999). 
Despite record levels of R&D funding by the U.S. government during the 1950s and 
1960s, there were fears that technology developed with federal support was not being effectively 
transferred to and commercialized by the private sector (Ruttan, 2001). Consequently, several 
formal institutional innovations were implemented with the aim of enhancing technology transfer 
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from the public to the private sector (Lee, 1997). Legislation enacted with this goal in mind 
includes the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allowing universities to patent technologies that were 
developed using federal funds (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedons, 2001; Nelson, 2001), the 
1980 Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act allowing federal agencies to grant exclusive 
licenses for federally-owned patents, and the 1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act that created 
rules for federal-private cooperative research and technology development agreements (Ruttan, 
2001). 
In 1983, the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness was convened to 
determine if other formal initiatives could be implemented to further increase the transfer and 
commercialization of viable technologies created with federal funds (Keyworth, 1986). One 
recommendation was the establishment of interdisciplinary university-based engineering 
research centers (Suh, 1986). Consequently, the Engineering Research Center (ERC) program 
was launched in 1984 under the guidance of National Science Foundation director Erich Bloch. 
The ERC program was designed to explicitly link technology development and manufacturing in 
order to increase the chances of successful commercialization (Bozeman and Boardman, 2004). 
Antitrust policy also continued to evolve during this era. By the 1970s, concerns emerged 
that the deconcentrationist view of antitrust had constrained corporate strategy and day-to-day 
decision-making for industrial research and technology development (Peck, 1961; Markham, 
1974; Scherer, 1977). As the economic downturn continued, leading economists from the 
University of Chicago and elsewhere revisited Schumpeter’s criticisms of antitrust policy in 
search of ways to stimulate innovation (Hart, 2001). Several of Schumpeter’s ideas resonated 
with economists and policymakers alike, particularly that markets are contestable through 
product and process innovation (Schumpeter, 1950). Consequently, legislation was enacted to 
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encourage private firms to enter into pre-competitive R&D partnerships (Lee, 1997). An example 
of such legislation is the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA), which paved the 
way for the MCC and SEMATECH consortiums (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). While these 
consortiums would have been considered anti-competitive under the previous antitrust regime, 
the NCRA allowed firms to enter cooperative R&D arrangements without the fear of violating 
antitrust. 
A final change in the formal rules is one that is perhaps lesser known, but arguably just as 
important in regards to its impact on the re-emergence of the market for technology. Unlike the 
initiatives discussed above, the 1979 clarification by the US Department of Labor (DOL) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 was not consciously designed with 
the goal of fueling innovation and transferring technology in mind. Initially, ERISA’s prudent 
man rule restricted retirement fund managers from investing in high-risk assets, including 
venture capital. However, the DOL ruled in 1979 that investing a small fraction of a portfolio in 
a venture capital fund was not imprudent. As a result, venture capital funds sharply increased 
compared to previous levels. Whereas venture capital had never exceeded more than a few 
hundred million dollars annually, it rapidly grew into the billions (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). In 
many cases, the funds raised were invested into young firms to finance risky early-stage projects 
that lacked tangible assets. 
The rise of venture capital also helped to spur the growth of technology clusters such as 
Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor. The origin of the Boston-based cluster, however, can 
be traced back to the 1920s and the efforts of Vannevar Bush, who was an MIT associate 
professor before taking the OSRD post in WWII. Bush played an important role in the founding 
of the predecessor of Raytheon, one of the leading firms of the Route 128 Corridor (Roberts, 
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1991). According to Castells and Hall (1994), concerns about the declining industrial 
competitiveness of the U.S. have accelerated attempts to replicate the technology cluster model 
since the 1980s. With their proximity to major universities, firms involved in the clusters are 
often offshoots founded by faculty that retain their ties, establishing possibilities for university-
industry collaboration, particularly in technology development, that take advantage of the 
policies introduced in the 1980s. 
2.4.3.3. Summary of the Dual Path Era. The last 30 years have been marked by the re-
emergence of the market for technology, spurred on by the appearance of new industries based 
on technological discontinuities. With the rise in venture capital to unprecedented levels and 
advances in information and communications technology (ICT), specialized technology suppliers 
surfaced to take advantage of these opportunities (Langlois, 2003). In addition, new policies 
were enacted by the U.S. government to encourage the formation of technology development 
partnerships. Concurrently, the informal norms and beliefs that were prevalent during the 
internally focused era began to break down, making the acquisition of technology from an 
external source a viable option once again. 
It is important to note that firms have far from abandoned internal R&D, as corporate 
R&D expenditures in the U.S. were expected to grow to $260.3 billion in 2010 (Grueber and 
Studt, 2009). However, it does appear that firms are opting for a more balanced, ‘dual path’ 
approach to innovation as they continue their internal efforts while simultaneously engaging in 
technology development alliances and licensing agreements. It would also appear that advances 
in ICT have played a role in this phenomenon. As technology improves and communication 
costs decrease, information asymmetry is likely to be reduced, making it easier for firms to 
evaluate the skills of potential partners and to monitor their progress. 
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2.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Early in this essay it was noted that firm-level theories can help explain technology 
development mode choices made by individual firms for specific projects, but they appear to 
have less power to explain the aggregate trends observed from era to era. Thus, this essay sought 
to examine technology development through a lens that could explain the origins of trends, how 
they become stable over long periods of time, and how changes to trends arise. To accomplish 
this objective, a pan-disciplinary version of institutional theory that incorporates ideas from both 
economics and sociology was adopted. 
As discussed in the previous section, the formal rules and regulations and informal norms 
and beliefs changed twice over the period examined, leading to three distinct eras characterized 
by fairly stable practices within each. It is important to note, however, that the practices in some 
industries within an era run counter to the overall trends. For example, whereas most industries 
were still relying on the market for technology, the trade and professional associations affiliated 
with the railroads saw the value of internalizing technology development and pushed for the 
adoption of this practice in the mid- to late-19
th
 century (Usselman, 1999). Similarly, innovation 
in industries such as nuclear reactors and aircraft engines has remained internally focused in the 
current era despite the shift to a more balanced approach in other industries (Chesbrough, 2003). 
From the examination conducted in this essay, it appears that the major shifts from era to 
era depend on the specific institutional environment encountered. As Williamson (1998) notes, 
institutions act as shift parameters that can raise or lower transaction costs. Thus, as institutions 
change, the range of options available may become wider or narrower depending on how the new 
rules impact the costs of engaging in transactions. For example, the passage of the Patent Act of 
1836 appears to have led to an increase in the number of patent attorneys and patent agents who 
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matched inventors with would-be buyers (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2002). In this role, these 
intermediaries helped reduce the information asymmetry between inventors and prospective 
purchasers. As a consequence, the implementation of a new formal institution helped to lower 
the transaction costs associated with exchanging intellectual property, making the sale and 
assignment of patents viable and secure. 
In addition to acting as shift parameters, it also appears that institutions can have a more 
direct impact on shaping the choices and options available to actors. In many cases, firms simply 
imitate the practices of other firms in their industry or reference group. The literature suggests 
that firms engage in mimetic isomorphism to gain legitimacy among peers (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), to maintain relative competitive position, and to prevent a rival from gaining an 
unassailable competitive advantage (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006), regardless of the economic 
rationality of such mimicry (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1982; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). 
This seems to be the case during the early years of the internally-focused era, as firm established 
labs in order to emulate the practices of research pioneers such as AT&T, DuPont, GE and 
Kodak. It also appears that companies such as Ford, General Motors, IBM and U.S. Steel 
established in-house labs later in the internally-focused era because it had become fashionable, 
not because doing so guaranteed improved performance. 
The findings of this essay also demonstrate that new institutions often arise because they 
are supported by powerful actors. For example, the NRC and the DIR played an important role in 
extolling the value of establishing an in-house R&D lab. It is important to note that the NRC’s 
initial agenda was to build a permanent support system for scientific research in the U.S. rather 
than to shape technology development practices. However, with the creation of the Advisory 
Committee on Industrial Research, the NRC began to play a direct role in the promotion of 
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industrial R&D (Hounshell, 1996). Eventually, many of the members of the committee went on 
to found the DIR, taking on an even stronger advocacy role. With these powerful actors deeply 
invested, the institutional setting demonstrated a great deal of inertia during the internally-
focused era. 
The evidence in this essay also supports the notion that it often takes a triggering event or 
a change in leadership for actors to initiate and experiment with new practices. Despite the 
recognition that the flow of blockbuster new products from the major corporate labs had slowed, 
many firms continued to rely solely on in-house R&D during the waning years of the internally-
focused era. Coupled with the perception that the U.S. was losing industrial pre-eminence, a 
series of economic crises in the 1970s provided the shock necessary to prompt managers, 
researchers and policy makers to question whether the internally-focused approach was indeed 
working. It appears that overcoming this inertia required enacting formal legislation to spur on a 
change in the informal beliefs (i.e., the NIH mindset, successful innovation requires control) that 
had become institutionalized during the previous era. 
As this case demonstrates, entrenched institutional actors often have difficulty 
envisioning alternatives to their current beliefs (North, 1990; Beckert, 1999). In order to enact 
change, actors need to at least recognize that the institutional setting is no longer addressing 
critical problems or presenting valuable opportunities (Schön, 1971). Transforming the 
institutional setting may then require actors to force change, as formal and informal rules have a 
tendency to reinforce each other (North, 1990). Unless both sets of rules are altered with the 
same goal in mind, it is unlikely that the institutional setting will change, or that the desired 
outcomes will be achieved. In this instance, the implementation of new formal rules preceded the 
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change in the informal norms and beliefs. Thus, this is an example of the type of feedback loop 
discussed in the theory section. 
This essay raises the question of whether current technology development trends actually 
represent ‘a reversion towards the ‘norm’ for industrial R&D that existed at the turn of the 20
th
 
century’ (Howells, 1999: 19). It appears that this is not exactly the case. While the market for 
technology has re-emerged, firms are not eliminating their internal R&D labs. Rather, it seems 
that firms in the current era have adopted a more balanced approach to technology development, 
where the ‘inventive marketplace’ and ‘administered innovation’ are viewed as complements 
rather than substitutes. Along these lines, several scholars have suggested that substantial in-
house technological capabilities are necessary to rely on the market for technology (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Rosenberg, 1990). Thus, effectively acquiring and efficiently using technology 
from external sources may require that firms invest heavily in R&D. 
Finally, this essay is subject to the limitations and trade-offs typically encountered in 
historical analyses. Given that only the history of technology development in the U.S. was 
studied, the findings from this essay may not generalize to other countries. Casual observation 
suggests that a number of other countries have also witnessed trends similar to those observed in 
the U.S. over the same period we examined. However, different transaction environments are 
likely to arise depending on the combination of formal and informal constraints. Consequently, 
care must be taken when generalizing about the impact of one rule without considering the entire 
institutional setting that the rule is embedded in. Implementing one country’s innovation policies 
in another country without taking the unique structural and institutional characteristics of each 
country into account may actually be counterproductive. 
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In conclusion, this essay developed a model based on institutional theory to explain 
technology development trends in the U.S. since the mid-19
th
 century. Both informal and formal 
rules and constraints influenced these trends, suggesting that the institutional setting can help to 
explain the choices made by managers that cannot be accounted for by firm-level theories alone. 
While there is little doubt that much has been learned from cross-sectional studies that draw on 
firm-level theories, such studies can only tell part of the story when examining a trend or series 
of trends over a much longer period of time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE R&D OUTSOURCING DECISION: 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
3.1. Introduction 
There is a recent debate about whether the research and development (R&D) conducted 
by firms is yielding fewer valuable or ‘game-changing’ new products and processes than it once 
did (Howells, 2008). As a result, managers are beginning to question (1) whether current levels 
of R&D investment are justified given the apparent lack of innovative output from in-house 
research efforts and (2) if their firms possess the R&D capabilities to remain competitive in 
markets that are rapidly becoming global. Consider the following statements from managers of 
firms noted for innovation: 
 Dick Conrad, Senior Vice President for Global Operations at Hewlett-
Packard, says, ‘Our strategy is now to work with global networks to leverage 
the best technologies on the planet.’ (Engardio and Einhorn, 2005) 
 Robert W. Armstrong, Vice President for Global External Research at Eli 
Lilly, commenting on Lilly’s research programs in India, ‘It’s a 
transformation of the R&D enterprise.  We have to think in a totally different 
mode.’ (Engardio and Weintraub, 2008) 
 
These statements reflect the recognition that innovation capabilities are now widely 
distributed over a global network, and that external sources have become increasingly relevant to 
corporate innovation (Porter and Stern, 2001). In response to this reality, firms are looking 
beyond their own R&D labs and linking with other firms and organizations in order to discover 
ideas that can lead to breakthrough new products and technologies. Overall, this search for ideas 
originating outside of the firm is part of the ‘open innovation’ phenomenon that has received 
considerable attention in the innovation management literature (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003; 
Gassmann, 2006).
6
                                                 
6
 Interestingly, a number of scholars observed the gradual ‘opening up’ of innovation in the 1980s.  For earlier 
discussions of this trend, see Graham (1985), Teece (1988), Mowery (1995) and Quinn (2000).  
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In contrast to closed innovation strategies that rely primarily on internal R&D efforts, 
open innovation processes capitalize on both internal and external knowledge acquisition and 
internal and external pathways to exploit knowledge (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, and West, 
2006). It is important to note that an open innovation strategy does not equate to disintegrating 
the entire internal R&D function (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). Rather, adopting the 
principles of open innovation indicates a willingness to acquire knowledge by developing it 
internally or by accessing the R&D capabilities of external sources. Similarly, open innovation 
does not rely solely on internal commercialization channels to exploit knowledge. External 
pathways such as the out-licensing of technology developed in-house can also be utilized. 
Clearly, the availability of multiple acquisition and exploitation pathways presents managers 
with potential opportunities to increase the return from R&D investment, but also poses new 
management challenges (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010). 
The main focus of this essay is R&D outsourcing, which is one of the external knowledge 
acquisition pathways that firms can follow. This topic has received interest from both academics 
and practitioners (e.g., Prahalad, 2005; Engardio and Weintraub, 2008; Howells, 2008). Many of 
the studies that have examined project-level R&D outsourcing decisions in the academic 
literature have drawn on transaction cost economics (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Ulset, 1996). Despite the 
general support for the predictions derived from transaction cost economics, individual project-
level decisions often run counter to theory. This observation suggests that other factors may 
influence such decisions. Thus, a multi-level decision framework is developed in this essay that 
incorporates environmental factors with firm-specific considerations and project-level 
characteristics in addition to the traditional transaction hazards. The model highlights the 
importance of integrating information possessed by managers from different levels of the firm, 
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which should result in a more thoughtful analysis of the outsourcing decision and potentially a 
more successful outcome. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section provides 
background about R&D outsourcing, followed by an assessment of the importance of this 
phenomenon in the academic and practitioner literatures. The third section then briefly reviews 
the TCE literature as it pertains to the R&D outsourcing decision. This review suggests that a 
more holistic view of the factors that influence the outsourcing decision is needed, wherein 
managers from multiple levels of the organization are involved. A decision framework composed 
of environmental factors, firm-level considerations and project-level characteristics that 
indirectly and directly influence R&D outsourcing decisions in addition to the traditional 
transaction characteristics discussed elsewhere is then introduced. Finally, future research 
directions are identified and conclusions are offered. 
3.2. Background: The R&D Outsourcing Phenomenon 
Firms first began to outsource component manufacture in the 1950s and 1960s. Cost-
reduction motivations played a primary role in early component outsourcing decisions; firms 
looked to focus scarce resources on high value-added activities such as design and assembly 
while reducing labor costs and eliminating non-core activities (Welch and Nayak, 1992). In the 
1990s, IT outsourcing heralded the shift towards the corporate disaggregation of knowledge-
based activities (Mahnke, Overby, and Vang, 2005), as U.S. firms looked off-shore for highly 
educated workers in countries with lower cost and wage structures as in India (Kapur and 
Ramamurti, 2001). 
With the IT outsourcing market rapidly growing, a number of observers concluded that 
R&D was the next logical activity to outsource (e.g., Quinn, 2000; Piachaud, 2005). Recent 
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statistics support this conclusion; despite a slight downturn in 2005, R&D outsourcing has 
steadily increased by U.S. firms since the early 1990s.
1
 From 1993 to 2005, the amount spent on 
research contracted to other domestic firms increased from $3.5 billion to $11.7 billion. Over the 
same period, the overall ratio of contracted-out R&D to company-funded, company-performed 
R&D increased from 3.7% to 5.7%. This trend is even more pronounced in manufacturing 
industries, as the rate increased from 3.3% to 6.3%. Industries with particularly high funding 
ratios for contract versus in-house R&D include pharmaceuticals (13.2%), scientific R&D 
services (11.4%), navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments (7.9%) and 
motor vehicles, trailers and parts (7.2%). 
While sharing the cost-cutting rationale of component outsourcing, remaining 
competitive in the future and having the ability to continually innovate are additional motivations 
fueling the growth of R&D outsourcing (Howells, 2008). Accessing external R&D provides an 
opportunity to tap into world-class research capabilities unavailable internally. The underlying 
logic is that internal and external R&D are complements; maintaining in-house R&D builds the 
absorptive capacity required to evaluate, acquire and assimilate the output from an external 
project back into the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Laamanen and Autio, 1996; Chen, 2010). 
3.2.1. An Assessment of the Rising Significance of R&D Outsourcing  
In order to assess the importance and magnitude of the trends noted above, an in depth 
search of academic journals, the popular press, and business books was conducted. The 
methodology employed by David and Han (2004), particularly in regards to quantifying the 
number of studies published in peer-reviewed journals, was followed. The period examined was 
the decade between 2000 and 2009. Covering this period provides a reasonably comprehensive 
                                                 
1
 All statistics cited in this paragraph are from the Science and Engineering Indicators 2008 report (National Science 
Foundation, 2008). 
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picture of the peer-reviewed work covering this topic following the publication of Quinn (2000) 
who suggested that the time was ripe to outsource back at the turn of the 21
st
 century. 
The ABI Inform database was used to conduct a search of peer-reviewed journals. This 
database was mainly selected due to its multidisciplinary nature: in addition to its extensive 
coverage of innovation management journals, it covers other disciplines likely to publish work 
on R&D and technology development such as law, management, marketing, and strategy. ABI 
Inform is thus a comprehensive, appropriate and efficient database for this purpose because it 
searches multiple disciplines at once. Limiting the search to published work also serves as a filter 
for quality. 
Predetermined keywords were used in order to obtain a count of the relevant articles. To 
ensure that the search returned studies focused on the phenomenon of interest, the keywords 
were carefully selected to filter out articles lacking relevance. For example, keywords such as 
R&D, innovation, outsourcing, and sourcing, and combinations of these terms, were used as an 
initial screen. Non-relevant articles were further eliminated by scanning the abstracts of the 
papers identified in the first step. The results from this search provide a strong indication that 
R&D outsourcing is an important topic in the academic literature. The search of ABI Inform 
returned 143 articles covering this phenomenon in top academic journals spanning multiple 
disciplines including R&D Management, Research Policy, the International Journal of 
Technology Management, Technovation, Research-Technology Management, Organization 
Science, the Academy of Management Journal, and Management Science.  
A similar search of the popular business press using LexisNexis returned approximately 
3500 articles containing various combinations of the keywords. It proved overwhelming to 
screen these articles further using the same procedure employed to eliminate non-relevant peer-
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reviewed articles. However, a quick scan of the results revealed several noteworthy articles 
including ‘Outsourcing Innovation,’ which was published in BusinessWeek Online (March 21, 
2005), and a special extended section in Fortune (November 24, 2003) focusing on technology 
outsourcing and foreign direct investment. Several other relevant articles were also found in a 
variety of sources including The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. In addition, 
several announcements of R&D partnerships in high-technology industries including 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and telecommunications were observed in 
BusinessWire and FinancialWire. 
Several prominent business books that investigate the broader idea of opening up the 
innovation process were also published during this period (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003; Hargadon, 
2003; von Hippel, 2005; Chesbrough et al., 2006). These books provide excellent theoretical 
foundations along with in depth case studies of how companies use external knowledge to not 
only substitute for internal knowledge but also as a complement. Prominent themes explored in 
these books include the importance of user-driven innovation and how firms tap into user 
communities, the reappearance of markets for and the trade of technology, and the role that 
knowledge brokers play in bringing innovators and buyers together. 
In sum, a search of the literature was conducted to assess the importance and magnitude 
of R&D outsourcing. A systematic process similar to David and Han (2004) was employed that 
relied on keyword searches and manual screening of article abstracts to uncover a relatively large 
body of academic research that investigates this phenomenon. In addition, several noteworthy 
articles and business books published between 2000 and 2009 were identified that examine the 
R&D outsourcing phenomenon and the more general ‘open innovation’ trend. As noted, this 
assessment of the literature demonstrates the importance of these topics in both academic and 
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practitioner circles and establishes the need for a careful examination of the R&D outsourcing 
decision. 
3.3. A Brief Review of the R&D Outsourcing Decision through the Lens of Transaction 
Cost Economics 
 
Management scholars have typically drawn on transaction cost economics (TCE) in order 
to shed light on the project-level R&D outsourcing decision. In general, the focus of TCE is on 
the individual transaction as the unit of analysis and how the attributes of such a transaction 
influence the choice between alternative governance forms. According to TCE, this choice rests 
on the level of contractual hazards in a transaction (Williamson, 1975). The extent of such 
hazards is shaped by factors including the degree of asset specificity, the availability of suppliers, 
and the degree of uncertainty. 
Asset specificity refers to the transferability of assets to alternative uses (Williamson, 
1985). When assets are specific to a transaction, they have little or no value outside of that 
transactional context. In such a situation, suppliers may act opportunistically and try to extract 
excessive rents from customers (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). This hazard is further 
exacerbated when the number of suppliers is limited. In this so-called small-numbers bargaining 
situation (Williamson, 1975), it is difficult and costly to switch between suppliers when 
transaction-specific assets are required, leaving the customer open to opportunistic contract 
renegotiation by the current supplier if there are few credible alternate suppliers to choose from. 
Uncertainty may also lead to opportunistic behavior, as the inability to predict future demand and 
changes in technology makes it difficult to write a complete contract to govern the transaction 
(Williamson, 1975). Overall, TCE suggests that if these hazards are extreme, firms are likely to 
internalize the transaction and perform the activity in-house. 
51 
 
 
 
9
0
 
5
1
 
Empirical research has generally provided support for the tenets of TCE in the context of 
project-level R&D outsourcing. In an early study, Pisano (1990) found that firms tend to 
outsource R&D projects when ample suppliers are available, and when intellectual property 
rights are relatively easy to assign and enforce. In a later study, Ulset (1996) found support for 
the contention that firms are more likely to outsource R&D projects when the sunk costs related 
to transaction-specific assets are limited. Finally, Robertson and Gatignon (1998) found that the 
likelihood of outsourcing an R&D project increases when transaction-specific assets are not 
required, demand is relatively predictable, and supplier performance is reasonably verifiable.  
While providing important insight regarding the choice between alternative governance 
forms, TCE relies on a restrictive set of assumptions that ignores the influence other factors 
potentially have on the outsourcing decision. ‘The resulting implication is that, in equilibrium, all 
firms facing a given set of transactional attributes will reach similar conclusions regarding which 
activities to execute internally and which activities to outsource’ (Leiblein and Miller, 2003: 
841). However, a simple comparison of firms competing in the same industry demonstrates that 
this is not always the case. For example, whereas Lucent Technologies largely relied on internal 
R&D in the late-1990s, Cisco Systems acquired technology from external sources (Chesbrough, 
2003). Thus, it would appear that the predictive power of TCE is limited on its own. 
What other factors may account for the deviations from the predictions of TCE? 
Hagedoorn (2006) suggests that technology sourcing decisions are likely to be impacted by 
country- and industry-specific characteristics. Scholars have also suggested that the firm’s 
technology orientation plays a role in such decisions (e.g., Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009). Lastly, 
the firm’s own capabilities (or lack thereof) and specific characteristics of the project itself may 
have an influence. Thus, a more holistic view of the R&D outsourcing decision is needed. A 
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decision framework based on prior literature is developed in the following section that accounts 
for these various explanations in addition to the traditional hazards from TCE. 
3.4. An R&D Outsourcing Decision Framework 
The more comprehensive project-level R&D outsourcing decision framework that is 
developed in this paper is shown in Figure 3-1. In the sub-sections that follow, each level of this 
framework is discussed and tied to the pertinent literature, starting with the key environmental 
factors (i.e., country- and industry-specific characteristics) that have played a role in opening up 
the innovation process and that indirectly impact the decision to outsource R&D. Firm-specific 
strategic considerations that influence such decisions are then discussed followed by an 
examination of project- and transaction-level characteristics. Akin to the distinction made by 
Howells et al. (2008), firm-specific strategic considerations play a role in initiating the decision 
to outsource, while project- and transaction-level characteristics have a more direct impact on the 
outsourcing decision itself. 
3.4.1. Environmental Factors 
Figure 3-1 presents seven prominent environmental factors that indirectly influence the 
project-level R&D outsourcing decision. These key factors were identified through a review of 
the literature.
2
 Included among these factors are country- and industry-specific characteristics 
that have played a role in the erosion of the ‘closed innovation’ paradigm, creating a new 
landscape for firms that desire to remain competitive through innovation. The discussion that 
follows expands upon the previous research by exploring the link between factors that have been 
examined elsewhere (e.g., the rise of venture capital, the mobility of knowledge workers). 
Factors that have received less attention previously in the context of the R&D outsourcing 
                                                 
2
 Previous work that helped to shape our list of environmental factors includes Prahalad (1998), Chesbrough (2003), 
and Gassmann (2006). 
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Figure 3-1. A project-level R&D sourcing decision framework
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decision and the open innovation phenomenon (e.g., the growth of knowledge bases, the impact 
of government policies) are also discussed. 
The environmental factors have been placed outside of the pyramid in Figure 3-1 in 
recognition that these trends are primarily external to and outside of the control of individual 
firms. Consequently, it is suggested that these factors can be viewed as shift parameters in the 
sense that while they do not directly determine the outsourcing decision, they can shift the costs 
of outsourcing within the context of a particular country or industry. Phrased differently, the 
barriers to outsourcing are typically lower in contexts where these factors have taken hold, while 
the barriers remain high in contexts where they have not. For example, nuclear reactors, military 
applications and aircraft engines are industries that have remained primarily closed due to 
governmental regulation, while biotechnology and health care are in transition as university 
research and venture capital push to open the innovation process (Chesbrough, 2003). Overall, 
the more that the trends in a particular context conform to the environmental factors, the more 
appropriate the open innovation model appears to be (Gassmann, 2006), making it more likely 
that R&D outsourcing is occurring. 
3.4.1.1. The Increasing Supply and Mobility of Knowledge Workers. The first 
environmental factor influencing the opening up of the innovation process is the increasing 
number and mobility of knowledge workers. In the 1980s, the perceived competitiveness gap 
with Japan, and the declining number of U.S.-born science and engineering (S&E) graduates was 
a cause for concern for both business and the U.S. government. Efforts were taken by the 
government to rectify this perceived crisis, including the establishment of academic research 
centers focused on near-term technology transfer and the education of new scientists and 
engineers (Bozeman and Boardman, 2004). As a result, there has been a steady increase in total 
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S&E bachelor’s degrees awarded by U.S. and Asian universities, and in S&E doctorates awarded 
by U.S. institutions, since the 1970s (National Science Foundation, 2006). 
The make-up of the recent S&E graduates is diverse; the percentage of recent foreign-
born doctoral candidates attending U.S. institutions is higher than that of any previous era 
(National Science Foundation, 2006). Consequently, the overall pool of S&E graduates has 
increased in the U.S. In the past, the corporate lab would have been viewed as the employment 
option of choice for many of these graduates. However, the mobility of foreign-born S&E 
graduates has dramatically increased in the last decade, as some are being attracted home by 
incentives and career opportunities that did not previously exist (Kim, 1999; National Science 
Foundation, 2006). In addition, new employment opportunities with universities, startups and 
other small firms abound for S&E graduates, regardless of their country of origin. These 
opportunities are frequently tied to the second environmental factor, the venture capital market. 
3.4.1.2. The Venture Capital Market. While not entirely unique in regards to this 
environmental driver, access to and the availability of venture capital (VC) is certainly more 
widespread in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. Prior to 1980, the formal VC market was 
small even in the U.S. However, after the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
was revised by the Department of Labor in 1979, VC rates sharply increased. Whereas VC had 
never exceeded more than few hundred million dollars annually, investments steadily climbed 
into the tens of billions by the late-1990s (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). After the technology 
bubble burst in the early 2000s, the VC market dramatically declined. However, the amount of 
VC invested rebounded to $29.4 billion in 2007, the highest total since 2001 (Marketwire, 2008). 
Until VC became readily available, promising ideas and technologies frequently 
languished within large corporate R&D labs if they did not fit with current customers, supply 
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channels or business practices. As a result, a considerable amount of useful technology that could 
potentially be commercialized lay dormant on laboratory shelves. However, as access to VC 
increased, ideas that were formerly trapped within large corporate labs could be liberated. 
Projects that showed promise, but were shelved due to their lack of fit, could be spun out into an 
organization with the proper structure to handle new technologies and new markets. 
Alternatively, technologies could be exploited by out-licensing them to new, VC-backed firms. 
3.4.1.3. The Increasing Supply and Capabilities of Contractors. A third 
environmental factor shaping the opening up of the innovation process is the increasing supply of 
contractors possessing high-quality R&D capabilities. Examples include startups and spin-offs, 
university and government labs, and contract research organizations (CROs). Elaborating on this 
last source, high-quality CROs have been established worldwide. In the U.S., three prominent 
CROs are ADL, Battelle, and Carnegie. One of the most notable CROs is WIPRO in India, 
which provides services in product design, information technology, and technology consulting. 
As a consequence of the improved level of research quality provided by these various external 
sources, firms are more willing to search externally for needed technological solutions than they 
were in the past. 
3.4.1.4. The Growth of Knowledge Bases. In conjunction with the increased supply of 
highly mobile scientists and technologists, is the rapid growth of knowledge bases, and access to 
them. A knowledge base refers to both tangible databases and the more amorphous depositories 
of knowledge like regional and national innovation clusters that specialize in a specific field of 
science or technology. Both types of knowledge bases are fueled by the discoveries of 
universities, startups, and other small research and design firms as well as by multinational firms. 
Tangible databases like those maintained by the U.S. and European Patent and Trademark 
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Offices can be searched manually, or automatic searches can be performed and results delivered 
by firms offering patent-mining services like Nerac. Regional and national innovation clusters 
have also become rich sources of new knowledge in industries such as biotechnology, 
information technology and pharmaceuticals (Gambardella, 1995; Kenney, 2000; Cooke, 2001). 
Due to the abundance of information contained within these various knowledge bases, 
many firms realize that they cannot possibly possess all of the knowledge in any one field of 
science or technology. A stunning example of this realization is seen in Merck’s 2000 annual 
report, which notes that: 
‘Merck accounts for about 1 percent of the biomedical research in the world. To 
tap into the remaining 99 percent, we must actively reach out to universities, 
research institutions and companies worldwide to bring the best technologies and 
potential products into Merck. The cascade of knowledge flowing from 
biotechnology and the unraveling of the human genome – to name only two 
recent developments – is far too complex for any one company to handle alone’ 
(Chesbrough, 2003: 53). 
 
While this vast supply of knowledge exists, accessing and making sense of what is 
available is another issue. Information and communication technology (ICT) and innovation 
technology (IvT), which are discussed next, have played an important role in creating access to 
these knowledge bases. 
3.4.1.5. ICT and IvT. The proliferation of ICT has also influenced the opening up of the 
innovation process by providing access to knowledge and enabling greater coordination and 
collaboration between firms. As a consequence of employing ICT, access to information half a 
globe away is less of a barrier to technological and scientific progress. Co-location pressures for 
project team members are also reduced due to the ability to share information in real-time via 
ICT. Solutions can be as simple as arranging for employees in remote locations to communicate 
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via voice and/or video calls over the Internet, or as intricate as establishing proprietary networks 
only accessible by team members. 
In addition, Dodgson, Gann, and Salter (2006) suggest that new IvT has also played a 
role in the shift towards open innovation. IvT includes a wide range of tools such as simulations, 
modeling, virtual reality, data mining, and rapid prototyping that can be used to assist in the 
generation of new ideas. When brought together, ICT and IvT can play a critical role in 
promoting the flow of knowledge among parties to collaborate at all stages of the innovation 
process. 
3.4.1.6. Complexity and Interaction of Disparate Technology. Another major factor 
influencing the drive to open up the innovation process is the increasing complexity of new 
products and processes. Kodama (1992) noted this trend in the late 1980s-early 1990s while 
studying high-technology firms in Japan. He observed that many innovations were actually the 
result of combining previously separate fields of technology in new and unique ways. This 
process, which he called ‘technology fusion,’ involves the integration of knowledge from diverse 
scientific and technical disciplines. 
Take for example fuel cell R&D in the automobile industry. This research entails 
combining knowledge from fields such as materials science, chemical engineering, and physics 
to develop a solution. Integrating these disparate scientific and technical fields is likely to result 
in projects fraught with complexity. Thus, industries characterized by a high degree of 
technology fusion and rapid technological change are more likely to exhibit the extensive use of 
external sources to support product development (Howells, 1999; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). 
3.4.1.7. Government Policies, Incentives and Regulations. A final group of factors 
contributing to the opening up of the innovation process are government policies, incentives and 
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regulations. Policies and incentives may include tax credits for R&D-related expenses, increased 
access and lower interest rates on capital to encourage entrepreneurial activities, and reductions 
of domestic and international trade barriers to encourage international technology transfer. While 
many incentives encourage a firm to collaborate with partners in their country of origin, some 
regulations may encourage firms to search outside of that country for a research base (Boutellier, 
Gassmann, and von Zedwitz, 1999). For example, with stricter regulation of stem cell research, 
U.S. biotechnology firms have looked to countries like Singapore that have less stringent 
regulations in order to conduct exploratory studies (The Economist, 2002). In addition, 
government-funded technology clusters like India’s Genome Valley near Hyderabad and Dubai’s 
DuBiotech Research Park are likely to attract foreign interest, especially if federal funding for 
stem cell research remains restricted in the U.S. 
A fundamental shift in government R&D funding in the U.S. is also part of this overall 
trend. University labs are now conducting much of the basic research that was formerly 
performed by corporate laboratories (Chesbrough, 2003). Pressures to deliver advanced product 
solutions with shorter cycle times and short-term earnings expectations are driving this trend in 
corporate R&D. Consequently, near-term product development programs are emphasized over 
long-term fundamental scientific research in company labs. As a result, much of the government 
funding that used to be awarded to private firms to conduct basic research has been shifted to 
universities and CROs. 
3.4.2. Firm-Specific Strategic Considerations 
While the environmental factors set the context within which a project-level R&D 
outsourcing decision is made, firm-specific strategic considerations play a role in initiating the 
decision to outsource. The considerations outlined in this section are those emphasized in the 
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technology strategy and organizational capabilities literature. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, 
technology strategy is typically the domain of senior management, while the capabilities 
considerations on the second level are typically the concern of middle and functional (i.e., R&D) 
managers. 
3.4.2.1. Technology Strategy. A firm’s technology strategy defines how the use and 
development of technology supports the firm’s overall goals and corporate strategy (Brockhoff 
and Pearson, 1992; Ernst, 1998). A firm’s technology strategy also often determines whether it 
aggressively pioneers new technology or takes a more conservative, ‘wait-and-see’ approach; 
technologically aggressive firms tend to adopt the former approach in an attempt to develop 
capabilities and technology superior to that of their competitors (Miles and Snow, 1978). Thus, 
the degree of a firm’s technology aggressiveness influences decisions regarding which 
capabilities and technologies to invest in and develop (Chiesa and Manzini, 1998). 
A firm’s technology strategy may be a key determinant of its decision to open up the 
innovation process (Davis and Harrison, 2001; Lin, Chen, and Wu, 2006), and in turn consider 
outsourcing R&D a viable option. Previous research indicates that firms that have aggressive 
technology strategies usually acquire less external technology (Brockhoff and Pearson, 1992). 
Technologically aggressive firms are more likely to focus on internally developing, rather than 
externally acquiring, new technology (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009). Technologically 
aggressive firms typically invest intensively in developing their in-house R&D capabilities, 
leading to the creation of proprietary technologies in order to achieve a technological advantage 
relative to the competition. As a result, such firms are often reluctant to rely on externally 
developed technology, potentially even exhibiting the ‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome (Katz and 
Allen, 1982). Thus: 
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Proposition 1: The degree of technological aggressiveness is negatively related to 
the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option.
9
 
 
3.4.2.2. Organizational and Relational Capabilities. The current organizational 
capabilities that a firm possesses are often a reflection of decisions made in the past regarding 
which capabilities and technologies to develop. Firms that have heavily invested in a particular 
area of science or technology are likely to have accumulated the capabilities necessary to exploit 
knowledge in that field (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Roberts and Berry, 1985; Bohn, 1994), and 
internally develop new technology. As a result, firms that have developed strong internal R&D 
capabilities are likely to leverage such capabilities. Conversely, a firm’s capabilities may be 
significantly behind those of its competitors, or it may lack the capabilities required to conduct 
an R&D project in a particular area of science or technology. According to the notion of time 
compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), such a firm may be unable to develop the 
necessary capabilities internally in a timely, cost-effective manner. As a result, management 
within a firm that either possesses inferior capabilities or that lacks the capabilities required to 
conduct a specific R&D project may be more willing to consider outsourcing a viable option. 
Accordingly: 
Proposition 2: The strength of a firm’s technological capabilities is negatively 
related to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option. 
 
In addition to organizational capabilities related to exploiting scientific and technological 
knowledge are ‘relational capabilities’ that help a firm to manage inter-firm relationships (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). The accumulation of such capabilities reflects past experience with inter-firm 
relationships. A firm that frequently outsources R&D is likely to develop skills related to 
selecting attractive partners, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and managing inter-firm 
                                                 
9
 This proposition is tempered by research that suggests that acquiring technology from external sources is now 
considered a requirement rather than an option by many firms (Jones, Lanctot, and Teegen, 2001; Edler, Meyer-
Krahmer, and Reger, 2002). 
62 
 
 
 
9
0
 
6
2
 
relationships. As a result, managers in firms that have developed strong relational capabilities are 
more likely to consider outsourcing a valid option. However, if a firm has not had much 
experience with R&D outsourcing, or if it had a negative initial outsourcing experience, it may 
lack relational capabilities. In this case, managers may be more reluctant to outsource R&D. 
Previous research also indicates that firms that had a negative initial experience avoid 
outsourcing subsequent R&D projects unless absolutely necessary (Brockhoff, 1992; Robertson 
and Gatignon, 1998). Thus: 
Proposition 3: The strength of a firm’s relational capabilities is positively related 
to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option. 
 
3.4.3. Transaction- and Project-Level Characteristics 
Transaction- and project-level characteristics are the primary determinants of the R&D 
outsourcing decision in the model. These factors are the most operational in nature, and thus 
project managers are more likely to be familiar with these characteristics than functional 
managers. It is important to note that even though these characteristics are presented as direct 
determinants of the outsourcing decision, they are often intertwined with and tempered by the 
contextual and initiating factors discussed above. As a result, there are potential interactions 
between the levels that may help to explain why individual R&D outsourcing decisions may not 
be in line with the predictions drawn from TCE alone. The following two propositions are 
offered ceteris paribus, and then the potential for interactions that may enhance or diminish the 
proposed effects is explored in Section 4.4. 
In regards to the characteristics that are most frequently explored by TCE scholars (i.e., 
asset specificity and small-numbers bargaining), Table 2-1 briefly summarizes the findings from 
the studies discussed in Section 3.4. The empirical evidence presented in the table shows general 
support for the TCE contention that transactions fraught with hazards are more likely to be 
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conducted in-house versus outsourced. The remainder of this subsection is therefore dedicated to 
discussing the influence of project-level characteristics, primarily drawn from the technology 
management literature, on the R&D outsourcing decision. These characteristics have received 
comparatively less attention relative to transaction hazards. 
3.4.3.1. Degree of Modularity. The degree of modularity essentially defines how easy or 
difficult it is for the firm to decompose or separate out a particular research activity in order to 
permit another firm to perform that task (Mikkola, 2003). When the task or the technology to be 
developed is highly modular, very distinct boundaries can be drawn and the task can be well-
defined. In this case, the task or the component of the technology can easily be separated. As a 
result, the task can easily be communicated across firm boundaries, allowing one firm to 
outsource it to the firm best equipped to complete it. 
Conversely, where the task or technology is systemic and involves closely interrelated 
and complex linkages, the boundaries are likely to be indistinct, making it difficult to separate 
out from the overall project. In addition, there are likely to be coordination and communication 
challenges associated with bridging these boundaries when the tasks are interrelated. As a result, 
such a project is less likely to be outsourced due to the inherent costs of overcoming these 
challenges. Thus: 
Proposition 4: The degree of modularity is positively related to the likelihood of 
outsourcing an R&D project. 
 
3.4.3.2. Stage of the R&D Process. R&D encompasses a variety of activities including 
basic research, applied research, and development. Each of these activities has a distinct time 
horizon and can be characterized by its degree of technology and market uncertainty. Figure 3-2 
illustrates how each activity corresponds to these characteristics.
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Figure 3-2. Stages of R&D
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Basic research typically refers to activities leading to fundamental, scientific discoveries, 
and it is likely to have a long-term operational time horizon. Applied research is conducted to 
determine if scientific discoveries can be exploited to solve a particular problem. The operational 
time horizon is typically shorter for applied versus basic research. Development is often 
associated with bringing together applied research to create a specific product or solution that 
can be commercialized to satisfy the requirements of customers. Normally, development has the 
shortest operational time horizon, as development activities are often associated with the 
realization of short-term commercial goals. 
In addition, technology and market uncertainty normally decrease along the continuum 
from basic research to development since more questions about technical feasibility and market 
acceptance are answered at each subsequent stage. Predicting whether a technology will actually 
work, and gauging market responsiveness to and subsequent demand for product ideas in a very 
early stage of R&D, is often difficult due to a lack of credible market research, specifically 
where customers and needs are unknown and product specifications are ambiguous. In this 
situation, the costs associated with trying to cope with uncertainty across firm boundaries are 
likely to be high, decreasing the likelihood of outsourcing. 
Conversely, predicting the market potential of a new technology is less subject to error 
when customers and their current needs are known and technology is proven to be feasible. Inthe 
development stage, many of the customer requirements for a new product become fixed. Thus, it 
is less costly to communicate these requirements across firm boundaries. In addition, 
development activities are easier to monitor due to the lower level of uncertainty, making them 
less subject to the risk of the contractor acting opportunistically. This line of reasoning suggests 
that development stage projects are more likely to be outsourced. Overall: 
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Proposition 5: The stage of the R&D process is positively related to the likelihood 
of outsourcing R&D. 
 
3.4.4. Potential Interaction Effects 
Table 3-1 summarizes the propositions and key relationships discussed above. The 
individual effects of environmental factors, firm-level considerations, and transaction- and 
project-level characteristics on the R&D outsourcing decision have already received considerable 
attention in the literature. However, potential cross-level interactions also need to be examined. 
An analysis of this more complex system of interactions provides a better understanding of such 
decisions by going beyond a straightforward summation of individual effects. 
The potential for interactions among the different factors examined above underscores 
the importance of considering the context within which individual outsourcing decisions are 
made. Such decisions can be reduced to a straightforward economic interaction, where the 
outcome is based solely on transaction- and project-level characteristics. However, to gain a 
more complete understanding of the decision, it is important to recognize that the firm’s 
technology strategy is likely to have an impact on management’s attitude toward external 
technology, which in turn influences whether outsourcing is considered a viable alternative to in-
house R&D. In firms that have adopted an aggressive technology strategy, outsourcing may 
never be considered even if the transaction- and project-level factors suggest that it is the 
appropriate choice. 
Similarly, the firm’s possession or lack of capabilities is likely to frame the outsourcing 
decision. For example, it was suggested above that when the project involves basic research, a 
firm is more likely to conduct in-house R&D owing to the coordination and communication 
challenges associated with highly uncertain tasks. However, if the firm lacks the technological  
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Table 3-1.     Summary of key relationships and propositions 
Factors influencing the outsourcing decision at each level Key relationships and propositions 
Environmental factors 
 Increasing supply and mobility of knowledge workers 
 The Venture Capital market 
 The increasing capability of external suppliers 
 Growth of knowledge bases 
 Globalization, telecommunications and the Internet 
 Complexity and interaction of disparate technology 
 Government policies, incentives and regulations 
 
 The barriers to and costs of outsourcing are likely to be lower in 
industries and countries that exhibit many of the environmental factors 
compared to contexts where the factors have not yet taken hold.  
Technology strategy 
 Technological aggressiveness 
 
 P1: The degree of technological aggressiveness is negatively related to 
the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option. 
Firm-specific capabilities 
 Technological capabilities 
 
 
 Relational capabilities 
 
 P2: The strength of a firm’s technological capabilities is negatively 
related to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable 
option. 
 P3: The strength of a firm’s relational capabilities is positively related 
to the likelihood of considering outsourcing R&D a viable option. 
Transaction-level characteristics 
 Asset-specificity 
 Small-numbers bargaining 
According to TCE: 
 Firms are more likely to outsource R&D when asset specificity is 
low. 
 Firms are more likely to outsource R&D when there are many 
capable suppliers 
Project-level characteristics 
 Degree of modularity 
 
 Stage of the R&D process 
 
 P4: The degree of modularity is positively related to the likelihood of 
outsourcing an R&D project. 
 P5: The stage of the R&D process is positively related to the likelihood 
of outsourcing R&D. 
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capabilities to conduct the project, it may have to take a more careful look at whether internal 
R&D is truly the best option. In particular, management needs to examine the trade-off between 
the costs incurred to develop the required capabilities to conduct the project in-house versus the 
costs of communication, coordination and monitoring. If the former costs outweigh the latter, 
following Proposition 5 is likely to lead to a less satisfactory outcome if the firm’s technological 
capabilities are not also taken into consideration. 
It is also important to recognize that the environmental factors, at both the country- and 
industry-level, are likely to have an impact on the propensity of firms to outsource R&D. For 
example, in an industry such as pharmaceutical biotechnology, the general trend among the 
environmental factors points to the industry being receptive to open innovation. As a result, 
many firms in this industry engage in interactions with other firms. Thus, the propensity of an 
individual firm to outsource R&D is likely to be influenced by the practices of other firms within 
the industry. In addition, as more firms engage in outsourcing and other forms of R&D 
partnerships, the network of competent potential partners is likely to increase. As a result, the 
small-numbers bargaining situation is likely to be mitigated to some extent, reducing the 
transaction costs associated with outsourcing. The same logic applies at the country-level; in 
countries where the factors align with open innovation, more firms are likely to be engaging in 
outsourcing, making it a more attractive option for individual firms. Thus, the environmental 
factors are likely to have an influence on a firm’s individual technology strategy and attitude 
toward externally developed technology, which in turn impacts the propensity to outsource. 
The foregoing discussion highlights the importance of managers from different levels of 
the firm being involved in R&D outsourcing decisions. Each level of managers is likely to 
possess specific information that is needed to develop a more complete picture of the factors at 
69 
 
 
 
9
0
 
6
9
 
play, as suggested by Figure 3-1. In the absence of some of the information, decisions could be 
potentially arrived at that are consistent with theory at the transaction-level, but not truly feasible 
given the overall context. As a result, the performance and outcome of the project may suffer. 
3.5. Conclusion 
Managing the R&D function in a world where the innovation process is open presents 
new challenges to overcome and opportunities to exploit. Many firms have begun to take 
advantage of these opportunities and acquire new knowledge and technology from a wealth of 
external sources. This essay has focused on one of these external acquisition pathways, namely 
R&D outsourcing. 
The purpose of this essay was to develop a framework for understanding the influence of 
various strategic considerations and environmental factors on the project-level R&D outsourcing 
decision. It was argued that while the environmental factors that are emerging in many sectors 
only indirectly influence this decision, they can act as shift parameters and increase or decrease 
the costs of outsourcing. It was also posited that it is important to consider firm-specific strategic 
considerations in addition to the transaction- and project-level characteristics that are typically 
the focus of an R&D outsourcing decision. The potential for interactions among the different 
levels of factors examined was discussed at the end of the previous section. This discussion 
highlights the importance of involving different levels of management in the decision. Whereas 
R&D and project managers are likely to focus on project-level considerations, senior managers 
are more familiar with firm-level considerations. An important implication of this argument is 
that a thoughtful analysis of the factors, which involves managers from all levels, can lead to 
better informed R&D outsourcing decisions and more successful outcomes. 
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While this essay examines the decision to outsource R&D from the perspective of the 
‘buying’ firm, firms ‘supplying’ R&D services are likely to face their own strategic and 
operational issues, influencing their decision to take on a project. An examination of the 
contracting and organizational issues faced by suppliers should help buyers to understand the 
conditions that influence the supplier’s decision to accept contract R&D work from a buyer 
(Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Providing a complete picture of both sides of the sourcing 
relationship should benefit both parties to the transaction, increasing the likelihood that a project 
will result in a successful innovation outcome. 
Future research should also seek to develop a better picture of the overall R&D 
outsourcing process. As noted, only the actual decision itself is examined in this essay. However, 
as suggested by Mahnke et al. (2005), R&D outsourcing research can benefit from adopting a 
process conceptualization. It is important to acknowledge that the R&D decision is only one 
stage of this process and that the roles and responsibilities played by managers at different levels 
are likely to change as the process progresses. Consequently, a study that investigates the on-
going roles of the managers involved in the initial decision in the management of the project 
after the contract has been signed could benefit academics and practitioners alike. 
The overall purpose of this essay was to develop a framework to help researchers and 
managers understand the direct and indirect influence of both strategic and environmental factors 
on project-level R&D outsourcing decisions. The model developed in Figure 3-1 illustrates the 
relationships between environmental factors, technology strategy, firm specific capabilities and 
finally transaction- and project-level characteristics, and the potential for interactions across the 
multiple levels. The model also identifies which managers are likely to possess the information 
relevant at each level of Figure 3-1. Finally, several areas for future research were suggested. As 
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R&D outsourcing continues to grow in importance, many research opportunities exist to further 
understand this important area of technology management. In addition, as the global economy 
continues to expand and the fact that science and technological information are not limited by 
boundaries, the R&D outsourcing decision represents a major strategic issue for firms.
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CHAPTER 4 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE DESIGN OF R&D ALLIANCE 
CONTRACTS IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, alliances have been examined extensively in the strategic 
management literature (see Inkpen, 2001; Rivera-Santos and Inkpen, 2009; Wassmer, 2010 for 
reviews on this and related topics). Alliance researchers have investigated the phenomenon 
through a variety of theoretical lenses such as the networks perspective (e.g., Powell, 1990; 
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996), inter-organizational learning (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Inkpen 
and Tsang, 2007), and transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson, 1985, 1991). Important 
issues explored through these lenses include why firms form alliances, how alliances are 
structured and what impact alliances have on performance. Research and development (R&D) 
alliances
10
 have especially been examined in great detail (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). 
This is not surprising considering that roughly half of the alliances reported in the SDC database, 
one of the most prominent sources of alliance data, involve R&D (Schilling, 2009).
11
 
The increase in the number of R&D alliances over the last 50 years is an interesting 
phenomenon in its own right. As discussed in the first essay, by the mid-20
th
 century, in-house 
R&D came to be viewed as an important source of scientific and technological knowledge 
(Mowery, 1983), and a potential driver of competitive advantage (Reich, 1985). Thus, for much 
of the 20
th
 century, firms tended to favor internal R&D over collaborative R&D in order to 
protect valuable knowledge and skills. However, later in the 20
th
 century, many firms began to 
                                                 
10
 In this essay, an R&D alliance refers to a contractual partnership formed by two or more partners, in order to pool 
their complementary resources and capabilities in order to conduct collaborative R&D (and potentially other value 
chain activities further downstream). However, unlike an equity joint venture, an R&D alliance does not entail the 
formation of a separate legal entity. 
11
 Representative examples of studies that have relied on the SDC database for information about R&D alliances 
include Oxley and Sampson (2004), Sampson (2005), and Li, Eden, Hitt, and Ireland (2008). 
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search beyond their own boundaries in order to uncover new ideas and access resources required 
for successful innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). The complex and multidisciplinary nature of 
scientific research and the increased relevance of science for corporate innovation also factored 
prominently in this trend (National Science Board, 2008). 
Alliances between firms are now a ubiquitous phenomenon (Gulati, 1998). The growth in 
the number of R&D alliances since the 1960s has been particularly explosive. Based on 
information from the MERIT-CATI database, the annual number of R&D alliances formed in the 
1960s hovered between just a handful and ten.
12
 By the end of the 1960s and into the early 
1970s, this number had grown to about thirty per year, followed by a sharper increase to roughly 
160 new alliances annually in the late 1970s. The phenomenon intensified during the 1980s, 
peaking at over 500 new R&D alliances formed in 1989. After a slight downturn in the early 
1990s, the number of new R&D alliances rebounded to nearly 700 in 1995. R&D alliance 
activity subsequently declined in the late 1990s and early 2000s to mid-1980s levels, but began 
to climb again in the mid-2000s. 
R&D alliances enable firms to access new or critical resources and capabilities, share 
risks, access complementary assets, and learn about recent advances in science and technology 
(Teece, 1986; Tripsas, Schrader, and Sobrero, 1995; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996, 
1998; Stuart, 2000; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). However, forming an alliance poses the risk 
that a motivated and capable firm may misappropriate its partner’s valuable knowledge (Hamel, 
1991). This is an especially daunting prospect when smaller, entrepreneurial firms form alliances 
with larger, established firms. While the larger firm typically possesses the ability to learn about 
the smaller firm’s technology, it is often takes a substantial amount of time for the smaller firm 
to learn about the larger firm’s organizational resources (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). 
                                                 
12
 The information reported in this paragraph is drawn from Hagedoorn (2002) and Schilling (2009). 
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Despite the threat of misappropriation, R&D alliances frequently require the transfer of 
scientific and technical information between the partners. While the asymmetry in the ability to 
learn between small and large firms complicates the transfer of such information, transfer is also 
hindered when the knowledge to be exchanged is tacit and organizationally embedded (Teece, 
1977; Kogut, 1988). Managers are thus advised to carefully select a governance mode (i.e., 
organizational form) that adequately responds to the degree that misappropriation hazards and 
transfer challenges are present in a given transaction (Sampson, 2004b). 
While a wealth of research has examined the governance mode decision, the formal 
contracts that establish the terms and structure of alliances have only recently gained much 
interest in the strategic management literature (Weber, Mayer, and Wu, 2009). Formal contracts 
have also received considerably less attention than the relational aspects of alliance governance, 
even though they provide an important blue print for conducting an exchange (Macaulay, 1963). 
Many of the studies in this stream examine whether relational mechanisms, such as trust, and 
formal governance are substitutes or complements (e.g., Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; 
Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger, 2004; Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom, 2005; Gulati 
and Nickerson, 2008). Nevertheless, firms do devise formal contracts in a wide range of high-
technology industries, including biotechnology (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011), information 
technology (Mayer and Argyres, 2004), and telecommunications equipment (Sampson, 2007). 
Much of the early research on alliance contracts use contract-related variables to explain 
other alliance attributes or outcomes (e.g., Parkhe, 1993; Deeds and Hill, 1999; Reuer and Ariño, 
2002). More recent studies examine the determinants of contract characteristics, particularly 
contractual complexity and completeness (e.g., Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer, 
Ariño, and Mellewigt, 2006; Ryall and Sampson, 2009). The operationalizations of these two 
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concepts are often conflated, however, leading to confusion in the literature (Weber et al., 2009). 
Thus, other studies have turned to examining the general functions contracts play and/or the role 
of specific clauses or groups of clauses in alliance contracts (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; 
Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Reuer and Ariño, 2007). 
The central premise of the research in this stream is that in order to achieve better 
performance, more complex/complete contracts are necessary to deal with the hazards that 
plague transactions. Williamson (1985) suggests, however, that contracts should only include 
safeguards that address the hazards that are actually present in a particular transaction. Argyres 
and Mayer (2007) posit that these hazards are likely to be context-dependent. Thus, while some 
safeguards may be widely applicable, others are likely to be tailored to fit the unique hazards 
encountered in a particular context. Study 1 in this essay focuses on the hazards that are 
prominent in one context, R&D alliances, and how partners contractually contend with such 
hazards. Specifically, Study 1 examines the extent to which communication and appropriation 
challenges are present in R&D alliances and the likelihood of including particular clauses 
designed to cope with these challenges. 
A key assumption in the contract design literature is that managers and lawyers have the 
ability ‘to learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards, and factor these back into the contractual 
relation, thereafter to devise responsive institutions’ (Williamson, 1996: 9). In other words, 
managers and lawyers are thought to be able recognize when hazards are likely to arise or at least 
learn from their experience relatively quickly and implement that knowledge when designing a 
contract. Evidence suggests, however, that managers and lawyers are not as farsighted as theory 
assumes (e.g., Mayer and Arygres, 2004; Lumineau, Fréchet, and Puthod, 2011). Study 1 relaxes 
this assumption in order to investigate if and how previous contract design experience impacts 
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the likelihood that specific contractual clauses will be included to contend with the hazards that 
can be identified at the outset of R&D alliances. The study also delves into whether contracting 
capabilities that are applicable in the context of R&D come about exclusively from participating 
in R&D alliances, or from experience negotiating and drafting contracts for alliances involving 
other value chain activities (e.g., marketing, manufacturing) as well. 
A second important stream in the contract design literature examines the allocation of 
decision and control rights between firms engaged in alliances. Such rights refer to provisions in 
alliance contracts that provide one of the partners with ownership of key alliance assets and the 
right to decide how they should be used. Research in this stream has primarily drawn on property 
rights theory (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), which 
suggests that the logic of incentive-alignment should guide the assignment of decision and 
control rights. Study 2 follows in this tradition. It deviates, however, from previous research in 
that it suggests that the rationale behind the allocation of different rights is likely to be specific to 
the right in question. This suggestion is based on recent research that shows that different rights 
matter to different partners (Ariño and Ring, 2010; Kloyer, 2011), and play different functions 
(Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Thus, whereas previous studies examine why one partner wins 
more rights or a higher percentage of the rights available in a particular alliance contract, Study 2 
investigates the factors that influence the assignment of specific rights that are important in R&D 
alliances, namely the ownership of new intellectual property (IP) and severe termination rights 
(i.e., those that allow one partner to unilaterally and unconditionally terminate the alliance). 
While addressing important theoretical issues, the two studies conducted in this essay are 
also motivated by practical, managerial concerns related to how contract design impacts alliance 
performance. Sampson (2002) notes that managers often resist careful consideration of contract 
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terms in fear that trust between partners may erode during the negotiation process. However, 
alliances tend to have high failure rates (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2001). Studies have shown that 
between 30% and 70% of alliances fail (Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, and Robinson, 2004). In 
addition, more than 50% of all alliances are terminated (Lunnan and Haugland, 2008), resulting 
in the destruction of shareholder value for the companies engaged in them (Kale, Dyer, and 
Singh, 2002). Thus, investigating the questions posed in this essay may provide useful insights 
about the contract design process that managers may find helpful. 
Even though the contract design process is only one element of managing an alliance, 
understanding this process may help to improve the likelihood of achieving success. DiMatteo 
(2010) suggests that comprehension of contract law can enhance collaborative efforts and 
mitigate opportunistic behavior in strategic alliances. Thus, considering that over 30% of annual 
research expenditures for many of the world’s largest firms are tied up in alliances (Ernst, 2004), 
the capability to design effective contracts may be a potential source of competitive advantage, 
which leads to better alliance outcomes (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). 
Overall, this essay is concerned with the design of contracts developed to govern R&D 
alliances. Thus, the overarching research question examined is: What factors impact the design 
of R&D alliance contracts? Building on this question, the two studies in this essay specifically 
address: 
 What hazards are encountered in R&D alliances and what contractual solutions are 
implemented to contend with them? (Study 1) 
 
 How does previous alliance experience impact the relationships between the hazards 
encountered in R&D alliances and the contractual solutions implemented to contend with 
them? (Study 1) 
 
 What factors influence the assignment of key control and decision rights in R&D alliance 
contracts? (Study 2) 
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Using a sample of 66 contracts from R&D alliances in the medical device industry 
between 1994 and 2009, I test hypotheses concerning the inclusion of specific safeguards in 
R&D alliance contracts in Study 1 and hypotheses regarding the assignment of specific control 
rights in Study 2. The contracts in the sample involve partners with a considerable size 
difference,
13
 which is important because many of the theoretical arguments developed in the 
studies that follow are driven by the learning and power imbalances created by this asymmetry. 
From a methodological standpoint, both studies involve non-linear models that contain 
interaction effects. Because these effects cannot be interpreted in the same way as they are in a 
linear model, I employed the simulation-based approach developed by King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg (2000), which was recently introduced in the strategic management literature by 
Zelner (2009), to overcome this difficulty. This technique makes it possible to graphically 
evaluate and interpret interaction effects in non-linear models. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
comprehensive literature review that covers several research streams that form the theoretical 
and empirical backdrop for Study 1 and Study 2. Specifically, I review three of the key 
theoretical lenses that have been used to examine alliances: the networks perspective, inter-
organizational learning, and transaction cost economics. I then narrow the focus of the review to 
discuss how transaction cost economics and property rights theory jointly inform our knowledge 
of contract design. Finally, I review an emerging body of the literature that examines alliance 
and contracting capabilities and their impact on contract design. The section that follows then 
develops the research questions that were introduced above in light of the research opportunities 
identified and conclusions presented in the literature review. A detailed description of the 
                                                 
13
 The revenue generated by the larger partner is approximately 255 times that of the smaller partner in the deals 
examined in this essay. 
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research setting and the data set and an overview of the two empirical studies are also provided. 
Study 1 is then presented, which examines the relationship between the hazards that plague R&D 
alliances and the contractual solutions implemented to mitigate them. Study 1 also investigates if 
and how previous alliance experience impacts this relationship. The subsequent section presents 
Study 2, which examines the assignment of two key control rights in R&D alliances. The final 
section summarizes the findings and discusses the contributions from each study along with 
implications for practices, limitations, and directions for future research. 
4.2. Literature Review 
The studies in this essay focus on the design of contracts for R&D alliances. R&D 
alliances are contractual partnerships with no intervening organizational structure in which two 
or more firms pool their resources in order to conduct research and/or development. Several 
streams of the literature have examined various aspects of R&D alliances. I briefly review three 
of these streams in this section: networks, inter-organizational learning, and transaction cost 
economics. I pay particular attention to how each stream informs our knowledge about why firms 
form R&D alliances, the choice between R&D alliance governance forms, and the impact that 
R&D alliances have on performance. A brief summary is then offered, highlighting where the 
streams overlap. 
I expand upon these brief reviews, and discuss how transaction cost economics and 
property rights theory jointly inform our knowledge of alliance contracts and their design. In 
addition, I review an emerging body of literature that examines alliance capabilities and their 
impact on contract design. I conclude with a discussion of three research opportunities related to 
contract design that emerge from synthesizing the literature reviewed in this section. These 
opportunities serve as the basis for the hypotheses that are developed later in this essay. 
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4.2.1. The Networks Perspective 
The origins of the networks view of alliances can be traced to Powell (1990). 
Reconsidering his earlier beliefs (i.e., Powell, 1987), Powell suggests that alliances are not just a 
hybrid or intermediate governance form; rather they are something altogether distinct from 
markets and hierarchies – they are social networks. In this view, networks are considered to be 
the ideal form of economic organization when there is a need to efficiently and reliably exchange 
information that is difficult to quantify such as know-how and technology. The ability to transmit 
information is enhanced in networks due to the relative absence of explicit quid pro quo 
behavior, owing to their relational features. In essence, exchange in networks is driven by 
reputation, friendship, interdependence and altruism (Macneil, 1985). Thus, the establishment of 
trust is a key cornerstone of the networks perspective of alliances. 
Drawing on concepts from sociology, scholars in this stream have examined the motives 
for forming alliances, and the factors that impact alliance structure and firm-level performance. 
Each of these areas is briefly reviewed in the following sub-sections with special attention paid 
to research on R&D alliances. 
4.2.1.1. Motives. In their study of collaborative R&D in biotechnology, Powell, Koput, 
and Smith-Doerr (1996) set out to examine the network structure that typifies the field. In doing 
so, they offer a perspective on the motives for collaborative R&D that greatly contrasts with the 
more strategic rationale of transaction cost economics. Specifically, Powell et al. suggest that 
collaborative R&D is ‘an admission ticket to an information network and a vehicle for the rapid 
communication of news about opportunities and obstacles’ (1996: 120). This ticket is important 
in industries where technology is changing rapidly. In such a situation, knowledge is likely to be 
broadly distributed among the firms in the industry, rather than concentrated in any single firm. 
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As a result, the locus of innovation is likely to be found in a network of inter-organizational 
relationships (Powell and Brantley, 1992). 
Powell et al. (1996) go on to state that staying current in the face of rapid change, 
especially when knowledge is dispersed, requires action both internally and through cooperative 
research with external sources. Thus, R&D alliances provide access to knowledge that is 
otherwise unavailable or too costly to develop in-house. Firms need to invest in internal R&D, 
however, in order to have the absorptive capacity to utilize the knowledge gained from 
collaborating (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Accordingly, internal R&D and collaborative R&D 
are complements rather than substitutes (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). 
In sum, the networks perspective suggests that a principle motive for participating in 
R&D alliances is to stay competitive currently and to expand to meet the competitive needs of 
the future. R&D alliances are, however, not just a way to compensate for a lack of internal skills, 
nor are they just a series of discrete transactions. Rather, R&D alliances provide a firm with 
access to a broader network of knowledge to draw upon, directly from its partners and indirectly 
through its partners’ ties to other firms. As a result, a firm that actively participates in R&D 
alliances is likely to be able to stay abreast of rapidly changing conditions and learn about the 
new opportunities arising from these changes. 
4.2.1.2. Alliance Structure. Initially, the networks literature was relatively silent about 
alliance structure and the choice between alliance modes. Powell (1990) suggests, based on the 
evidence available, that there is no clear relationship between the legal form of alliances and 
their purpose. Rather, he observes that the form of agreement appears to be tailored to the needs 
of the respective parties, and to tax and regulatory considerations. Subsequent research presents a 
different picture, however, drawing on the concept of embeddedness. 
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Embeddedness refers to the degree to which firms are entangled in a social network 
(Granovetter, 1985). Being embedded in a network provides a firm with preferential access to 
information about the trustworthiness of partners while also conveying information about its own 
attractiveness to other firms as a potential partner (Burt, 1992). Firms that are embedded in a 
network of alliances are often presented with opportunities for new alliances by their existing 
alliance partners and frequently turn to their partners for referrals regarding new partners (Gulati, 
1993). These observations stand in stark contrast to the traditional view that ‘a firm on its own 
initiative identifies the need for an alliance, identifies the best partner available, and chooses the 
appropriate alliance form’ (Gulati, 1998: 294). Thus, research suggests that a firm’s degree of 
embeddedness is likely to impact its decision to enter an alliance, choice of an alliance partner, 
and choice between alternative alliance modes. 
Empirical evidence indicates that embeddedness does influence the likelihood that a firm 
will enter an alliance. For instance, several studies have shown that firms with more prior 
alliances, that are more centrally embedded in their alliance network, or that have more focused 
alliance networks, are more likely to enter into new alliances and to do so with greater frequency 
(Kogut, Shan, and Walker, 1992; Gulati, 1993, 1997). Additional research echoes these findings 
regarding firm centrality and the likelihood of entering new alliances (e.g., Podolny and Stuart, 
1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). Research also supports the 
notion that embeddedness is a predictor of which available firms are likely to partner with each 
other (Gulati, 1995b). Findings indicate, from a relational embeddedness perspective, firms are 
likely to engage in new alliances with previous partners owing to the trust established during 
prior alliances (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Goerzen, 2007). In addition, evidence 
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suggests, from a structural embeddedness perspective, a firm and a potential new partner are 
more likely to form an alliance if they already had prior indirect ties (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
Overall, there is strong support for the notion that embeddedness is a predictor of the 
formation of new alliances. What is far less clear is whether, and how, embeddedness impacts 
the choice between alliance governance forms. Research indicates that the use of equity in 
strategic alliances diminishes as network centrality and proximity increase (Robinson and Stuart, 
2007). A parallel stream in the networks tradition suggests that the history of previous 
interactions between partners impacts the choice of alliance structure. Specifically, scholars 
propose that as partners become more familiar with each other through subsequent alliances, they 
build enough confidence in each other to forego the more hierarchical control offered by equity 
alliance forms in favor of trust-based, non-equity alliances. Several studies have shown support 
for this relational view, which asserts that trust substitutes for formal control mechanisms (such 
as contracts) in alliances (Larson, 1992; Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1995a). 
4.2.1.3. Performance. The networks perspective also provides insight into how alliances 
impact performance. In their study of R&D alliances in biotechnology, Shan, Walker, and Kogut 
(1994) find that innovative output, as measured by the number of new patents granted, is 
indirectly related to network position. Specifically, highly embedded firms are more likely to 
enter into multiple alliances, increasing their access to new knowledge, which in turn improves 
their innovativeness. In contrast, Deeds and Hill (1996) report a curvilinear relationship between 
a biotechnology firm’s number of R&D alliances and its innovative output, as measured by the 
rate of new product development. This finding suggests that firms are likely to earn diminishing 
returns once their alliance portfolios increase above a certain size. 
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Ahuja (2000) finds that innovative output is not simply impacted by the number of 
alliances that a firm participates in, but by the strength of the ties that it builds to its network 
through its portfolio of alliances. Performance, as measured by patents granted, is higher when 
firms have more indirect ties but fewer direct ties. For a firm with limited access to the network 
through immediate partners, connections to a partner’s partners provide additional access to 
information that would otherwise not flow to the firm. When a firm already has many direct ties, 
however, indirect ties are less likely to contribute new information that the firm does not already 
have access to through its direct ties. 
4.2.2. Inter-organizational Learning 
A second stream of the literature that has informed our knowledge of R&D alliances is 
inter-organizational learning. Researchers in this area propose that a firm’s ability to learn from 
partners and capture knowledge from outside its own boundaries are critical to competitiveness 
(Ulrich, Von Glinow, and Jick, 1993). Inter-organizational learning research draws on concepts 
from several streams including the capabilities perspective (e.g., Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), the knowledge-based view (e.g., 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2002), and the 
broader knowledge management literature (e.g., Nonaka, 1991, 1994). 
Today, it is well accepted that alliances are a vehicle for inter-organizational learning, 
providing partnering firms with access to new knowledge. As Inkpen and Tsang (2007) note, 
firms learn with and from their partners through joint problem solving, shared execution of 
alliance tasks, and observation of alliance activities. The formation of an alliance reduces the risk 
that knowledge will dissipate quickly (Powell, 1987), because unlike other learning contexts, the 
creation of an alliance results in a repository for knowledge. Thus, alliances provide an ideal 
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platform for learning, as two firms with different skill sets and knowledge are purposefully 
brought together. The differences between the firms act as a catalyst for learning by both firms. 
Research in this stream has also examined the motives for forming alliances, the choice 
between alliance governance modes, and the impact of alliances on performance. 
4.2.2.1. Motives. The acquisition of tacit knowledge is considered to be a strong motive 
for establishing an alliance (Inkpen, 2005). If knowledge is tacit, it may be difficult to obtain 
without close observation of and interaction with its owners. Thus, an alliance may provide the 
access needed to foster learning. Alliance learning can be classified into four types: learning 
about alliance management, learning about an alliance partner, learning with an alliance 
partner, and learning from an alliance partner (Inkpen and Tsang, 2007). 
Learning about alliance management refers to gaining knowledge about the design and 
management of alliances that may be useful in subsequent alliances (Lyles, 1988; Simonin, 
1997; Gulati, 1999; Gupta and Misra, 2000). The effectiveness of a firm’s future alliances is 
considered to be a function of its accumulated learning from previous alliances. Evidence 
suggests that firms that have extensive alliance experience learn to manage alliances more 
effectively over time (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and Bell, 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Tsang, 2002). A caveat, however, is that the benefits derived from previous alliance experience 
may depreciate rapidly, as suggested by Sampson’s (2005) study of R&D alliances in the 
telecommunications equipment industry. 
Learning about an alliance partner refers to gaining familiarity with the skills and 
practices of a specific partner. Doz and Hamel (1998) consider this type of learning to be a key 
to joint value creation. The knowledge obtained about an alliance partner may also play an 
important role in the evolution of an alliance (Doz, 1996; Ariño and De La Torre, 1998). 
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Learning with an alliance partner refers to situations where partners jointly enter new business 
arenas and develop new capabilities. The goal in this case is for each firm to build its capabilities 
in complementary areas rather than to transfer knowledge because each partner will continue to 
operate in its own area of expertise (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 2002). During an alliance, 
each partner continues to develop its own skills, but learns how to use them in conjunction with 
the partner’s capabilities. Mowery et al.’s (2002) study indicates that this type of learning helps 
facilitate the coordination and integration of activities conducted by alliance partners. 
Learning from a partner is the type of alliance learning that has received the most 
attention in the literature. By definition, an alliance involves collaboration, creating the 
opportunity for each collaborator to learn from its partners and gain access to knowledge that it 
does not possess and may have no access to without an alliance. Learning from a partner is not 
inevitable, however, as access to knowledge may be explicitly blocked by one or more partners. 
Firms enter alliances with different intents regarding learning from a partner. In some cases, the 
partners may seek to simply contribute their knowledge to the alliance without transferring the 
knowledge that is shared with and/or developed by the alliance back into their own operations. 
In contrast, a major motivation for forming an alliance is to acquire knowledge from a 
partner and use it in areas unrelated to the alliance in order to create private benefits (Khanna, 
Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). Hamel (1991) first described this situation in the context of 
international alliances, coining the phrase ‘learning race’ to emphasize that the partners’ intent is 
to out-learn each other. Once the faster learning partner learns what it set out to learn, it no 
longer needs the other partner, potentially creating an asymmetry in bargaining power (Makhija 
and Ganesh, 1997). This may lead to a shift in the competitive position of the partners outside of 
the alliance as well. 
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Learning races are exemplified by alliances that pair smaller, entrepreneurial firms with 
large, established partners (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). The asymmetry in the size of the partners 
is a salient feature of many alliances, as it has an impact on the relative ability of each firm to 
learn. The large firm in such alliances is often able to learn the small firm’s knowledge at a faster 
rate than the small firm can imitate the organizational resources of the large firm owing to an 
imbalance in the scope of what the small firm needs to learn. While evidence that such races 
occur is mixed (Inkpen and Tsang, 2007), concerns about effectively transferring and protecting 
knowledge factor prominently into questions about alliance structure, which is the topic of the 
next sub-section.  
4.2.2.2. Alliance Structure. Scholars have long argued that transferring knowledge-based 
assets, particularly tacit knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is not easily codified), across firm 
boundaries is difficult because such knowledge is often organizationally embedded (Teece, 1977; 
Kogut, 1988). Thus, learning from a partner may be hindered if the knowledge to be obtained is 
tacit in nature. In order to transfer tacit knowledge, research suggests that direct interaction 
between the partners is required (Leonard-Barton, 1988; Mascitelli, 2000), implying that alliance 
structure is likely to be influenced by the type of knowledge to be learned from a partner. 
R&D alliances often involve tacit knowledge (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). Scholars 
applying the knowledge-based perspective suggest that equity joint ventures (EJVs) provide the 
appropriate forum for interaction between firms to promote the transfer of tacit knowledge. In 
particular, EJVs facilitate knowledge transfer through the formation of a joint venture board, 
which is typically composed of managers from all venture partners (Killing, 1983). In addition, 
the partners in EJVs frequently co-locate employees, further increasing the chances that 
knowledge will be shared via close interaction between individuals. In comparison, non-equity 
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alliances may not be as suitable an environment for learning as more hierarchically structured, 
equity-based alliances. 
Several studies support the notion that EJVs are preferred over non-equity alliances when 
the knowledge to be learned is tacit in nature. For example, research shows that EJVs provide 
more intimate human interaction than licensing agreements, making them more suitable for 
transferring complicated, organizationally embedded technology (Kogut, 1988; Tsang, 1997). 
Similarly, Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) report that EJVs are a more effective conduit 
for transferring complex capabilities than non-equity alliances, such as licensing agreements, 
based on an analysis of patent cross-citation rates among alliance partners. 
Learning from an alliance partner may also result in a negative outcome for the partner 
whose knowledge is appropriated (Lorange, 1997). A loss of knowledge by one partner in a 
learning race may lead to the creation of a new or strong competitor. Thus, knowledge protection 
is a key issue that has implications for alliance structure. Research suggests that EJVs are 
preferred over non-equity alliances when it is difficult to monitor alliance activities and when 
knowledge is tacit because the structure of EJVs protects against knowledge leakage. Norman’s 
(2004) finding that EJVs have the lowest level of knowledge loss concurs with this argument. 
Oxley and Sampson (2004) report that limiting the scope of activities for an R&D alliance (i.e., 
by excluding downstream activities such as manufacturing and/or marketing from the alliance) is 
also an effective way to protect against knowledge leakage. 
4.2.2.3. Performance. The learning literature also provides insight into how alliances 
impact performance. In regards to learning about alliance management, Anand and Khanna 
(2000) find that performance, as measured by abnormal stock returns, is higher for firms that 
have more alliance experience. Presumably, as experience accumulates, firms learn how to better 
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manage alliances, resulting in value creation. Large learning effects are found in managing EJVs, 
but not for licensing agreements, and the effects of learning on value creation are strongest for 
R&D joint ventures, while they are weakest for marketing joint ventures (Anand and Khanna, 
2000). 
In regards to learning from a partner, research suggests that the characteristics of the 
partners themselves impact performance, particularly the transfer of knowledge between the 
partners. According to Hamel (1991), the most important factors from the learning partner’s side 
that influence performance are the partner’s intent to learn, receptivity to new knowledge, and 
absorptive capacity. From the teaching partner’s side, Pisano (1988) asserts that the teacher must 
be willing to fully cooperate and share knowledge with the learning partner to ensure that 
performance is positive. For example, activities can purposely be separated to keep the physical 
proximity of experts distant, and gatekeepers can be placed at the alliance interface to block the 
unrestricted flow of knowledge from the teacher to the learning firm (Baughn, Denekamp, 
Stevens, and Osborn, 1997). Thus, the teaching partner’s degree of protectiveness is a strong 
determinant of alliance performance. 
4.2.3. Transaction Cost Economics 
Alliances have been examined extensively through the lens of transaction costs 
economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975, 1985). From a TCE perspective, alliances are viewed as 
mechanisms for governing transactions that are more complex than a standard market exchange 
but not complex enough to warrant full integration (e.g., Williamson, 1991; Zenger and Hesterly, 
1997; Gulati, 1998). In contrast to the networks perspective, alliances are considered an 
intermediate or hybrid organizational form that combine elements of spot market contracting 
with elements of internal organization (Williamson, 1991). The following sub-sections provide a 
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brief review of what we know from the TCE literature about why firms form alliances, the 
choice between alliance modes, and the impact of alliances on performance, with special 
attention given to studies that examine R&D alliances. 
4.2.3.1. Motives. From a TCE perspective, a primary motivation for the formation of 
alliances is to organize in the most efficient way to pool resources and capabilities. Scholars in 
this tradition argue that firms use alliances because markets are perceived as being unable to 
effectively bundle valuable resources and capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994), while 
hierarchies weaken incentives and reduce the flexibility to reverse decisions regarding resources 
and capabilities once they are under common ownership (Ménard, 2004). Alliances are 
characterized by semi-strong incentives and an intermediate degree of administrative apparatus, 
along with semi-strong cooperative and autonomous adaptation, while working under a semi-
legalistic contract law regime (Williamson, 1991). Thus, according to TCE, alliances are 
considered to be an intermediate or hybrid form of governance that lies between the two polar 
extremes of markets and hierarchies. 
TCE suggests that alliances often represent an attractive way to organize R&D activities. 
In particular, alliances are not weighed down by the bureaucratic costs of internal organization, 
making them more nimble and better able to innovate (Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1997). 
Alliances do, however, provide enhanced coordination and control compared to spot market 
contracts (Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1997). Alliances also offer access to resources not available 
or easily developed in-house, owing to time-compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989), as well as economies of scale and scope in R&D (Tripsas et al., 1995). 
4.2.3.2. Structure. TCE scholars initially argued that R&D activities are more efficiently 
organized within hierarchies than through markets (Williamson, 1975: 203; Teece, 1988), owing 
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to the difficulties associated with coordinating R&D activities across firm boundaries. However, 
Teece (1988) suggests that some of the properties of internal organization can be replicated by 
using partial equity ownership within hybrid forms of organization. Thus, the resources and 
capabilities needed to carry out a complex R&D project can be accessed from an external party 
without fully integrating with that party. 
The calculus of TCE provides guidance regarding the conditions under which each form 
of governance is preferred. In general, alliances are more appropriate when the degree of asset 
specificity and uncertainty are moderate, and when repeat interactions are anticipated. Empirical 
research, however, has not examined the choice between all three modes simultaneously. Rather, 
studies have examined the dichotomous choice between in-house and external sources of R&D. 
It is not entirely clear in the studies conducted by Pisano (1990) and Ulset (1996) whether the 
external sources were restricted to alliances or also included spot market contracts, whereas in 
Robertson and Gatignon’s (1998) study it is clear that the external mode is R&D alliances. 
Regardless, the results from all three studies support the central tenets of TCE; firms are more 
likely to conduct R&D in-house when transaction-specific investments are required, few 
competent suppliers are available, and performance is difficult to measure. 
TCE has also been drawn upon to examine the choice between different hybrid forms of 
R&D collaboration. Pisano (1989) examines the motives for using partial equity investments in 
collaborative relationships. He proposes that a firm is more likely to select an equity-based 
alliance when the level of uncertainty is high, and relationship-specific investments are required. 
He suggests that holding equity can help a firm to mitigate some of the contractual hazards 
encountered through better communication and close monitoring. The results of his study of 
biotechnology alliances support this argument; firms prefer equity over non-equity alliances 
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when there is an R&D component in the alliance, and when there are multiple projects and few 
potential collaborators. 
Building on Pisano’s (1989) earlier study, Oxley (1997) examines the choice between 
three modes of alliance governance: unilateral contractual agreements, bilateral contractual 
agreements, and equity-based alliances. In agreement with TCE, she finds that more-hierarchical 
alliances are selected over more market-like alliances when transactions involve R&D in 
addition to manufacturing and/or marketing and a broader range of products/technologies. The 
logic behind this finding is that more-hierarchical alliance modes, through the use of equity, 
mitigate the appropriability hazards associated with hard-to-monitor activities like R&D. 
Sampson (2004b) also applies TCE to examine how firms choose organizational form for 
their R&D alliances, specifically the choice between EJVs and bilateral contractual agreements. 
Based on a sample of R&D alliances in the telecommunications equipment industry, she finds an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability of selecting an EJV over a bilateral 
contractual agreement and the diversity of the knowledge bases of the alliance partners. The 
argument behind this finding is that at a low degree of diversity, the threat of knowledge leakage 
is not high enough to warrant the formation of a separate legal entity, but as diversity increases, 
establishing an EJV becomes necessary to protect against spillovers. However, the threat of 
leakage is mitigated by the need for absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), limiting 
each partner’s ability to misappropriate the other partner’s knowledge when their knowledge 
bases are highly divergent, which in turn diminishes the need for an EJV. 
4.2.3.3. Performance. Intuitively, successful alliances should contribute to positive firm 
performance (Weber et al., 2009). However, there has been no empirical validation of this 
contention to date. The performance of individual alliances has been examined by TCE scholars 
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through the lens of the discriminating-alignment hypothesis (Williamson, 1991: 277). Studies in 
this tradition investigate whether the outcome of a particular alliance is enhanced when the 
governance structure selected follows the logic of TCE. For example, Sampson (2004a) 
measures the costs of misaligned governance in R&D alliances in the telecommunications 
equipment industry. She finds that selecting alliance governance according to the logic of TCE 
substantially improves collaborative benefits (in terms of each firm’s innovate output as 
measured by citation-weighted patents applied for after alliance commencement) compared to 
when the mode selected contradicts the logic of TCE. 
Sampson (2007) also examines characteristics that may moderate the relationship 
between governance mode and performance outcomes. She finds that the degree of technological 
diversity between R&D alliance partners moderates the main relationship. Specifically, under 
high levels of technological diversity, EJVs contribute more to firm innovation (as measured by 
citation-weighted firm patents applied for following alliance commencement) than do bilateral 
contractual agreements. Taken together, these findings suggest that firms that consistently 
misalign the governance of their alliances will perform poorly in the market. In the long-run, 
such poor performers should be forced to exit the market. 
4.2.4. Summary 
The literature reviewed in this section has greatly contributed to our understanding of 
R&D alliances. While the choice between alliance governance modes has been examined in 
depth, the debate about the relationship between relational and formal governance mechanisms 
has until recently stalled the study of the actual contracts developed to manage alliances. Argyres 
and Mayer (2007) attribute the wealth of attention paid to the relational aspects of governance to 
the influence of Macaulay (1963), who emphasized non-contractual relations in business. Some 
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scholars argue that relational and formal governance mechanisms are substitutes, suggesting that 
contracts inhibit cooperation (Sitkin and Bies, 1993; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996), and that trust is 
the key to inter-organizational success (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, 1994; Gulati, 1995, 1998). 
Other scholars counter that trust and formal governance mechanisms are complements, 
suggesting that greater trust manifests itself through contracts that are more detailed (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007). Recent research 
has sought to untangle this complex relationship. Mellewigt, Madhok, and Weibel (2007) found 
that trust and formal governance are substitutes and complements, while Puranam and Vanneste 
(2009) suggest that the relationship is dynamic and may evolve over time. 
The focus on this debate, rather than on the structure and design of contracts, has largely 
been due to data availability. Ring (2002) notes that it has traditionally been difficult to obtain 
business contracts. This situation has improved, however. Since 1996, public companies have 
been required to electronically file all material documents, including alliance contracts, with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This information can be retrieved from the 
SEC’s EDGAR database. Another free resource is the Contracting and Organizations Research 
Institute’s (CORI) database, which contains over 690,000 contracts, mostly from SEC filings. 
Thus, there are now ample opportunities to examine the content of actual alliance contracts in 
order to gain insight into their design and use. The recent upward trend in the number of inter-
firm contract studies reflects this improvement in data availability (Weber et al., 2009). I now 
turn to a review of the contract design literature, particularly as it relates to R&D alliances. 
4.2.5. The Contract Design Literature 
Contracts are legally enforceable agreements which provide a framework for inter-firm 
exchange that delineates the partners’ obligations and responsibilities to perform particular 
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actions in the future (Llewellyn, 1931; Macneil, 1978). Formal contracts are particularly valuable 
in the context of R&D alliances, given the substantial difficulties of developing technology 
across firm borders (Ryall and Sampson, 2006). Contracts aimed at managing ongoing inter-
organizational relationships such as alliances typically contain provisions which outline the roles 
and responsibilities of each party, how various contingencies will be contended with, how the 
parties will communicate with each other, how disputes will be resolved, and how decision and 
control rights will be allocated between the parties (Argyres & Mayer, 2007). 
Despite their importance, formal contracts have received little attention from alliance 
researchers until recently (Ariño and Reuer, 2006). Most studies that have examined formal 
contracts use an economic lens, especially transaction cost economics and property rights theory 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). Each theory and the key studies 
in the contract design literature that draw upon them, particularly those that focus on R&D 
alliances, are reviewed in the following sub-sections. 
4.2.5.1. Transaction Cost Economics. As discussed above, transaction cost economics 
(TCE) was originally called upon to address questions regarding the minimization of transaction 
costs through the selection of the appropriate governance structure. Scholars have, however, 
increasingly applied TCE to the study of contracts, drawing on Williamson (1985, 1991). The 
bulk of this research explores how transaction characteristics impact contract design, which is 
salient in the context of this study considering that most R&D alliances involve a written 
contract that serves as a blueprint for managing the relationship between the parties involved. 
TCE is founded on two key behavioral assumptions, opportunism and bounded 
rationality. Opportunism is defined as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’, which includes such 
behavior as lying, stealing, and cheating, but often takes on more subtle forms of deceit 
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(Williamson, 1985: 47). Absent opportunism, an economic exchange could be satisfactorily 
governed by ‘general clause’ contracting, whereby the exchange partners would simply promise 
to behave in a cooperative fashion (Williamson, 1985: 66). However, ex ante, it is difficult to tell 
who will and who will not act opportunistically. This problem is magnified when transactions 
require relationship-specific investments. In such a case, the party whose investment is less at 
risk is in position to ‘hold up’ (i.e., expropriate surplus from) the other party (Klein, Crawford, 
and Alchian, 1978). Thus, TCE suggests that the parties should incorporate safeguards into the 
contract to protect relationship-specific investments from opportunistic expropriation. 
The second behavioral assumption is bounded rationality, which assumes that economic 
actors are ‘intendedly rational, but limitedly so’ (Simon, 1957: xxiv). As such, despite an 
individual’s best efforts, his or her ability to analyze all possible future contingencies that may 
arise in organizing an economic exchange is limited. Absent bounded rationality, an exchange 
could be governed by a comprehensive contract, because all potential contingencies could be 
anticipated. However, this expectation is not realistic when bounded rationality is taken into 
consideration (Radner, 1968). In addition, even if an individual could perform a comprehensive 
analysis of all possible scenarios, it would likely be too costly and time consuming for any 
transaction to be efficient. The situation is further complicated by uncertainty, which may arise 
from the external environment or the actions of the parties involved in the transaction. Contracts, 
therefore, are unavoidably incomplete (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1996). 
In sum, while TCE suggests that individuals cannot anticipate all future contingencies 
that might affect a contractual relationship, they can foresee major contractual hazards stemming 
from potential opportunism by partners. Thus, even though complete contracts cannot be 
devised, clauses and provisions can be drafted to mitigate identifiable contractual hazards. 
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While a sizeable amount of empirical work has focused on trying to understand what 
factors impact the design of alliance contracts, the bulk of this work has only accumulated in the 
last twenty years. The study of contract characteristics as dependent variables is actually a 
relatively recent phenomenon (Ariño and Reuer, 2006), which is interesting considering that 
economists have long been interested in contracts. The lack of access to actual contracts 
probably played a role in this, and may also explain why the dependent variable in many studies 
is the measure of contractual detail rather than the inclusion of a specific provision. 
According to Crocker and Reynolds (1993), the degree of contractual detail is an 
important choice variable which should be aligned with the characteristics of an alliance in order 
to safeguard against the threat of opportunism. Two measures have been used to characterize the 
degree of contractual detail: completeness and complexity. Completeness, referring to how 
detailed the relevant clauses are for a given alliance, is typically measured by the level of clause 
specification (Ryall and Sampson, 2003), and by survey responses about the level of clause 
completeness (Anderson and Dekker, 2005). Complexity, referring to how many clauses are in a 
contract, is often measured by counting the number of clauses included from a predetermined list 
(Parkhe, 1993). While it is difficult to assess completeness without detailed knowledge of the 
alliance that a contract refers to, complexity can often be measured by simply reading the 
contract and counting the clauses included. Thus, contractual complexity has typically been 
measured due to the relative ease of data collection (Eckhard and Mellewigt, 2006). 
The seminal article in this vein is Parkhe (1993), in which a measure of contractual 
complexity is developed that includes eight provisions considered critical by legal scholars.
14
 
These provisions were rank ordered according to their stringency. If a particular provision is 
                                                 
14
 The provisions are: (1) rights to reports of relevant transactions, (2) notification rights for departures from the 
agreement, (3) auditing rights, (4) confidentiality provisions, (5) restrictions on proprietary information, (6) 
termination provisions, (7) arbitration clauses, and (8) lawsuit provisions. 
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present, it is assigned the value of its ranking (i.e., first provision = 1, second provision = 2, and 
so on), zero otherwise. Contractual complexity is then measured by normalizing the total of the 
weighted number of provisions present, resulting in a score that can range from zero to one. A 
normalized score closer to one indicates that more provisions are in place, thus the contract is 
more complex. Several studies have employed this method exactly or with slight modifications 
to the measure (e.g., Deeds and Hill, 1999; Reuer et al., 2006; Reuer and Ariño, 2007), while 
other scholars have developed alternative measures (e.g., Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
As noted above, TCE suggests that the degree of contractual detail is predicated by the 
severity of the hazards present in an exchange. Thus, several studies have sought to explain how 
prominent alliance characteristics impact complexity. Empirical tests, however, have delivered 
conflicting results. For example, some studies have confirmed that a high degree of asset 
specificity promotes the need for a more complex contract (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002; 
Anderson and Dekker, 2005), whereas others have failed to find support for the hypothesized 
relationship (e.g., Reuer et al., 2006). Similarly, some studies have confirmed a positive 
relationship between contractual complexity and uncertainty (e.g., Anderson and Dekker, 2005), 
while others have found a negative relationship (e.g., Saussier, 2000). Inconsistent findings have 
also surfaced for the relationship between contractual complexity and prior alliance ties. 
One possible explanation for these finding is that most multi-item measures of 
contractual complexity contain provisions that serve totally different purposes, resulting in the 
hypothesized effects cancelling out (Eckhard and Mellewigt, 2006). Consequently, aggregate 
measures of complexity may be masking other contractual functions, which are impossible to 
capture with a one-dimensional construct (Furlotti, 2007). Thus, Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand, 
and Nooteboom (2005) suggest that research on alliance contracts would benefit from a closer 
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look at the precise content of the provisions included in contracts, the intentions with which the 
contract was developed, and the actual use of the contract. Answering this call, a number of 
recent studies have shown that the general conceptualization of contracts as one-dimensional 
legal safeguarding instruments is restrictive, and that contracts play multiple functions. 
Studies in this stream can be subdivided into two categories. In the first category are 
studies that propose distinct functions based on theory, or uncover distinct functions via case 
study, without measuring them separately.
15
 In the second category are studies that propose 
distinct functions and actually measure each separately, frequently using factor analysis methods 
to verify if the underlying items load as hypothesized. As can be seen from Tables 4-1 and 4-2, 
studies in the first category (10) outnumber those in the second (7). Again, the lack of access to 
actual contracts is a possible explanation for this imbalance. Data availability is particularly 
salient for studies in the second category that use factor analysis techniques, as they require a 
large sample size to confirm the factor structure. Consequently, it is relatively easier to employ 
case study methods to uncover functions from a small sample of contracts. 
It is important to note that in some of the studies contained in the tables, the authors are 
simply focusing on major contractual provisions (e.g., Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007), while other 
studies are actually examining the higher-level functions that contracts play (e.g., Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005; Mellewigt et al., 2007). Specific provisions are typically associated with 
the higher-level functions, thus it is possible to look for commonalities across all seventeen 
studies despite the different levels of focus and the different labels used. A careful reading of 
each study reveals three functions that appear repeatedly: safeguarding, coordination and 
contingency adaptability. 
                                                 
15
 Reuer and Ariño’s (2007) study is also included in this category. The authors do not start from the hypothesis that 
contracts can perform multiple functions. Rather, they uncover two distinct dimensions when they perform a factor 
analysis on Parkhe’s (1993) multi-item contractual complexity measure. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-1. Studies that propose distinct contract functions based on theory, or uncover distinct functions via case study, without 
measuring them separately 
Study Details Safeguarding Coordination  Contingency 
Adaptability 
Other 
Lerner and 
Merges (1998) 
Large sample study of biotech alliances, 
data from Recombinant Capital database. 
 
 Control of Intellectual 
Property 
 Alliance management   Determination of 
alliance scope 
 Governance structure 
Avadikyan et 
al. (2001) 
Case study of two fuel cell development 
projects. 
 Incentive  Coordination   Learning 
Dekker (2004) Case study of railroad alliance project.  Management of 
appropriation 
concerns 
 Coordination of tasks   
Klein 
Woolthuis et al. 
(2005) 
Case study of four collaborative 
innovation projects. 
 Legal safeguarding  Coordination  Safeguarding for 
contingencies 
 Sign of commitment 
Mellewigt et al. 
(2007) 
Large scale survey, HR outsourcing 
contracts. 
 Control  Coordination   
Reuer and 
Ariño (2007) 
Survey of 91 alliances in Spain.  Enforcement  Coordination   
Argyres and 
Mayer (2007) 
 
Theory article; primarily focused on 
contracting in high-tech industries. 
 Decision/control 
rights 
 Dispute resolution 
 Assign 
roles/responsibilities 
 Communication 
 Contingency 
planning 
 
Hagedoorn and 
Hesen (2007) 
 
 
 
Case study of a small sample of 
technology development partnership 
contracts drawn from MERIT-CATI 
database. 
 Dispute settlement 
mechanisms 
 Property rights 
 Damage measures 
 Warranties 
  Revisions 
 Adaptation 
(hardship and force 
majeure) 
 
Mayer and 
Teece (2008) 
Case study of 15 aerospace alliance 
contracts. 
 Dispute resolution  Information exchange   Payment terms and 
incentives 
 Structure and 
administrative 
processes 
Faems et al. 
(2008) 
Case study of two exploratory R&D 
alliances. 
 Formalization of 
monitoring 
 Formalization of task 
division 
 Formalization of 
information flows 
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Table 4-2.     Studies that propose distinct functions and actually measure each separately 
Study Details Safeguarding Coordination Contingency 
Planning 
Other 
Luo (2002) 
 
Survey of 293 international joint 
ventures in China. 
  Term specificity  Contingency 
adaptability 
 
Anderson and 
Dekker (2005) 
Survey of 858 transactions for IT 
products and services. 
 Assignment of rights 
 Legal recourse 
   After-sales service 
 Product and price 
Ryall and 
Sampson 
(2006) 
 
Small sample of technology 
alliance contracts from the SDC 
database. 
 Monitoring 
 Penalties 
 Termination clauses 
 IP rights 
  Adjustment 
mechanisms 
 Contract 
completeness 
 Cost sharing 
 Technology aspects 
Argyres et al. 
(2007) 
Sample of IT service contracts 
from one IT services firm. 
  Task description  Contingency 
planning 
 
de Jong and 
Klein 
Woolthuis 
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Given the volume of research on alliance contracts by TCE scholars, it is not surprising 
that fifteen studies (out of seventeen) propose and/or measure a safeguarding function. These 
studies demonstrate that alliance contracts tend to include safeguarding provisions when the level 
of asset specificity is high (e.g., Anderson and Dekker, 2005; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; de Jong 
and Klein Woolthuis, 2009), as well as when there are significant spillover risks (de Jong and 
Klein Woolthuis, 2009). It is also not unexpected that a coordination function is proposed and/or 
measured in fourteen studies given the rise of alliance research drawing on the capabilities-
perspective and the relational-view of contracting. These studies reveal that contracts include 
coordination provisions when the degree of interdependence between the alliance partners is 
non-trivial (Argyres et al., 2007), while fewer coordination provisions are included when 
uncertainty is driven by the need to innovate (Argyres et al., 2007) and when there is trust 
between the partners (de Jong and Klein Woolthuis, 2009). While not investigated as often as the 
safeguarding and coordination functions, seven studies propose and/or measure a contingency 
adaptability function. The studies show that interdependence also influences the use of 
contingency adaptability provisions (Argyres et al. 2007), as do prior ties between alliance 
partners (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). 
In sum, recent research shows that alliance contracts play multiple functions (i.e., 
safeguarding, coordination, contingency adaptability), and that different antecedents influence 
the inclusion of the provisions associated with each function. Argyres and Mayer (2007) 
synthesize this research. Drawing primarily on TCE, they discuss the relationships between five 
key transaction hazards (opportunism, complexity, appropriability, the lack of observability, and 
the lack of verifiability) and the types of provisions that typically appear in contracts (the roles 
and responsibilities of each party, how various contingencies will be contended with, how the 
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parties will communicate with each other, how disputes will be resolved, and how decision and 
control rights will be allocated between the parties). An important takeaway from Argyres and 
Mayer (2007) is that the provisions included in an alliance contract are impacted by the nature of 
the hazards present and industry context. In other words, certain hazards are more likely to 
appear in some contexts than others. As a result, provisions designed to contend with such 
hazards are likely to be context-specific. 
Provisions that provide one or both parties with control over specific aspects of an 
alliance can be found that play at least one of the three functions uncovered in the research 
reviewed in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. Ownership of the intellectual property (IP) developed during an 
alliance is one example. The assignment of IP rights plays a safeguarding role, which protects 
the party that holds the rights from expropriation. While TCE is largely silent about which 
partner should obtain such rights, property rights theory, is not. 
4.5.2.2. Property Rights Theory. As developed by Grossman, Hart and Moore (e.g., 
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), property rights theory (PRT) is 
similar to TCE in that it focuses on firm boundary and scope issues, describing an incomplete 
contracting approach to explain firm-level vertical integration decisions. Based on the logic of 
incentive-alignment, the basic premise of PRT is that firms arise when parties cannot write 
complete contracts and thus the allocation of control over key assets and decisions is important. 
While PRT was not directly developed to explain alliance contracts, it has nonetheless come to 
greatly inform our understanding of them. 
The main assumption of PRT is that it is impossible for two parties to write a verifiable 
contract, enforceable in a court of law, that specifies the amount of effort and the output of each 
party. Bounded rationality plays a role in why this is so; there are several possible contingencies, 
104 
 
 
 
not all of which can be foreseen at the time the contract is drafted. To overcome this problem, 
control over key assets should be assigned to the party whose marginal contribution to the 
outcome of the alliance is indispensable (i.e., has the greatest impact). Control over key assets 
grants the controlling party the right to make decisions about how such assets should be used that 
cannot be specified in the contract ex ante. The controlling party gains bargaining power from 
control over key assets that enables it to appropriate a majority of the returns resulting from the 
alliance. When allocated efficiently, this incentive should induce the controlling party to make 
decisions that maximize the returns from the alliance and refrain from acting opportunistically. 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) adapt the general PRT model to an R&D alliance between two 
firms. In their model, they assume that the firm conducting research does not possess financial 
resources of its own, cannot borrow any funds, and lacks the complementary capabilities to 
commercialize the resulting innovation itself. Thus, the research firm turns for funding to a 
partner, which may intend to utilize the innovation itself or resell it to other firms, but cannot 
carry out the research on its own. The success of the research project in the model is an 
increasing function, though at a decelerating rate, of both the effort exerted by the research firm 
and the financial resources supplied by the funding firm. While simplistic in many respects, the 
model is representative of many ‘real world’ alliances, especially with regard to the size disparity 
between the partners that it portrays.  
Drafting a contract to govern an R&D alliance is challenging. While ownership of the 
resulting innovation can be assigned in an enforceable contract, and the resources to be provided 
by the funding partner can also be specified, it is difficult to write a contract for the delivery of a 
specific innovation owing to uncertainty. In addition, it is difficult to write an enforceable 
contract that specifies the amount of effort to be supplied by the research firm, and even if effort 
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can be contracted it is difficult to verify that the effort has been exerted. From these initial 
assumptions and conditions, Aghion and Tirole (1994) consider two polar cases: (1) the research 
firm has ex ante bargaining power, and (2) the funding firm has ex ante bargaining power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Allocation of control rights according to Aghion and Tirole (1994) model 
 
Figure 4-1 shows the predictions from the model. Ownership of the research output will 
always be efficiently allocated (i.e., follow the basic incentive-alignment premise of PRT) when 
the bargaining power rests with the research firm. In this case, the rights to the innovation will be 
retained by the research firm if the marginal impact of its contribution on the alliance is greater 
than that of the funding firm’s investment (Quadrant III), and transferred to the funding firm in 
exchange for a cash payment if the marginal impact of the funding firm’s investment is greater 
(Quadrant II). The model also predicts that the allocation of ownership is efficient when the 
funding firm holds the leverage if the marginal impact of its investment is greater than that of the 
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research firm’s effort. In this case, the funding firm obtains the rights (Quadrant I). However, if 
success hinges on the marginal contribution of the research firm when the funding firm holds the 
leverage, the ideal outcome will not be attained. While the funding firm is willing to exchange 
the rights for cash, the research firm is unable to compensate the funding firm because of its 
financial constraints. Thus, contrary to PRT, the funding firm retains the rights to the innovation 
in this scenario (Quadrant IV). 
The Aghion and Tirole (1994) model presents a situation where the parties haggle over a 
single, indivisible property right to any forthcoming innovation. However, a wide variety of 
rights are assigned in actual contracts in addition to ownership of any resulting innovation. For 
example, R&D alliance contracts are likely to include clauses that restrict or allow one or both 
parties to terminate the alliance, and expand/extend the alliance. Clauses are also likely to be 
drafted that restrict or allow one or both parties to license the IP developed during the alliance to 
a third party. In addition, the right to delay or suppress journal publications based on the 
technology underlying any IP developed during the alliance may be granted to one or both of the 
partners. While the aforementioned rights are relatively independent of industry context, other 
rights may be included that are context-dependent such as the right to manage the governmental 
approval process in an industry where the introduction of new products is regulated. 
Based on interviews with practitioners, Lerner and Merges (1998) suggest that it is the 
accumulation of various rights, rather than control over any specific right, that makes a 
prospective alliance favorable. Thus, starting with Lerner and Merges (1998), scholars have 
focused on explaining why one firm wins more rights or a larger percentage of the available 
rights in an R&D alliance contract. The setting for the vast majority of this research has been 
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pharmaceutical biotechnology.
16
 As a result, most of the studies in this stream rely on the list of 
control rights developed in this context by Lerner and Merges (1998), or examine a subset of 
these rights (see Table 4-3 for the rights examined in representative published studies). For 
example, Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) investigate the allocation of ‘pie-splitting’ control 
rights (i.e., those that confer ownership or control over activities and the intermediate outputs 
from the alliance that directly affect how the value to be created is to be divided between the 
partners), such as ownership of patented and unpatented IP, the right to manufacture the final 
product, and the right to control the marketing process. 
Several studies confirm the basic PRT hypothesis that control rights are assigned 
according to the marginal contribution (i.e., relative indispensability) of each alliance partner. 
For example, Lerner and Merges (1998), Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003), Higgins (2007) and 
Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) find that more rights or a larger share of rights are assigned to the 
funding firm when research is in an early stage. The logic behind this finding is that early-stage 
projects are in greater need of funding. In addition, there is presumably a high degree of 
information asymmetry between the partners in early-stage projects. Thus, the rights should be 
allocated to the funding firm to induce its optimal level of investment. 
A second proxy for marginal contribution examined in several studies is the number of 
patents held by the research firm at alliance inception. Lerner and Merges (1998) suggest that if 
the research firm has a strong patent portfolio, the initial research is already likely to have been 
completed. In this situation, the research firm’s relative contribution to the alliance will be 
modest. Thus, more rights should be assigned to the financing firm to provide an incentive to 
invest in the alliance. While Lerner and Merges (1998) confirm this contention, Adegbesan and  
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 Two exceptions are Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2003) investigation of Internet portal alliances, and Leiponen’s 
(2008) study of the interaction between knowledge-intensive business service providers and their client firms in 
Finland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-3. Key controls rights in representative studies that examine their allocation 
Lerner and Merges (1998);  
Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003) 
Higgins (2007) Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) 
Key aspects of alliance management 
1. Right to manage clinical trials 
2. Right to undertake process development 
3. Right to manufacture final product 
4. Right to market universally 
5. Right to market product alone 
Determination of alliance scope 
6. Right to expand alliance breadth 
7. Right to expand alliance duration 
8. Right to terminate alliance without cause 
9. Right to terminate particular projects 
10. Right to sub-license 
11. Right to sub-license after expiration/termination 
12. Right to ‘shelve’ project 
Control of IP 
13. Ownership of patents 
14. At least partial patent ownership 
15. Control of patent litigation process 
16. Right to ‘know-how’ transfer 
17. Ownership of ‘know-how’ 
18. Right to delay publication 
19. Right to suppress publication 
Governance structure 
20. Control of project steering committee 
21. Seat on R&D firm’s board 
22. Equity in R&D firm 
23. Right to participate in R&D firm’s financing 
24. Right to register R&D firm’s stock 
25. Ability to make public equity purchases 
IP rights 
1. Ownership of patents 
2. Control and responsibility for patent litigation 
3. Transfer of unpatented R&D ‘know-how’ 
Licensing rights 
4. Right to sub-license 
5. Royalty payment tie-ins 
Clinical trials and distribution rights 
6. Management of clinical trials 
7. Control of initial manufacturing process 
8. Marketing rights to product 
Exit rights 
9. Product reversion rights upon termination 
10. Right to terminate without cause 
IP rights 
1. Partial patent ownership 
2. Exclusive patent ownership 
3. Right to transfer of unpatented ‘know-how’ 
4. Ownership of unpatented ‘know-how’ 
Licensing rights 
5. Right to sub-license 
6. Continued licensing right on expiration 
Manufacturing rights 
7. Right to manufacture final product 
Marketing rights 
8. Basic marketing rights 
9. Universal marketing rights 
10. Control of entire marketing process 
  
1
0
8
 
109 
 
 
 
Higgins (2011) findings suggest that it is simply the research firm’s possession of patents at 
alliance inception, rather than the size of its patent portfolio, that impacts the allocation decision. 
It is important to note that Adegbesan and Higgins’ (2011) do not draw on PRT 
explicitly. Rather, their theoretical approach derives from Adegbesan (2009), who uses the 
‘bargaining perspective on resource advantage’ (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) which builds upon 
strategic factor market theory (Barney, 1986) to account for instances where acquiring firms 
display heterogeneous complementarity to target resources. Drawing on the bargaining 
perspective, Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) examine a third factor which could be considered a 
proxy for marginal contribution, superior complementarity. They argue that research firms with 
more early-stage R&D project experience are likely to possess superior research capabilities, 
making them attractive partners. Thus, the research firm should retain more rights. In addition, 
they suggest that funding firms with more late-stage R&D project experience should obtain more 
rights because they are likely to possess superior downstream complementary assets required for 
commercialization. The authors’ results show strong support for both hypotheses. 
Several studies have also examined the direct impact of bargaining power on the 
allocation of control rights. Investigating the influence of bargaining power is important from a 
theoretical standpoint considering that the results of the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model depend 
on the relative bargaining position of each alliance partner. In addition, examining the impact of 
bargaining power is salient in the context of pharmaceutical biotechnology alliances given the 
frequent size disparity between the research partner (typically a small biotechnology firm) and 
the funding partner (typically an established pharmaceutical manufacturer). 
Using financial measures to gauge the health (and thus bargaining power) of the research 
firm, Lerner and Merges (1998), Lerner et al. (2003), and Higgins (2007) find that cash-
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constrained research firms relinquish more control rights to the funding firm. A similar outcome 
is observed when public IPO funds available in the year prior to the alliance are limited. Higgins 
(2007) finds that funding firms with research pipeline concerns (and thus less bargaining power) 
also tend to give up more control rights, especially in later stage alliances. Finally, Adegbesan 
and Higgins (2011) find that funding partners with larger alliance portfolios obtain a greater 
share of ‘pie-splitting’ control rights. The logic behind this finding is that the funding partner is 
in a better bargaining position because it is less reliant on any one alliance or partner, which is in 
line with anecdotal evidence that pharmaceutical firms with more alliances are able to extract 
more concessions from their biotechnology research partners (Lerner and Merges, 1998). 
It is important to note that the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model does not propose that 
bargaining power directly impacts the allocation of control rights. Rather, the model suggests 
that bargaining power distorts the relationship between marginal contribution and the allocation 
of rights, specifically if the research partner’s contribution is more important (i.e., indispensable) 
when the funding firm holds the leverage. Thus, bargaining power is treated somewhat like a 
moderator in the model. The only test of this interaction is found in Lerner and Merges (1998). 
The authors discover a statistically significant interaction, but not the one proposed by Aghion 
and Tirole (1994). Instead, they find that the research firm cedes fewer rights if its contribution is 
not as critical as the financing firm’s when it possesses the leverage in the relationship. Referring 
back to Figure 4-1, Lerner and Merges’ (1998) findings suggest that the inefficient outcome 
occurs in Quadrant II rather than in Quadrant IV. 
One parallel line of research delves into the part of the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model 
that investigates the relationship between bargaining power and performance. In a study of 
transactions between knowledge-intensive business service providers and their clients, Leiponen 
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(2008) examines the consequences of the service firm relinquishing its rights to the resulting 
innovation when it is in a weaker bargaining position despite its contribution being critical to the 
outcome. She finds that misallocation of the control over the intellectual output due to bargaining 
power differences results in a 23 percent reduction in the probability of service innovation, 
which is a socially sub-optimal outcome. 
In a related study, Kloyer (2011) investigates the effect of the assignment of different 
rights, including IP ownership, the right to control the management of the R&D process, and the 
right to control the marketing of final products, on supplier opportunism. He examines whether 
any of these rights provide a supplier with a greater incentive to refrain from behaving 
opportunistically and exert the optimal amount of effort to attain a successful innovation 
outcome. His findings indicate that IP ownership is the only right that provides such an incentive 
and has an impact on preventing supplier opportunism in early-stage, market-distant R&D 
alliances. The logic behind this finding is that R&D firms lose their original bargaining power 
once the R&D results are transferred to the funding partner, providing little incentive to exert an 
optimal amount of effort. This means that the R&D firm will have to rely on another basis of 
power to ensure that funding partner provides it with a fair share of the returns from the 
innovation. Only IP ownership provides enough power because it is a right that is enforceable in 
court. Thus, retaining IP ownership helps restore some of the R&D firm’s bargaining power, 
providing an incentive to exert optimal effort and refrain from behaving opportunistically. 
Rather than the relationship between bargaining power and performance, Lerner et al. 
(2003) investigate the relationship between bargaining power and contract renegotiation. Using 
the availability of public market financing as a proxy for bargaining power, the authors suggest 
that R&D firms are more likely to initiate contract renegotiations prior to the minimum term 
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stipulated in the contract during periods of increased financing activity when the contract 
initially favors the funding firm. The logic behind this suggestion is that in such a market, 
bargaining power has shifted to the R&D firms. Lerner et al.’s (2003) results are consistent with 
this hypothesis. It is important to note, however, that this study only examines whether the 
contract was renegotiated (as indicated by a publicly-available amendment to the original 
contract). The authors do not provide any details regarding which rights were the focus of the 
renegotiation between the alliance partners. 
A final study that diverges from traditional PRT research is Ariño and Ring (2010). The 
authors, drawing on the broader literature that focuses on the formation stage of alliances and the 
negotiation process (Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Doz, 1996; Ariño and 
de la Torre, 1998; Ariño, de la Torre, and Ring, 2001), analyze a single case study of a 
negotiation between two family-owned firms interested in forming an international joint venture. 
They find that the logic firms use to decide how to allocate various rights, including the 
composition of alliance boards, the roles to be played by personnel from each firm, and which 
decisions each firm will have control over, is jointly shaped by procedural and distributive 
justice. They also find that this logic evolves over time and is shaped by revelations about the 
capabilities of each party and by exogenous events. In addition, they discover that each partner’s 
relative bargaining power is influenced by the organizational role of the negotiators. Overall, 
Ariño and Ring’s (2010) study provides a process view of how the negotiating position of each 
party is shaped which, in turn, impacts the allocation of control and property rights.  
4.2.6. Alliance Capability 
The final stream of the literature reviewed in this section is an emerging area in strategic 
management that emphasizes the importance of a firm’s ‘alliance capability’. Drawing on the 
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inter-organizational learning literature and the dynamic capabilities perspective, research on this 
topic has focused on how firms learn to manage individual alliances and build their alliance 
capability (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002). Khanna defines alliance 
capability as ‘a firm’s ability to identify partners, initiate alliances, and engage in the ongoing 
management and possible restructuring and termination of these alliances’ (1998: 351). Scholars 
suggest that possessing alliance capability is the key to mastering the difficult tasks associated 
with alliance management (Kogut, 1989), achieving tangible and intangible collaborative 
benefits (Simonin, 1997), maximizing the probability of alliance success (Kale et al., 2002), and 
creating competitive advantage through alliances (Draulans, de Man, and Volberda, 2003). 
Alliance experience is considered an important building block for generating alliance 
capability (Simonin, 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath, 2002; Kale 
et al., 2002; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Research shows, 
however, that alliance capability is not created by simply accumulating more experience through 
participation in additional alliances. Rather, firms need to actively engage in leveraging previous 
alliance experience by transferring lessons and the specific know-how from prior alliances to 
other existing alliances, as well as to new alliances (Powell et al., 1996; Kale et al., 2002). This 
research parallels the stream of the inter-organizational learning literature that examines the 
process of learning about alliance management that was discussed earlier in this review. 
Scholars have identified several keys to successfully creating alliance capability 
including an alliance learning process (Simonin, 1997; Khanna, 1998; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999; Kale and Singh, 2007), a firm’s routines to capture, codify, store, integrate, and diffuse 
prior and ongoing alliance knowledge (Powell et al., 1996; Simonin, 1999; Anand and Khanna, 
2000; Kale et al., 2002; Heimeriks, Duysters, and Vanhaverbeke, 2007), and training programs 
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for managers and executives (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2001; Draulans et al., 2003). Research 
indicates that firms that institutionalize these keys by establishing a dedicated alliance function 
achieve better alliance- and firm-level performance (Kale et al., 2002). This relationship is 
mediated, however, by the firm’s alliance learning process (Kale and Singh, 2007). 
Based on extensive interviews with managers from companies reputed to have effective 
alliance capabilities, Dyer et al. (2001) uncovered five key phases of the alliance life cycle (see 
Figure 4-2). The third phase of this cycle, alliance negotiation and governance, encompasses the 
design and drafting of alliance contracts. If the concept of alliance capability is unpacked further, 
specific contract design capabilities emerge from the lessons learned at this phase. Argyres and 
Mayer (2007) argue that these capabilities can become a distinct source of competitive advantage 
as firms learn over time to design more effective contracts, and remedy earlier insufficiencies in 
contract detail when writing subsequent contracts. The limited research that has examined 
contract design capabilities suggests that learning is short-lived, however, unless firms 
deliberately capture lessons from previous contracting experiences (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). 
In the absence of explicit processes, managers are unlikely to document their own contracting 
experiences, or to seek out knowledge from other managers about their contracting experiences. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. The five phases of the alliance life cycle 
Source: Dyer et al. (2001) 
4.2.7. Conclusion 
Three research opportunities emerge from synthesizing the literature reviewed in this 
section. First, it is apparent that scholars believe that contracts play a wide variety of roles in an 
alliance. Research suggests that contracts do more than safeguard an exchange against various 
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hazards; they also serve as a framework to coordinate the actions of the partners and provide the 
partners with guidance regarding how to cope with unforeseen contingencies when they arise. As 
discussed above, several of the studies summarized in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 employ factor analysis 
techniques to tease out these functions from predetermined lists of clauses. Implicit in this 
research is the notion that more complex contracts lead to better exchange performance. TCE 
suggests, however, that particular transaction hazards and/or characteristics are mitigated by 
including specific provisions, not just more or more detailed clauses (Williamson, 1985). In fact, 
including irrelevant clauses may actually lead to prolonged and contentious negotiations between 
exchange partners, which can be avoided if the issues that such provisions contend with are not 
present in the exchange. In addition, adding more detail than required makes a contract harder to 
follow and enforce. Thus, there is an opportunity to examine why specific clauses are included in 
a contract and what function they play. 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) have called on scholars to examine particular provisions in 
contracts rather than relying on global measures. Weber et al. (2009) suggest that a promising 
avenue is to identify the prominent transaction hazards encountered in a specific industry, and 
determine which provisions are typically included in a contract to contend with the hazards that 
are identified. Along these lines, the first research opportunity that this essay addresses is the 
identification of the key hazards and challenges associated with R&D alliances in the medical 
device industry and the contractual mechanisms designed to cope with them. 
Second, this literature review highlights a major assumption about the ability of managers 
and lawyers to undertake complex tasks such as drafting contracts. TCE supposes that managers 
and lawyers know which issues they should be aware of when they draft contracts, and have the 
foresight to anticipate when such issues are likely to arise in a particular transaction. Recent 
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evidence from the alliance capability and inter-organizational learning literatures suggest, 
however, that this may not be the case, especially if managers and lawyers lack previous 
experience drafting contracts (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al., 2011). Thus, the 
second research opportunity that emerges is to examine the role that prior experience plays in the 
development of alliance capabilities, specifically those related to the design of R&D alliance 
contracts. Of particular interest is whether experience with other types of alliances (i.e., 
marketing, supply) is valuable in the context of R&D alliances. Research indicates that the key 
issues in R&D alliances are quite different from those in alliances that involve other value chain 
activities (e.g., Dyer et al., 2001). Thus, I also explore whether the experience gained from 
participating in marketing and supply alliances leads to the development of capabilities that 
contribute to successfully designing R&D alliance contracts. 
Finally, studies employing PRT have greatly advanced our knowledge of the allocation of 
control rights in R&D alliance contracts. Empirical research indicates that bargaining power 
plays a strong role in the assignment of control rights, often outweighing the concerns of 
incentive alignment, particularly in the context of pharmaceutical biotechnology. As noted, 
Leiponen (2008) finds that a sub-optimal amount of effort is exerted when the ownership of 
innovative outputs is misallocated, owing to bargaining power differences. Kloyer (2011) 
discovers, however, that the incentive to exert optimal effort can be restored if the research 
partner retains ownership of the IP. The same incentive is not provided to the research partner 
when it gains control over the management of the R&D process or over the marketing of final 
products. Together, these findings suggest that certain rights are more important to obtain than 
others in order to elicit the optimal degree of effort from one of both alliance partners. 
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Ariño and Ring’s (2010) case study provides insight into how firms initially determine 
which provisions to negotiate over and what the terms should be. They suggest that perceptions 
of procedural and distributive justice jointly shape the negotiating positions of the parties related 
to property and control rights. In the case that they document, managers engage in negotiations 
over specific rights, such as the composition of the alliance board, the roles to be played by 
personnel from each firm, and which decisions each firm will have control over, not counts or 
shares of rights. Lerner et al. (2003) show, however, that contracts are not immutable. Rather, 
they are living documents that can be amended if bargaining power shifts during an alliance.
17
 
Taken together, these studies suggest that a fruitful research avenue to examine is the 
allocation of specific rights rather than investigating why one firm ‘wins’ more of the rights that 
are available at the outset of contract negotiations (some of which may be immaterial to one or 
both firms). Managers do discuss individual rights, as the Ariño and Ring (2010) study 
demonstrates. Most previous empirical work, however, has not examined whether distinct 
allocation mechanisms underlie different rights that play different functions, leading to mixed 
results (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). One exception is Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2003) study of 
Internet portal alliances in which incentive alignment arguments explain the allocation of rights 
associated with ownership, while the assignment of rights associated with control was responsive 
to measures of the relative bargaining power of the two parties. Thus, this essay investigates the 
factors that influence the allocation of rights that play different functions. 
Lastly, whereas the Aghion and Tirole (1994) model suggests that ex ante bargaining 
power distorts the allocation of control and decision rights as predicted by PRT, previous 
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 It is important to note that the authors only examined whether a renegotiation took place (as indicated by a 
publicly-available amendment to the original contract). They did not examine which particular clauses and rights 
were renegotiated. Based on the amended contracts that I examined, however, renegotiation of the entire contract is 
not typically the norm. Rather, amendments tend to focus on narrower issues and the re-allocation of specific rights. 
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research has primarily treated it as having a direct impact. Therefore, this essay will examine 
whether bargaining power plays role a moderating or direct role in determining how rights are 
assigned in R&D alliances. 
4.3. Research Design 
This section starts by recapping the role that contracts play in alliances and the theories 
that address contract design. The research questions that are examined in the two studies in this 
essay are then introduced, followed by a description of the research setting and the data set. A 
brief overview of the two empirical studies conducted in this essay concludes this section. 
4.3.1. Brief Recap of the Role of Contracts in Alliances 
Alliances have become important mechanisms through which firms exchange products, 
services and knowledge (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Mowery et al., 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). 
Such exchange often involves lengthy contracts aimed at improving the financial performance of 
the partner firms, implying that the ability to manage alliances to achieve superior performance 
is crucial (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000). From a managerial standpoint, the 
ability to design alliance contracts efficiently and effectively is potentially an important source of 
competitive advantage (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Thus, it is important to understand the role 
that alliance contracts play and how they are designed. 
In general, a contract is ‘an agreement which is legally enforceable or legally recognized 
as creating a duty’ (Atiyah, 1989: 40). The precise role that contracts play differs depending on 
the theoretical lens applied. In agency theory, contracts are viewed as a means to align incentives 
and share risks (Eisenhardt, 1989). In transaction cost economics (TCE), contracts are seen as 
safeguarding devices that offer protection against opportunism (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 
1985, 1991). Contractual provisions establish penalties for non-cooperative behavior, which 
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should curb such behavior, or, at a minimum, compensate the injured party if it occurs. 
According to property rights theory (PRT), contracts are used to assign specific rights to each 
party to elicit optimal effort in order to ensure successful outcomes (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). 
All three theories suggest that contracts establish the governance mechanisms through 
which transacting parties contend with incentive conflicts. Contracts also provide a blueprint for 
conducting an economic exchange (Macaulay, 1963). As discussed in the literature review, 
alliance contracts typically contain provisions that define each party’s roles and responsibilities, 
the allocation of decision and control rights, how to deal with contingencies, how the parties will 
communicate, and how disputes will be resolved (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Thus, in addition to 
safeguarding, contracts establish a framework that allows partners to coordinate and adapt their 
actions as an alliance unfolds (Llewellyn, 1931; Crocker and Masten, 1991; Gulati, Lawrence, 
and Puranam, 2005). 
Empirical evidence suggests that alliance contracts display considerable heterogeneity. 
For example, in Lerner and Merges’ (1998) study of 200 biotechnology alliances, some of the 25 
provisions examined (see Table 4-3 for a list of these provisions) appear in as few as 6% of the 
contracts, while others are included in up to 93%. A similar degree of heterogeneity is exhibited 
in Reuer et al.’s (2006) analysis of alliances in the German telecommunications industry. They 
find that of Parkhe’s (1998) eight critical provisions (see fn. 14), the incidence of each ranges 
between 11% and 93%. While less heterogeneity is exhibited in Reuer and Ariño’s (2007) study 
of alliances across a variety of industries in Spain, the incidence of these provisions still varies 
between 26% and 58%.
18
 
                                                 
18
 For the sake of comparison with the studies conducted by Lerner and colleagues, equity joint venture contracts are 
excluded from the ranges reported in the studies conducted by Reuer and colleagues. 
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The variance in the structure of alliance contracts suggests that contract design is not a 
one-size-fits-all exercise, but rather an idiosyncratic process. Research has primarily drawn on 
economic theories in order to gain insight into this process. From an agency theory perspective, 
the optimal contract in the standard principal-agent model is comprehensive in the sense that all 
parties’ obligations can be specified in all future states of the world, to the fullest extent possible. 
If this were the case, there would never be a need to revise or renegotiate the contract as an 
alliance unfolds because any changes or additions should have been anticipated and built into the 
contract initially. In practice, however, contracts are not comprehensive and are often revised and 
renegotiated over the course of an alliance, as shown by Lerner et al. (2003). 
According to TCE and PRT, contracts are incomplete because they are costly to devise. 
Hart (1995) explains that the source of these costs is three-fold. First, in an uncertain world 
plagued by the threat of ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ or opportunism (Williamson, 1985: 47), 
it is difficult to foresee and plan for all contingencies due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). 
Second, even if a plan can be devised, negotiating may be difficult because the parties involved 
may lack a common language to describe states of the world and the actions that should be taken. 
Third, even if the parties can plan and negotiate a contract that accounts for various future 
contingencies, it may be difficult for them to write the plan down in a way that an outside party 
(such as a court of law) can understand and enforce. In other words, the parties must able to 
communicate with each other, as well as with outsiders who may not be familiar with the 
environment that the contracting parties operate in. 
While unavoidably incomplete due to these costs, firms are nonetheless observed making 
efforts to devise contracts that are lengthy and that contain detailed provisions to assist in the 
management of alliances. TCE provides guidance regarding the conditions under which certain 
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types of provisions should be included in alliance contracts. Williamson (1985) suggests that 
contracts should include specific types of safeguards, rather than more or more detailed 
safeguards, to mitigate specific hazards. From a practical standpoint, adding unnecessary details 
and irrelevant safeguards can lead to longer, more contentious negotiations or even a stalemate 
between the partner firms. Additional details also make contracts more difficult to follow and 
harder to enforce (Weber et al., 2009). 
While TCE provides guidance regarding when to include specific types of contractual 
provisions, it is relatively silent about how to assign provisions that provide one partner with 
specific decision and control rights, such as IP ownership and the right to control the marketing 
of new products resulting from an alliance. PRT fills this void, suggesting that the assignment of 
such rights is determined by two factors: the importance of each partner firm’s contribution to 
the alliance, and each firm’s relative bargaining power (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990; Aghion &Tirole, 1994). In general, PRT suggests that control should be granted to 
the partner firm whose marginal contribution to the alliance is indispensable. Bargaining power 
may distort the optimal assignment of such rights, however, and as a result, the partner firms 
may not exert full effort. 
As discussed in the literature review, much of the research that employs PRT focuses on 
understanding why one partner wins a larger share or greater number of the rights available in 
alliance contracts. Kloyer (2011), however, is an exception. In his study of R&D alliances in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, he examines whether the assignment of specific rights 
matters. Kloyer discovers that it is important for the research firm to control the IP generated in 
order to restore its incentive to exert optimal effort, which is lost if there is an imbalance in ex 
ante bargaining power favoring the funding partner. Neither control over the R&D process or the 
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marketing of the final product provides the same incentive. Ariño and Ring’s (2010) case study 
of the alliance formation process also provides evidence that firms negotiate for control over 
specific terms that are important to each partner, such as the composition of the alliance board, 
rather than simply haggling over which partner should obtain more rights (which may or may not 
actually be very important to that partner). 
In sum, contracts are shaped by individuals who are limited in their ability to foresee all 
possible contingencies that may arise and potentially impact alliances. As a result, contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete, leading to their frequent revision and renegotiation. Economic theories 
suggest, however, that despite their cognitive limitations, managers are farsighted enough ‘to 
learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards, and factor these back into the contractual relation, 
thereafter to devise responsive institutions’ (Williamson, 1996: 9). In other words, managers can 
anticipate some hazards, and in response, draft contracts that appropriately contend with the 
hazards identified. In equilibrium, TCE also assumes that firms that consistently design 
inadequate contracts and that fail to learn from these mistakes will perform poorly (Williamson, 
1985). In turn, these poor performers will be forced to exit the market. Thus, only alert managers 
and well-designed contracts will survive, which is the premise underlying TCE’s discriminating 
alignment hypothesis (Williamson, 1991). 
4.3.2. Research Questions 
Alliances between firms are now a ubiquitous phenomenon (Gulati, 1998). The ability to 
form and manage them more effectively than competitors has become critical to firm-level 
performance. Negotiating the terms and drafting a detailed contract to govern the relationship 
between the partner firms are important activities that occur during the alliance negotiation and 
governance stage of the alliance life cycle (see Figure 4-2) (Dyer et al., 2001). Thus, because 
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contract design is an important aspect of alliance management, I examine the following 
overarching question in this essay: What factors impact the design of R&D alliance contracts? 
The literature surveyed in the previous section points to three specific questions related to 
the overarching research question that warrant further investigation. First, managers are assumed 
to be economically rational and make decisions regarding contract structure that conform to 
TCE. Scholars acknowledge, however, that we lack explanations for the inclusion of specific 
provisions in contracts (e.g., Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Specifically, they suggest that some 
provisions are context-specific because some contractual hazards are more prevalent in some 
contexts than others. This observation points directly to the first research question addressed in 
this essay: What hazards are encountered in R&D alliances and what contractual solutions are 
implemented to contend with them? 
Second, while Williamson (1996: 9) suggests that economic agents learn from their 
experience, TCE has only recently incorporated learning into its framework (e.g., Williamson, 
1999; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). TCE’s equilibrium assumption implies that learning is 
relatively quick and thorough, and that firms that do not learn from their contract mistakes are 
not likely to survive for long. Evidence indicates, however, that managers may not learn as fast 
or be as farsighted as TCE suggests (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al., 2011). 
Rather, as suggested by the inter-organizational learning literature, extensive experience may be 
required to learn how to design contracts that reflect the critical hazards present in an alliance. 
Managers entering into their first alliance may lack an understanding of what hazards are likely 
to arise. Thus, the second question that this essay seeks to understand is: How does previous 
alliance experience impact the relationships between the hazards encountered in R&D alliances 
and the contractual solutions implemented to contend with them? 
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Finally, research is just starting to examine the contract negotiation process, and the role 
of bargaining power in this process, in an attempt to understand why partners focus on obtaining 
specific rights and not others. Such research departs from earlier work that examines why one 
partner wins more rights or a larger share of the rights available in an R&D alliance contract. 
Whereas this earlier work suggests that the same underlying mechanism explains the allocation 
of a bundle of rights, more recent research proposes that because individual rights play different 
functions, their assignment is expected to be explained by different mechanisms (Adegbesan and 
Higgins, 2011). Thus, the final research question examined in this essay is: What factors 
influence the assignment of key control and decision rights in R&D alliance contracts? 
4.3.3. Research Setting
19
 
In the studies that follow, an empirical context is required in which R&D alliances 
between large firms and smaller, entrepreneurial firms are relatively prevalent because the 
learning and bargaining power disparities that result from size asymmetry are features that factor 
prominently in the arguments that are developed and examined. The medical device industry 
provides an appropriate setting for this purpose. 
Section 321, paragraph (h) of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
defines a medical device as: 
‘[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or 
accessory, which is– 
 
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States 
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, 
 
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other 
animals, or 
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 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section comes from Ernst and Young (2010) and Seligman (2011). 
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(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or 
other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes 
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals 
which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its 
primary intended purposes.’ 
 
New medical devices are regularly developed and introduced that improve the diagnosis 
and treatment of various diseases and conditions. Such devices may be based on existing 
technologies or on new technologies that have a profound impact on healthcare practices. 
Global medical device sales for 2009 (the latest year for which information is available) 
are estimated to be between $206 billion and $350 billion. The U.S. market represents roughly 
47% of this total. Germany, the UK, and France account for about 50% of sales in the European 
Union. The global market is expected to continue to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 
over 5% through 2014, reflecting favorable worldwide demographic trends. Growth is expected 
to be driven by demand for new devices that show promise to be at least as effective as 
competing pharmaceutical treatment options across many major therapeutic categories. 
The medical device industry is extremely diversified, covering several related industries 
with hundreds of thousands of products. In addition to products which are used directly to treat 
patients, some devices are used for drug development and the analysis of laboratory samples for 
medical research. Medical devices can generally be divided into two categories: (1) conventional 
products with little technological differentiation and a wide variety of uses, and (2) high-
technology products that depend on cutting-edge science to address specific therapeutic and 
diagnostic applications. 
Conventional devices are comparatively easy to manufacture. Margins tend to be narrow 
due to low entry barriers and intense price competition. As a result, manufacturers depend on 
high sales volumes for profits. Firms often obtain long-term supply contracts with large-scale 
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institutional healthcare providers (i.e., hospital chains, health maintenance organizations, nursing 
homes) to be successful. Some examples of conventional devices include intravenous products, 
anesthesia items, surgical apparel, traditional wound dressings, kits, and trays. While many of 
these products are designed to be disposable, an instrument such as a stethoscope may be a once-
in-a-lifetime purchase for a physician. Conventional products often evolve over time. For 
example, traditional untreated gauze-based wound dressings are being replaced by new products 
that incorporate biologically-derived materials that stimulate faster healing.  
Major diversified companies rely on the cash generated from the sales of conventional 
products to fund the development of high-tech devices. Such products are less vulnerable to 
competition because they tend to require substantial R&D and regulatory review before they can 
go on the market. In addition, high-tech devices that address previously unmet medical needs are 
often able to command a premium price. In turn, firms are able to profit from the sizeable 
margins available from such products until competitors develop a similar device. Products in this 
category include implantable cardiovascular and orthopedic devices, advanced wound care 
management systems, and many surgical instruments, as well as a few in vitro diagnostic tests. 
Large corporations with global scale dominate the medical device industry, offering full 
lines of conventional and high-tech products. Small and mid-sized companies can find 
opportunities to compete though, especially in sectors that rely on innovation. Table 4-4 contains 
a list of the 10 largest global medical device manufacturers in 2009, ranked in terms of total 
sales. Nearly all of the world leaders are based in the U.S. Only a few non-U.S. firms, such as 
Smith and Nephew plc (London, UK) and the diversified conglomerates Royal Philips 
Electronics AV (Amsterdam, the Netherlands) and Siemens AG (Munich, Germany), have an 
influence on the industry. 
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Table 4-4. Ten largest global medical device companies, 2009 
Company Medical device sales 
(in millions of US$) 
% of total sales 
from medical devices 
Johnson and Johnson 23,574 38.1 
GE Healthcare 17,438 16.7 
Siemens Medical Systems 16,015 10.2 
Medtronic 14,599 100.0 
Philips Medical Systems 
(a unit of Royal Philips Electronics) 
10,933 29.7 
Covidien 8,995 29.2 
Boston Scientific 8,188 100.0 
Abbott Labs 7,813 73.2 
Becton Dickinson 7,161 100.0 
Stryker 6,723 100.0 
Source: Company reports 
In the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the principal agency responsible 
for protecting the public from dangerous or ineffective medical devices. Firms manufacturing 
devices must obtain FDA approval before they can sell their products in the U.S. or export them 
abroad.
20
 Firms must also meet the regulatory requirements of foreign governments if products 
are tested or marketed abroad. Japan, Australia and the EU have regulations and approval 
processes similar to the U.S., while developing countries such as those in Latin America and 
Asia generally have minimal regulatory oversight. 
In 1976, the U.S. Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
to address concerns about the malfunctioning of new devices. Since then, U.S.-based device 
manufacturers have been required to provide extensive documentation to the FDA regarding 
product safety and efficacy. The FDA reviews this material in order to determine whether 
marketing approval should be granted. The amount of evidence submitted to the FDA depends 
on the degree of risk the device presents to the patient. Devices fall into one of three general 
classifications for new submissions; these categories are briefly summarized in Table 4-5. 
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 The FDA does not regulate products that are both made and sold abroad by U.S. companies. 
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Table 4-5. General classifications for new medical device submissions 
Source: Seligman (2011) 
To gain marketing approval, manufacturers must submit one of two kinds of filings, 
either a premarket notification (also known as a 510(k) notification) or a premarket application 
(PMA). A 510(k) filing is the most common, applying to Class I, Class II and some Class III 
devices that are substantially similar to approved products that are already on the market. In most 
cases, descriptive data and a labeling review are sufficient to support a 510(k) submission, but 
clinical studies may be necessary for some Class III devices. The FDA reviews 510(k) filings 
and grants marketing clearance to those that it accepts, rather than formal approval. In 80% of 
cases, it takes 3-6 months to obtain clearance after a 510(k) is submitted (Emergo Group, 2011). 
A PMA must be submitted to the FDA for Class III medical devices that are not similar 
to those currently on the market or that employ novel treatment methods. A PMA is more 
complex and time-consuming to prepare than a 510(k) because the file submitted typically 
contains a large quantity of animal and clinical testing data, as well as manufacturing data, all of 
which are carefully reviewed by the FDA before approval is granted. The costs for clinical trials 
Classification Description 
Class I  Devices which pose little patient risk (e.g., stethoscopes, surgical 
scalpels) 
 Manufacturers only need to register their facilities and list their 
products with the FDA 
 Facilities must conform to good manufacturing practices (GMPs) 
Class II  Devices that pose a moderate risk to the patient (e.g., x-ray machines, 
endoscopes, surgical lasers) 
 Manufacturers have to provide the FDA with evidence of safety and 
efficacy 
 Products must meet certain performance standards 
 Manufacturers are responsible for post-market surveillance and 
maintenance of patient registries 
Class III  Technologically sophisticated products that entail significant risk to 
patients (e.g., cardiac pacemakers, angioplasty catheters, stents) 
 Must go through extensive clinical trials before FDA will review, let 
alone approve 
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in support of a PMA are substantially higher than for a 510(k), typically four to ten times greater. 
Firms must also file for an investigational device exemption (IDE) to obtain permission from the 
FDA to use complex new devices in clinical trials. If permission is granted, the IDE allows a 
manufacturer to use their device to conduct limited human clinical trials, typically involving 
fewer than 100 people. The entire FDA review process, which may involve public meetings to 
discuss the application, normally takes 18 months to two years after a PMA is filed. 
The development and introduction of innovative new products drive growth in the 
medical device industry. R&D spending, however, varies significantly from firm to firm. 
Companies manufacturing conventional products generally do not invest much in R&D, while 
those pursuing high-tech products maintain high levels of R&D spending. Overall, the range is 
wide (5-15%), but average R&D intensity is approximately 10%.
21
 
Ideas for new devices come from many sources. Manufacturers often collaborate with 
customers, seeking input on applications and design from the earliest stages of development. 
There are numerous accounts of physician-inventors approaching companies with ideas either for 
novel products or for ways to improve existing ones (e.g., Spetz, 1995; Lettl, Herstatt, and 
Gemuenden, 2006). Several studies have shown that many important scientific instrument 
inventions originated from user innovators, not from firms.
22
 University researchers are also an 
important source of medical device innovations (Blume, 1995; Gelijns and Rosenberg, 1995). 
Many large medical device firms are hesitant to develop high-tech products. Instead, they 
acquire or ally with small firms working on pioneering technologies to minimize their risk. 
Alliances have become important vehicles for R&D and product development in the medical 
                                                 
21
 For comparison, the R&D intensity for the average industrial company is 3-4%. 
22
 Early studies by von Hippel (1976) and Shaw (1985) reported that upwards of 80% of scientific instruments were 
conceived by user innovators. A more recent study by Chatterji, Fabrizio, Mitchell, and Schulman (2008) reported 
that physicians accounted for almost 20% of the approximately 26,000 medical device patents filed in the U.S. from 
1990 to 1996.  
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device industry over the last 40 years, with contractual alliances overtaking joint ventures as the 
dominant alliance mode in the industry during the 1990s (Hagedoorn, 2002). As a result, large 
companies often commercialize breakthrough products despite not necessarily originating them. 
Another factor contributing to the proliferation of contractual R&D alliances in the 
medical device industry since the early 1990s is the transition from an emphasis on mechanical 
innovations to biological innovations, and combinations of the two. Such innovations, known as 
convergence products, incorporate biologically active ingredients into traditional medical 
devices. Examples include joint implants coated with drugs that speed healing, implantable 
pumps used to deliver drugs directly to the site of an injury, and drug-eluting stents that help to 
prevent restenosis (i.e., the reoccurrence of the narrowing of a blood vessel) in diseased 
peripheral or coronary arteries. Developing convergence products requires expertise in biology 
and pharmacology, which a traditional, engineering-oriented medical device manufacturer often 
does not possess. Thus, many firms pursuing the development of drug-device combination 
products have formed alliances in order to access knowledge and the skills that they lack.
23
 
Overall, the evidence reviewed in this section suggests that the medical device industry is 
an ideal research setting – it is highly R&D intensive, the emergence of convergence products 
presents a capabilities challenge to industry incumbents, and most of the R&D alliances between 
large firms and their smaller, entrepreneurial partners are organized contractually. 
4.3.4. Data Set 
The sample of contracts employed to test the hypotheses developed in this study was 
obtained from Windhover Information, Inc., a Connecticut-based firm that was acquired by 
Elsevier Business Intelligence in March 2008. Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database 
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 In addition to drug-device combination products, there are also medical devices that incorporate wireless 
capabilities in order to transmit patient data. These products require expertise in software development and 
information technology, which also may not be within the knowledge portfolio of a traditional device manufacturer. 
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contains information on approximately 4500 medical device, research equipment and in vitro 
diagnostic alliances, including over 430 actual contracts. To my knowledge, there are currently 
no published studies in the strategy literature that have employed this database, making it 
difficult to comment on how compressive Windhover’s coverage is of R&D alliances in the 
medical device industry relative to the true amount of alliance activity in the industry over the 
time period covered by the database (1991-2012). However, Windhover collects information 
from a variety of sources including directly from companies in the medical device industry as 
well as from representatives of the investment banking, venture capital, consulting and other 
industry-support sectors. In addition, Windhover’s research staff extensively monitors press 
releases and SEC documents to ensure that transactions are captured in a timely fashion for 
inclusion in the database. The contracts collected come from forms 10-K, 10-Q, S-1 and 8-K, 
and they are available because publicly traded firms are required by the SEC to disclose 
materially relevant transactions (i.e., those that account for ≥5% of the firm’s annual revenue). 
Due to limited coverage between 1991 and 1994, I only investigate alliances in the 
database for the period 1995-2009. According to Windhover’s classification scheme, roughly 
2600 of the transactions in the database during this window involve R&D. Windhover was able 
to a locate contracts from SEC filings in 280 of these cases. However, Windhover’s scheme 
classifies several agreements where intellectual property (IP) or a previously developed product 
is simply being licensed as an R&D alliance. Thus, deals that did not involve an active R&D 
component were screened out of the sample. It is important to note though that many of the 
contracts included in the final sample do contain licensing provisions that address the usage and 
ownership of IP, issues which are critical in R&D alliances. In addition, while the contracts in 
the final sample focus on end-product-driven R&D, some also involve process development.  
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Following the convention in previous work (e.g., Higgins, 2007; Lerner and Merges, 
1998), I also excluded contracts involving universities, medical centers, other non-profit 
organizations, and government agencies, as the contracts drafted for these cases are likely to 
adhere to very specific templates dictated by state and federal mandate. In addition, I excluded 
alliances (1) where one of the firms was private, (2) with more than two partners, (3) where one 
partner had controlling interest in the other partner, and (4) where the contract served only as an 
amendment to an earlier contract.
24
 
After taking the screening criteria into account, the final sample contains 66 contracts 
with 44 unique buyers and 53 unique suppliers. The firms involved in each deal were classified 
as a buyer or supplier by examining the flow of payments. The firms providing funding and/or 
making an equity investment in the other partner are classified as buyers, while the firms 
receiving funding and/or an investment are designated as suppliers. Payments were not made in a 
few of the partnerships in the sample, so support documents (e.g., 10-K summaries, press 
releases) were used to determine the role of each party. It is important to note that this 
classification scheme corresponds with the terminology introduced in the hypotheses section of 
Study 1 regarding buyers and suppliers of technology in R&D alliances. Four firms served as 
both a buyer and a supplier in the sample. 
Table 4-6 provides the yearly distribution of the contracts in the sample. It is important to 
note that the sample only contains publically available contracts. Thus, it is difficult to 
definitively state whether the observed distribution is representative of the actual level of R&D 
alliance activity in the medical device industry during the 1995-2009 period. However, the 
pattern generally follows the trends reported by Hagedoorn (2002) and Schilling (2009) through 
at least 2005. The activity for the period after 2005 also appears to reflect the slight improvement 
                                                 
24
 In two cases, I was able to locate the contract corresponding to the original alliance agreement. 
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in the U.S. economy at mid-decade, followed by the recession that started in late 2007-early 
2008. 
Table 4-6. Yearly distribution of contracts 
Year Frequency Percent (%) Cum. percent (%) 
1995 1 1.52 1.52 
1996 2 3.03 4.55 
1997 1 1.52 6.06 
1998 8 12.12 18.18 
1999 8 12.12 30.30 
2000 10 15.15 45.45 
2001 12 18.18 63.64 
2002 2 3.03 66.67 
2003 7 10.61 77.28 
2004 1 1.52 78.79 
2005 3 4.55 83.33 
2006 3 4.55 87.88 
2007 6 9.09 96.97 
2008 1 1.52 98.48 
2009 1 1.52 100.00 
Total 66 100.00  
 
For each contract in the final sample, I extracted the following information from the deal 
summary compiled by Windhover: (1) if an equity investment was made by the buyer, (2) the 
potential deal value (i.e., the total value of any up-front payments plus potential milestone and 
R&D payments), and (3) if any royalties will be paid to the supplier. To ensure that the summary 
information was accurate, I checked it against the actual contract terms. Table 4-7 provides 
selected information about the deals associated with each contract and the firms participating in 
them. I used the actual contracts to determine if the clauses of interest in Study 1 are included 
and how the key rights of interest in Study 2 are assigned in each alliance in the sample. 
In addition, I collected patent data for each firm in the final sample of R&D alliance 
contracts. This information was collected from three sources: Delphion, FreePatentsOnline, and 
Google Patents. Delphion provides complete text and images of all U.S. patents granted by the 
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U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) since 1974, and bibliographic text and some images 
since 1971. FreePatentsOnline provides complete text and images of all U.S. patents granted by 
the USPTO since 1976. The Delphion and FreePatentsOnline collections also include full images 
for most patents dating back to 1790. In instances where I could not find a patent in the Delphion 
or FreePatentsOnline collections, I turned to Google Patents, which provides images for all U.S. 
patents ever granted by the USPTO. 
Table 4-7. Selected information about the sample 
Number of deals with an equity investment 25 (37.9% of sample) 
Common stock: 19 
Preferred stock: 9 
Average deal value $23.8 million 
No. of deals with potential royalty payments 37 (56.1% of sample) 
Buyer, average revenue in year prior to deal $10.9 billion 
Supplier, average revenue in year prior to deal $42.7 million 
 
Since firms do not always assign patents to the subsidiary where the technology was 
developed, the corporate-level knowledge portfolio of each firm rather than of single subsidiaries 
has to be measured. Failure to capture patents assigned to each subsidiary in a corporate structure 
leads to a noisy measure of a firm’s knowledge portfolio, and in turn, biased parameter estimates 
(Kennedy, 2003). To avoid this issue, a patent portfolio was constructed for each firm based on 
the patents assigned to the parent firm as well as those assigned to all of its subsidiaries. To 
identify all of the subsidiaries associated with each firm in the sample, I used the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations. The Directory contains information on the subsidiaries and affiliates of 
both public and private, U.S. and non-U.S. firms. To ensure that the subsidiaries listed in the 
Directory were actually associated with the parent firm at the time the alliance was established, I 
gathered a comprehensive history of each firm’s mergers and acquisitions from Mergent Online. 
In addition, the firms involved in several of the alliances are themselves subsidiaries. In each of 
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these instances, the ultimate parent firm was identified, and then the above procedure was 
followed to identify all subsidiaries associated with that parent. I then collected all of the patents 
assigned to the firms identified as part of each corporate tree for the purposes of constructing 
several of the key independent variables employed in Studies 1 and 2. 
Firm-level financial information was collected from Compustat, and information about 
firm-level alliance experience and the history of prior alliances between partners was gathered 
from the Strategic Transactions database. The measures constructed from the information 
collected from these additional sources are described in detail in the two studies that follow. 
4.3.5. Overview of Studies 1 and 2 
Study 1 identifies the prominent hazards that firms are likely to encounter in R&D 
alliances. A conceptual model is developed, which relies on the logic of TCE, specifying the 
relationships between these hazards and the inclusion of specific provisions. The impact of 
previous alliance experience on the proposed relationships is also addressed. The relationships in 
the model are then translated into specific hypotheses, which are then tested using the data set 
described above. 
From a theoretical standpoint, managers and lawyers are assumed to be economically 
rational. Consequently, it is also assumed that contract design is guided by the logic of economic 
theories. The hypotheses developed in Study 1 explore these assumptions. Specifically, by 
examining how previous alliance experience influences contract design, I hope to gain insight 
into whether managers implement what they have learned from experience rather quickly as TCE 
assumes, or whether learning is more slow and incremental as suggested by studies in the inter-
organizational learning and alliance capabilities literatures. This is a potentially important 
contribution of Study 1 that expands on what has been done in previous research. 
136 
 
 
 
Study 2 addresses the assignment of control rights in R&D alliance contracts. As noted 
by Adegbesan and Higgins (2011: 191), ‘most previous empirical work has failed to account for 
functionally differentiated subsets among control rights, leading to mixed results.’ For instance, 
in their study of internet-portal alliances, Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) found support for 
incentive-alignment arguments for the assignment of one subset of control rights, while the 
assignment of a second subset was responsive to the relative bargaining power of the partners. 
Thus, tests of theory can be confounded by the distinct allocation mechanisms underlying 
different control rights. This finding is in line with the research discussed previously that 
suggests that it is the assignment of individual rights, rather than the accumulation of many 
rights, that matters to the firms engaged in contract negotiations. 
Study 2 extends research on control rights by focusing on predicting the allocation of two 
rights that are important in R&D alliances, namely ownership of IP and unilateral termination 
rights. The conceptual model developed in Study 2 proposes that there are different underlying 
allocation mechanisms for each of these rights due to the role that they play. The empirical study 
conducted also investigates whether bargaining power directly influences the allocation of such 
rights or moderates the main relationships proposed. Thus, the main contribution of this study is 
that it explores the factors that influence how individual rights are assigned in R&D alliances, 
especially the pathway through which bargaining power operates. 
4.4. Study 1: Contractual Solutions to the Hazards Encountered in R&D Alliances and the 
Impact of Previous Alliance Experience on their Implementation 
 
4.4.1. Introduction 
R&D alliances can provide firms with several benefits such as access to new technologies 
and the shortening of development cycle times, but they are also fraught with hazards. Partners 
often must share knowledge with each other specific to the alliance activities. However, doing so 
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creates the opportunity for one or both partners to misappropriate such knowledge. Knowledge 
outside of the scope of the activities being performed may also be exposed during the alliance, 
creating the risk of ‘leakage’. Thus, managers are faced with two hazards in an R&D alliance: (1) 
adequately promoting the transfer of knowledge critical to the performance of the alliance while 
(2) protecting against the actions of a potentially opportunistic partner. These hazards are 
especially daunting in alliances that partner smaller, entrepreneurial firms with larger firms 
owing to the disparity in the learning rate between such firms (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). 
Drawing on the logic of transaction cost economics (TCE), this study examines how these 
hazards are dealt with contractually in R&D alliances. 
TCE suggests that particular hazards can be mitigated by devising the appropriate 
contractual safeguards (Williamson, 1985). This assertion supposes that managers and lawyers 
know which challenges they should be aware of in the first place, and have the foresight to 
anticipate when such issues are likely to arise in a particular transaction. Recent evidence 
suggests that this may not be the case, especially if managers and lawyers lack previous 
contracting experience (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al., 2011). However, 
managers and lawyers are more likely to have learned how to design contracts that reflect the 
critical challenges present in the partnership if they possess such experience. Thus, this study 
examines how previous alliance experience impacts contract design. 
This study also explores whether all alliance experience is created equally. From an 
operational standpoint, the knowledge and capabilities required to manage R&D alliances are 
likely to be quite different than those needed in manufacturing or marketing alliances. In 
addition, research indicates that the key contractual issues in R&D alliances are quite different 
from those in alliances that involve other value chain activities (e.g., Dyer et al., 2001). Thus, the 
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hazards that are prominent in R&D alliances are likely to be different than those encountered in 
marketing and/or manufacturing alliances. As a result, managers and lawyers may not know 
which challenges to be on the lookout for and which contractual solutions to implement if they 
lack experience designing R&D contracts or if they have only designed contracts for situations 
that involve other value chain activities. 
Overall, the following research questions are addressed by this study:  
1. What contractual solutions are implemented to contend the hazards encountered in 
R&D alliances? 
 
2. How does previous alliance experience impact the relationships between the hazards 
encountered in R&D alliances and the contractual solutions implemented to contend 
with them? 
 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses why 
R&D alliances are different than those that involve other value chain activities and why these 
differences give rise to the hazards that plague R&D alliances. This discussion is then followed 
by an exposition of the theoretical approach adopted in this study. A conceptual model of the 
relationships to be investigated is then developed. This model is used to generate a series of 
hypotheses, the tests and results of which are then detailed. Finally, I end by more fully 
discussing the results and their implications. 
4.4.2. Theory Development 
4.4.2.1. Major Hazards in R&D Alliances. The major challenges in R&D alliances 
stem from the knowledge-based nature of the resources contributed by each partner firm and the 
idiosyncratic nature of R&D itself. As a result, alliance outcomes are determined by the extent to 
which these challenges can be mitigated. Alliances involving R&D differ from those that involve 
manufacturing, marketing or component supply in two important ways. First, firms pool their 
knowledge in R&D alliances. This knowledge is subject to leakage, or unintended transfer, 
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because transfer may occur upon pooling
25
 and intellectual property (IP) rights offer only 
imperfect protection against leakage (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Second, R&D projects are 
more idiosyncratic and uncertain than manufacturing, marketing or supply activities. As 
Holmstrom (1989: 309) notes, R&D projects are: 
‘(a) risky – there is a high probability of failure, but also prospects for 
extraordinary returns; (b) unpredictable – many future contingencies are 
impossible to foresee; (c) long-term and multi-stage – the project has an 
invention, a development and a completion stage, and can be terminated between 
those; (d) labor intensive – all stages require substantial human effort; and (e) 
idiosyncratic – not easily comparable to other projects.’ 
 
Consequently, it is difficult to observe the inputs into the R&D process, due to their knowledge-
based nature, and it is difficult to verify whether the effort exerted by the partners is optimal by 
examining the outputs since the link between effort and outcome in R&D is not clear. These 
characteristics give rise to the two major opportunism hazards that plague R&D alliances: 
shirking and misappropriation. 
Shirking occurs when one or more of the partners contribute less effort and/or lower 
quality inputs to the joint R&D activities than originally agreed upon. For example, one or both 
of the partners may re-allocate knowledgeable personnel originally assigned to the alliance to 
other alliances or internal projects. The partners may also hold back knowledge relevant to the 
alliance. Shirking is particularly problematic in R&D alliances because it is difficult to observe a 
lack of effort and to determine when relevant knowledge is being withheld. Even if the outcome 
can be observed, it is difficult to verify in a court of law whether it was a lack of effort or 
insufficient knowledge transfer that lead to the performance shortcomings of a specific R&D 
alliance. Thus, the probability of shirking increases when it is difficult to detect. 
                                                 
25
 During an alliance, one partner may inadvertently transfer its proprietary knowledge to another partner without 
receiving any compensation, which is essentially Arrow’s (1971) fundamental paradox of information – information 
must be shared to be valued, but after it has been shared it has no additional value (Williamson, 1985). 
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Misappropriation, or the uncompensated leakage of knowledge between firms, is a well-
documented phenomenon in the TCE literature (Pisano, 1990; Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 
1998). This hazard is acutely problematic when a smaller, entrepreneurial firm forms an alliance 
with a larger firm (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). A ‘learning race’ in which each firm tries to 
acquire specific knowledge from the other firm is likely to ensue in this situation (Hamel, 1991). 
Specifically, the larger firm attempts to obtain the smaller firm’s technology, while the smaller 
firm tries to learn about and imitate the larger firm’s organizational resources and capabilities. 
The first partner to finish learning can then withdraw from the alliance, thus the characterization 
of the alliance as a learning race. 
A learning race often favors the larger firm (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). The smaller firm 
frequently lacks the managerial or financial resources to fully understand, evaluate, and imitate 
the larger firm’s organizational capabilities, which are embedded in complex processes and 
routines (Barney, 1995). Conversely, the larger firm often possesses the resources required to 
misappropriate the smaller firm’s technology. This task is made easier because the smaller firm 
often provides the larger firm with a significant amount of detail about its technology upfront in 
order to convince the larger firm to form an alliance. In addition, the smaller firm may expose 
proprietary knowledge that is outside of the scope of the alliance along with knowledge that is 
relevant to the alliance. 
The implications of these hazards are straightforward for the realization of the alliance 
objectives. Alliance success hinges on the ability of the partner firms to freely cooperate, while 
refraining from acting opportunistically. TCE suggests that these competing objectives can be 
satisfied by selecting the proper governance mode (Williamson, 1985). Thus, if cooperation can 
be achieved, the partners are less likely to shirk on the alliance or misappropriate each other’s 
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knowledge, improving the chances of success. This suggestion adheres to TCE’s discriminating 
alignment hypothesis, which predicts that performance should be superior when the governance 
mode is properly aligned with the attributes of a transaction (Williamson, 1991). 
Several studies have examined the choice between alternative R&D alliance governance 
modes (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2004b). The conclusion from these studies is 
that equity joint ventures (EJVs) are required when the threat of opportunism is high, unless the 
partners’ knowledge bases greatly diverge. In practice, however, most R&D alliances are not 
organized as EJVs. Only 6.5% of the R&D alliances examined in Sampson’s (2004b) study of 
the telecommunications equipment industry are organized as EJVs; the rest are organized 
contractually. A similar ratio is found in the MERIT-CATI database, which focuses on ‘strategic 
technology agreements’ between industrial partners (Schilling, 2009). According to this 
database, EJVs account for less than 10% of the R&D alliances formed since the mid-1980s 
across a variety of low-, medium- and high-tech industries. This trend indicates that ‘[b]y and 
large, companies seem to increasingly prefer contractual partnerships to joint ventures’ 
(Hagedoorn, 2002: 481). 
One potential explanation for the increase in the number of contractual R&D alliances is 
that the additional set up and administrative costs associated with EJVs offset the benefits from 
enhanced cooperation and the prevention of opportunism. In other words, the hazards faced may 
not be severe enough to warrant establishing a separate legal entity to contend with them. In 
addition, EJVs may not be the appropriate governance form to deal with the high degree of 
technical uncertainty encountered in R&D. It is also difficult to quickly change course in EJVs, 
and EJVs are costly to disband. In contrast, contractual alliances are more flexible and easier to 
adapt as R&D activities unfold. 
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It would be presumptuous to assume, however, that R&D alliances organized as 
contractual partnerships are absent of opportunism and that the partners freely cooperate with 
each other. Such issues are still likely to be present and require attention. The TCE approach to 
contracting suggests that these problems can be mitigated by drafting specific contractual 
provisions that act as substitutes for the hierarchical governance mechanisms employed in EJVs. 
The conceptual model presented in Figure 4-3 adopts this approach in order to investigate how 
contracts are structured to contend with the hazards that are encountered in R&D alliances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Conceptual model for study 1 
Shirking may take the form of intentionally holding back knowledge from the alliance. It 
may be difficult, however, to differentiate between such situations and those where knowledge is 
insufficiently exchanged because it is difficult to transfer. Thus, while it is often hard to 
determine why knowledge transfer was inadequate after the fact, managers can anticipate when it 
might be a problem by assessing transferability when setting up the alliance. Figure 4-3 shows 
that managers should incorporate communication provisions in an R&D alliance contract to 
contend with knowledge transfer issues, whether they stem from intentional shirking or not. 
However, in line with Argyres and Mayer (2007), I argue that the exact provisions to be drafted 
will depend on the precise nature of the hazard in this context. 
Transferability 
Appropriability 
Communication Provisions 
Safeguarding Provisions 
Previous Alliance 
Experience 
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Far from being easy to transfer, knowledge has been characterized as relatively immobile 
(Attewell, 1992), inert (Kogut and Zander, 1992), and even ‘sticky’ (von Hippel, 1994). The 
literature proposes that several factors influence transferability. Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad (1989) 
suggest that transferability is impacted by how easily knowledge can be transported, interpreted, 
and absorbed. Winter (1987) proposes that characteristics of knowledge itself, including how 
tacit, teachable, articulated, observable, complex, and systemic it is, influence its transferability. 
Von Hippel (1994) suggests that transferability is impacted by firm-level characteristics such as 
the reliability of the source, and the absorptive capacity of the recipient (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). Hamel’s (1991) case study of nine international alliances indicates that transferability is 
also influenced by firm-level traits such as intent, transparency, and receptivity. 
The degree of transferability also provides insight into the mechanisms through which 
knowledge is exchanged. When transferability is high, knowledge is readily exchanged between 
the partner firms, whereas it is more difficult to transmit when transferability is low. Simpler 
transfer mechanisms can be employed in the former situation, while more complex mechanisms 
are often required when knowledge is difficult to transfer. Thus, the provisions incorporated in 
an R&D alliance contract should reflect the complexity of the transfer mechanism. Based on this 
logic, I suggest that different communication provisions should be drafted depending on the 
degree of transferability, rather than proposing that communication provisions in general are 
required when transferability is low, and vice versa. The hypotheses developed in the next 
section examine how two of these factors, namely tacitness and knowledge diversity, determine 
the nature of transferability, which influences the type of communication provision necessary 
and the likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract. 
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The second important hazard in R&D alliances is the misappropriation of knowledge. 
According to the logic of TCE, managers should incorporate safeguarding provisions in R&D 
alliance contracts when the threat of appropriability is high. Again, I propose that there is a more 
nuanced relationship. Specifically, I suggest that the precise provisions to incorporate will 
depend on the mechanism through which knowledge is appropriated. The same factors that 
characterize the nature of transferability also describe the nature of appropriability (Sampson, 
2004b). Thus, this study also examines how tacitness and knowledge diversity determine how 
knowledge is appropriated, which impacts the type of safeguarding provision required and the 
likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract. 
The key relationships in the model draw on TCE, which assumes that managers learn 
relatively quickly from their experience, allowing them to design contracts responsive to the 
hazards that they perceive. This assumption is explored by investigating the impact of previous 
alliance experience on these key relationships. Several hypotheses proposing a moderating effect 
for previous alliance experience are also developed in the following section. 
4.4.3. Hypotheses 
4.4.3.1. The Ease of Knowledge Transfer and Communication Provisions. The ability 
to transfer knowledge in an R&D alliance is impacted by many factors including the 
characteristics of knowledge itself and of the alliance partners. Examining two of these factors, 
tacitness and knowledge diversity, provides an idea of how difficult it is to share knowledge 
between partners in an R&D alliance, which in turn influences the type of communication 
provision required and the probability of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract. 
Firms that form R&D alliances are essentially declaring their intent to share their 
knowledge with their partners. According to Winter (1987), the ability to share knowledge is 
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impacted by whether knowledge is explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge has been described as 
‘know-what’ (Brown and Duguid, 1998) and refers to knowledge that has been formalized and 
codified. Because it has been documented, explicit knowledge is fairly easy to identify, store, 
retrieve, and share (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Tacit knowledge, in 
contrast, has been described as ‘know-how’ (Brown and Duguid, 1998) and refers to intuitive, 
hard-to-define knowledge that is largely experiential in nature. Because it is difficult to articulate 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Szulanski, 1996), and often resides in the mind of the individual 
responsible for its development (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998), tacit knowledge is more difficult 
to share than explicit knowledge without direct interaction between individuals (Leonard-Barton, 
1988; Mascitelli, 2000). 
As noted by Alvarez and Barney (2001), large firms establish R&D alliances with 
smaller, entrepreneurial firms in order to gain access to new technologies. Using the terminology 
of a sourcing arrangement, large firms can be thought of as ‘buyers’ of technology and smaller 
firms as ‘suppliers’ of technology. The knowledge underlying new, ‘state-of-the-art’ technology 
is often tacit (Winter, 1987), and organizationally embedded (Teece, 1977; Kogut, 1988). When 
the supplier’s knowledge is tacit in nature owing to its relative newness, the transfer challenge is 
likely to be intensified. As a result, the need for and type of communication between the partners 
is likely to be a function of the degree of tacitness of the knowledge contributed to the alliance 
by the supplier, which in turn impacts the ease of its transfer to the buyer.
26
 
Based on the arguments outlined in the previous paragraphs, the exchange of technical 
documents is not likely to be an effective or efficient transfer mechanism when the knowledge to 
be shared by the supplier is tacit owing to its newness. In this case, I expect R&D alliance 
                                                 
26
 Knowledge transfer may not be as salient an issue for the supplier as it is for the buyer, as knowledge transfer is 
likely to be one-way (i.e., from the buyer to the supplier), especially in regards to the knowledge underlying the 
product/technology under development in the alliance. 
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contracts are likely to include a provision that explicitly allows key personnel from each partner 
firm to interact on a face-to-face basis in order to discuss technical matters and share knowledge. 
The inclusion of such a provision in an R&D alliance contract is akin to co-location, which is 
employed in joint ventures to overcome knowledge transfer challenges. In sum, I can state the 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the tacitness of the supplier’s knowledge, the greater 
the likelihood of including a contractual provision that allows for face-to-face 
communication between key personnel from each R&D alliance partner. 
 
A second factor that is expected to influence the ease of knowledge transfer and in turn 
the type of communication provision required and the likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D 
alliance contract is the similarity of the partners’ knowledge portfolios. The ability to obtain 
knowledge from an outside source is limited by a firm’s own experience in related areas (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As a firm gains experience in a particular field of 
science or technology, it learns the technical language that is associated with and widely known 
by practitioners in that field. Research suggests that having a shared language impacts the ease 
and efficiency of knowledge transfer (Newcomb, 1953; Runkel, 1956; Dearborn and Simon, 
1958; Triandis, 1960; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Allen and Cohen, 1969; Tushman, 1978). 
When firms are familiar with similar fields, they are likely to share a common language 
in the fields where their knowledge bases overlap. Sharing a common language allows technical 
employees to effectively communicate with their counterparts from other firms about their 
coinciding interests (Hagstrom, 1965), through both digital (e.g., verbal and natural languages) 
and analogical (e.g., symbols and non-verbal) means (Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, 1967). 
Conversely, when firms lack a high degree of overlap in their knowledge bases, they are less 
likely to share a common language. In this case, the receiving firm may misinterpret or be unable 
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to understand the knowledge that is being transferred (Cherry, 1965). In addition, less personal 
forms of communication are often less effective in the absence of a common language (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966). As a result, it may be difficult to transfer unfamiliar methods and 
techniques across firm boundaries through written forms of communication alone. 
In the absence of a common language, direct interaction between individuals may be 
necessary in order to transfer knowledge between organizations. The richness of knowledge 
tends to be lost without face-to-face contact (Allen, 1977). Research also suggests that 
individuals are the key conduits of knowledge transfer (Malecki, 1991), especially in R&D 
alliances when the partners’ knowledge bases are divergent (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). 
Thus, I expect that R&D alliance contracts will include a provision that allows key personnel 
from each partner to directly communicate with each other on a face-to-face basis when there is 
less overlap between the partners’ knowledge portfolios. Again, the inclusion of such a provision 
is akin to co-locating personnel in a joint venture. In sum, I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the dissimilarity between the knowledge bases of the 
R&D alliance partners, the greater the likelihood of including a contractual 
provision that allows for face-to-face communication between key personnel from 
each R&D alliance partner. 
 
4.4.3.2. The Threat of Appropriation and Safeguarding Provisions. The degree of 
tacitness also has implications for appropriability, which in turn influences the type of 
safeguarding provision required and the likelihood of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract. 
Tacit knowledge is difficult to misappropriate for the same reasons that hinder its transfer: it is 
hard to articulate, experience-based, and often resides within the mind of the individual or 
individuals responsible for its development. However, tacit knowledge may be acquired if 
individuals change employers (Argote and Ingram, 2000). Because tacit knowledge is often 
difficult to separate from those who possess it, Dosi (1988) suggests that hiring provides a way 
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to acquire knowledge that is otherwise immobile. Other research also proposes that the mobility 
of employees provides a way for firms to obtain knowledge developed by other firms without 
permission (e.g., Teece, 1982; Winter, 1987). Song, Almeida, and Wu (2003) call this 
phenomenon ‘learning-by-hiring.’ 
In addition to obtaining new technology, large firms form R&D alliances with smaller, 
entrepreneurial partners in order to gain access to ‘state-of-the-art’ technical talent (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2001). As a buyer of technology, a large firm may try to appropriate the tacit knowledge 
underlying the supplier’s new technology by offering employment to the supplier’s personnel 
responsible for developing the technology. A potential way to contractually safeguard against 
misappropriation through learning-by-hiring is to prohibit the recruitment of key scientific and 
technical employees involved in the alliance. Thus, based on these arguments, I expect that an 
R&D alliance contract is likely to include a non-solicitation covenant when the knowledge 
possessed by the supplier’s employees is tacit owing to its newness.
27
 I can state the hypothesis 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the tacitness of the supplier’s knowledge, the higher the 
probability of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D alliance contract. 
 
The similarity of the partners’ knowledge portfolios also has implications for 
appropriation, which in turn impacts the type of safeguarding provision necessary and likelihood 
of its inclusion in an R&D alliance contract. Partners with dissimilar knowledge bases have more 
to learn from each other than when their portfolios are homogeneous. As a result, one partner 
may try to obtain as much knowledge as they can from the other partner in areas unrelated to or 
outside of the scope of the focal partnership. This knowledge can then be utilized in other 
                                                 
27
 In practice, non-solicitation provisions rarely prohibit only the buyer from hiring key personnel from the supplier. 
Usually the clause is drafted to forbid either partner from engaging in such behavior. The inclusion of a non-
solicitation covenant, however, is often a more salient issue for the supplier than the buyer in an R&D alliance given 
the buyer’s motives for forming the alliance. 
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projects, or with other partners, without any compensation paid to the partner it was captured 
from. Thus, as the degree of knowledge diversity increases, so does the incentive to behave 
opportunistically.  
Despite this incentive, it is difficult to obtain and utilize knowledge in areas new to the 
firm if it lacks experience in related fields (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). In addition, when the partners’ portfolios are dissimilar, they are not likely to share a 
common language. Thus, misappropriating unfamiliar knowledge is likely to be difficult, even if 
there is a desire to do so. In this case, for misappropriation to occur, key individuals need to 
change firms. Again, learning-by-hiring provides a mechanism through which difficult-to-obtain 
knowledge can move across firm boundaries. To prevent this from occurring, a non-solicitation 
covenant can be included in the contract. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the dissimilarity between the knowledge bases of the 
R&D alliance partners, the higher the probability of including a non-solicitation 
provision in an R&D alliance contract. 
 
4.4.3.3. The Moderating Influence of Previous Contracting Experience. Hypotheses 
1-4 rely on the logic of TCE, which asserts that specific contractual solutions can be designed to 
contend with particular contractual challenges (Williamson, 1985). This assertion assumes that 
managers and lawyers know which issues to watch for in the first place, or that they at least learn 
relatively quickly from their experience, allowing them to design contracts responsive to the 
hazards they perceive. Research in both the inter-organizational learning and alliance capabilities 
literature suggests, however, that learning occurs slowly and incrementally. For example, in a 
study of eleven development contracts between the same two partners in the personal computer 
industry, Mayer and Argyres (2004) found that managers and lawyers were unlikely to devise a 
solution for a particular issue until they had experienced it for themselves. Similarly, in a study 
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of a contractual partnership in the animated film industry, Lumineau, Fréchet, and Puthod (2011) 
found that managers lacking previous contracting experience struggled to craft a contract that 
contained sufficient detail to protect their interests. However, as they worked through successive 
iterations of the contract over a period of seventeen months, they became more familiar with and 
better able to foresee the key challenges. 
Together, these findings suggest that participating in the contract design process might 
sensitize managers and lawyers to the challenges that they were previously unaware of, helping 
them to better recognize and contend with such challenges in future contracting situations. In 
essence, as managers and lawyers learn about alliance management, particularly about contract 
design, the experience that they accumulate should help them to better manage alliances over 
time. In subsequent research, Argyres and Mayer (2007) introduce the concept of ‘contract 
design capabilities’ to describe the skills and knowledge that managers and lawyers accumulate 
over time about how to draft the appropriate contractual solutions to cope with contracting 
hazards. Based on this notion, managers and lawyers are expected to learn how to design more 
effective contracts that are responsive to the hazards they perceive as they gain more experience 
with the negotiation stage of the alliance life cycle. 
In relation to Hypotheses 1-4, managers and lawyers with little or no experience may not 
be as familiar with the challenges that are likely to arise in an alliance as their counterparts that 
have participated in many alliances. As a result, I expect that the R&D alliance contracts drafted 
by managers and lawyers with more contract design experience are more likely to be in line with 
the predictions of TCE than the contracts drafted by managers and lawyers with less contracting 
experience. Stated differently, I expect that contracts drafted by experienced managers and 
lawyers are more likely to include the appropriate provisions when the situation requires them 
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than the contracts drafted by their less experienced counterparts facing the same contracting 
hazards. 
To this point of the study, the discussion of the impact of contract design capabilities has 
not discriminated between alliances that involve R&D and those that involve other value chain 
activities. Research indicates, however, that managing different types of alliances (i.e., R&D 
alliances, marketing alliances, supply alliances) requires different capabilities (e.g., Draulans et 
al., 2003). While it is likely that firms gain contract design capabilities from experience with all 
types of alliances (Ryall and Sampson, 2009), the issues that are most salient in R&D alliances 
are likely to be very different than those that are critical in alliances focused on other value chain 
activities (Dyer et al., 2001). For example, the challenges that are of central concern in R&D 
alliances (i.e., the efficient transfer of knowledge and the prevention of appropriation) are not 
likely to be as pertinent in marketing and supply alliances. Thus, managers and lawyers may not 
possess the knowledge and skills required to draft a contract for an R&D alliance if they have 
only designed contracts for other types of alliances. 
Based on these arguments, I expect that R&D alliance contracts designed by managers 
and lawyers with previous experience drafting contracts for R&D alliances will better conform to 
the predictions of TCE than those of their counterparts with less relevant experience. In sum, I 
can state the hypotheses as follows: 
Hypotheses 5a: The positive relationship between the tacitness of the supplier’s 
knowledge and the probability of including a contractual provision that allows for 
face-to-face communication between key personnel from each R&D alliance 
partner will be strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting 
experience (especially experience drafting R&D alliance contracts). 
Hypotheses 5b: The positive relationship between the diversity of the partners’ 
knowledge portfolios and the probability of including a contractual provision that 
allows for face-to-face communication between key personnel from each R&D 
alliance partner will be strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting 
experience (especially experience drafting R&D alliance contracts). 
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Hypotheses 5c: The positive relationship between the tacitness of the supplier’s 
knowledge and the probability of including a non-solicitation provision will be 
strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting experience (especially 
experience drafting R&D alliance contracts). 
Hypotheses 5d: The positive relationship between the diversity of the partners’ 
knowledge portfolios and the probability of including a non-solicitation provision 
will be strengthened as managers and lawyers gain contracting experience 
(especially experience drafting R&D alliance contracts). 
 
4.4.4. Measures 
The data set described in Section 4.3.4 is employed here to develop the key dependent, 
independent and control variables used to test the hypotheses under investigation in this study. 
4.4.4.1. Dependent Variables. To test the hypothesized relationships, I developed two 
dependent variables, facilities access and non-solicitation, which are described next. 
From discussions with practitioners and legal scholars and a thorough literature review, I 
identified an important contractual solution that creates a direct communication channel between 
R&D partners: the express grant of access to each firm’s facilities to observe, discuss, and 
conduct development work, jointly if necessary. A dummy variable, facilities access, was created 
to capture whether this solution was implemented in each contract. The variable was set to one 
when this term appears in the contract, zero otherwise. As argued above, exchanging technical 
documents (i.e., codified knowledge) may be sufficient in many cases to facilitate knowledge 
transfer, but actual face-to-face interaction may be required when the knowledge being shared by 
the supplier is particularly tacit in nature or the partners’ knowledge portfolios are dissimilar. 
In order to prevent knowledge leakage through learning-by-hiring, the legal scholars and 
practitioners that I spoke to recommended the inclusion of a non-solicitation covenant in an 
R&D alliance contract. Such a clause is designed to prohibit each firm from hiring the other 
firm’s employees during the alliance and for a fixed, but reasonable, period of time after the 
alliance ends. Whereas the validity and enforcement of non-competition and non-solicitation 
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provisions in employment contracts varies significantly from state to state (Stuart and Sorenson, 
2003; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009), non-solicitation covenants in alliance contracts are 
nearly universally found to be valid and enforceable.
28
 Using information directly from the final 
sample of contracts, a single dummy variable is created to capture the use of non-solicitation 
covenants. When such a covenant is included in an R&D contract, non-solicitation is set to one, 
zero otherwise. 
4.4.4.2. Independent Variables. To test Hypotheses 1, 3, 5a and 5c, a measure of 
tacitness is required. The exact specifications of the product under development in an R&D 
alliance are often kept confidential in the contract that is made publically available. However, the 
suppliers in many alliances tend to specialize in a rather narrow area of technology. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the supplier’s patent portfolio is representative of the knowledge that 
the supplier is contributing to the alliance.  
In order to assess the degree of tacitness of the knowledge shared by the supplier, I 
modified the ‘recency’ measure developed by Nerkar (2003). The measure was operationalized 
as follows: I first compiled each supplier’s U.S. patent portfolio by gathering all granted patents 
that were applied for in the five years prior to the date on the alliance contract. I then obtained 
the application year for all U.S. patents referenced in each patent in each firm’s portfolio. To 
measure the age of the knowledge in each patent, I calculated the median difference between the 
patent’s application date and that of the patents it references (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). I then 
measured the age of the supplier’s overall patent portfolio as the median of the median 
differences calculated in the previous step. I then examined the distribution of this variable 
across all supplier portfolios and found that the largest median difference was 13.5 years. Based 
                                                 
28
 Personal communication with Matt Marx on June 10, 2011. Confirmed by James R. Muldoon, an attorney with 
two decades of alliance contracting experience, on July 21, 2011. 
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on this examination, I transformed the median age to reflect the ‘recency’ of the supplier’s 
knowledge by subtracting 13.5 from the median age. The knowledge underpinning newer, ‘state-
of-the-art’ technology is often tacit in nature (Winter, 1987), thus I suggest that this measure is 
an acceptable proxy for the degree of tacitness of the supplier’s contributed knowledge. 
Essentially, the transformation assigns a higher value to newer (i.e., more tacit) knowledge and a 
lower value to older (i.e., less tacit) knowledge. 
A measure of knowledge diversity is necessary to test Hypotheses 2, 4, 5b and 5d. The 
diversity of the partners’ knowledge portfolios is captured by examining the extent to which the 
partners involved in each contract patent in the same technology classes. The original measure 
was developed by Jaffe (1986) and has been used recently by Sampson (2004b), Oxley and 
Sampson (2004), and Sampson (2007). The measure effectively captures the position of one 
partner firm’s knowledge portfolio relative to that of the other partner. The fact that patents are 
categorized according to underlying technology and not the end products per se is a distinct 
advantage in this study. Similar products can have very different underlying technologies and, 
thus, can reflect very different knowledge bases. For example, a firm producing traditional X-ray 
scanners does not necessarily have the technological knowledge to produce more advanced 
ultrasound scanners or MRI scanners, despite the fact that all of these products would be 
considered medical imaging devices. Thus, one can capture knowledge similarities between 
firms in different industries as well knowledge differences between firms in the same industry by 
using patent technology classes. 
To construct this variable, each firm’s knowledge portfolio is generated by measuring the 
distribution across patent classifications of the patents applied for in the five years prior to the 
formation of the alliance. This distribution is captured by a multidimensional vector, Fi = (Fi
1
 … 
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Fi
s
), where Fi
s
 represents the number of patents assigned to partner firm i in patent class s. 
Diversity of partner firm knowledge is then: 
                      
    
 
√(    
 )(    
 )
 
where i ≠ j. Knowledge diversity varies from zero to one, with a value of one indicating the 
greatest possible diversity between the partners’ portfolios. 
 This measure is not sensitive to the number of patents in a class and captures differences 
between the partners based on diversity rather than the volume of patents in the same class.
29
 As 
measured here, knowledge diversity is akin to measuring the angle between the individual 
vectors that represent the patent portfolios of allying firms. While this measure does not control 
for the fact that some technology classes are more similar to each other than others, the use of 
top-level patent classes instead of subclasses (which is similar to using a two-digit SIC code 
instead of a four-digit SIC code) reduces this problem to the extent possible. 
Three measure of previous contracting experience were developed to investigate 
Hypotheses 5a-5d. The first measure captures total previous contracting experience. While it 
would be ideal to have individual-level information regarding the experience of the exact 
managers and lawyers involved in drafting each contract in order to measure previous 
contracting experience, such information is not readily available. Thus, overall firm-level 
experience, as measured by the number of previous alliances entered into by each partner in the 
five years prior to the contract date, is used as a reasonable proxy. Research suggests that five 
years is considered to be the average period in which the experience gained from a previous 
                                                 
29
 Sampson (2007) notes that while firms may suggest patent classifications on patent applications, the examiners at 
the USPTO make the final decision regarding class assignments. She goes on to state that most firms use 
experienced patent attorneys to file their patents. These attorneys typically suggest the appropriate classification for 
a given application. The attorneys and examiners also normally correspond during the patent examination process, 
thus minimizing the risk of misclassification, virtually ensuring that there is no systematic misclassification. 
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alliance contributes to a firm’s alliance capabilities (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). The total 
number of R&D, marketing, and supply alliances entered into by each firm was gathered from 
Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database. 
The distribution of prior alliances among the firms in the sample is skewed. Most firms 
have no prior alliances (22.0% of sample firms in the five years prior to the year that the contract 
was signed). The next largest group has only one prior alliance (20.5%), while only 48.5% of the 
sample firms have more than two prior alliances. Approximately 21% of the firms have more 
than ten prior alliances. Ryall and Sampson (2009) suggest that the difference in experience 
between one and two prior alliances is likely greater than the difference between seven and eight 
prior alliances. However, Mayer and Argyres (2004) find evidence that learning to contract is a 
slow, incremental process. Thus, to fully explore the moderating effect of total previous 
contracting experience, I measure it as a continuous variable in this study. I collected separate 
counts for each partner involved in each alliance to investigate whether there is a difference 
between the experience accumulated by buyers (presumably larger firms) and the experience 
accumulated by suppliers (presumably smaller, entrepreneurial firms). 
The second measure developed captures each partner’s previous R&D contracting 
experience. Again, it would be ideal to have individual-level information regarding the 
experience of the managers and lawyers involved in drafting the contracts examined in this 
study. However, as noted above, this information is simply not available. Thus, a procedure 
similar to the one employed to measure total previous contracting experience was used to 
develop the measure for previous R&D contracting experience. Separate counts of the number of 
previous R&D alliances were collected from the Strategic Transactions database for each partner 
in the five years prior to the alliance. The distribution of R&D alliances among the firms in the 
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sample is likewise skewed. Most firms have not participated in an R&D alliance (36.4% of 
sample firms in the five years prior to the year that the contract was signed). The next largest 
group has only one prior R&D alliance (22.0%), while only 30.3% of the sample firms have 
more than two prior R&D alliances. Approximately 17% of the firms participated in more than 
five prior R&D alliances. 
To further investigate whether there is a difference between the experience gained 
drafting R&D contracts and the experience gained drafting contracts for all alliances types, I 
developed a third measure, which captures each firm’s R&D contracting experience intensity. I 
did so by dividing each firm’s number of previous R&D alliances by its total number of previous 
alliances. Thus, this measure ranges from zero to one, where a value closer to one indicates that 
more of the firm’s contracting experience has been dedicated to drafting R&D contracts. The 
intuition behind this measure is that firms with a higher percentage of alliance experience 
concentrated on R&D alliances are more likely to learn about the challenges and hazards that 
plague such alliances and how to draft the appropriate contract in subsequent R&D alliances 
compared to firms that have focused more on alliances involving other value chain activities. 
4.4.4.3. Controls. I included a several control variables in the econometric analyses to 
eliminate the possibility that alternative factors may drive the hypothesized relationships. Using 
information directly from the contract associated with each deal, a dummy variable is used to 
capture whether the buyer has committed to contribute any capital to the supplier over the course 
of the alliance. Alliance payment is set to one when the contract indicates that the buyer will 
make any type of payment (i.e., upfront, milestone, R&D) to the supplier, zero otherwise. The 
capital contributed by the buyer is essentially a hostage in that it is out of the buyer’s control 
once it is paid to the supplier (i.e., the supplier might use the contributed capital for conducting 
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activities related to the alliance, however, it may redirect the funds to internal projects or other 
alliances). The literature suggests that the buyer is likely to desire a more detailed contract in 
exchange for this hostage (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). 
Again, using information directly from the contract associated with each deal, a dummy 
variable is used to capture if the buyer takes an equity stake in the supplier as part of the alliance. 
Equity is set to one if the buyer takes any type of equity holding (common or preferred stock), 
zero otherwise. This variable controls for the possibility that ownership provides an alternative to 
the contractual solutions that can be implemented to contend with the knowledge transfer and 
appropriation concerns encountered in R&D alliances. Ryall and Sampson (2009) provide some 
support for this notion, finding that contracts are likely to be less detailed (i.e., contain fewer 
provisions) when the buyer takes an equity stake in the supplier as part of the alliance. This 
finding is not consistently significant across specifications in their study, however. 
A measure was also included to control for cases where the same partners were involved 
in a previous alliance. It may simply be the case that firms that have worked together in the past 
utilize the same contract template for their subsequent alliances. There is also evidence that firms 
that have engaged in multiple alliances learn how to contract with each other, leading them to 
draft more detailed contracts for their subsequent alliances (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004). 
Other research suggests that detailed contracts inhibit trust (e.g., Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; 
Gulati, 1995a), leading firms that have established trust by partnering in the past to prefer less 
detailed contracts when they engage in subsequent alliances. Therefore, to control for this factor, 
I include a dummy variable, same partner, which is set equal to one if there are any earlier 
alliances recorded in the Strategic Transactions database that bring together the same partners in 
the five years prior to the current alliance, zero otherwise. 
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Finally, I control for the fact that some firms have more than one contract in the sample. 
These contracts may not be independent of each other. Firms may use a similar contract structure 
in all of their alliances (regardless of whether it is with a previous or new partner), reflecting an 
organizational norm rather than the actual need to include specific provisions in the contract. I 
control for the possible lack of independence by clustering observations by firm for the purposes 
of calculating standard errors (Huber, 1967). In the limited number of instances where a contract 
can be assigned to more than one firm (i.e., because both partners have multiple contracts in the 
sample), the contract is assigned to the firm with the greater number of contracts in the sample 
for the purposes of correcting the standard errors. As most of the firms in the sample are only 
involved in one contract, fixed effects are not used. 
4.4.5. Methods 
Probit analysis is the appropriate technique to use to test the hypotheses given the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variables in this study. Under the probit model, the 
probability of including a facilities access provision in an R&D alliance contract and the 
probability of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D alliance contract are modeled in 
two separate equations as functions of alliance-, supplier-, and partner-specific variables. These 
variables are proxies for the level of contractual hazards (i.e., the ease of knowledge transfer and 
the threat of appropriation). Taking this example further, assume that the contractual hazards in 
alliance  are determined by the following specification: 
Y =  +  
where Y is the unobservable measure of the contractual hazards associated with alliance ; X is 
a vector of the independent and control variables described in the previous section;  is a vector 
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of elasticities for these variables; and  is a normally distributed, random error term. While Y is 
not observed, we do observe the following: 
Inclusion of Provision = 0, if Y ≤  
Inclusion of Provision = 1, Y>  
where  is an unknown threshold parameter. The probability of observing whether or not the 
provision is included is as follows: 
Pr[Inclusion = 0|] = Pr[ ≤ ’’
Pr[Inclusion = 1|] = Pr[ > ’’
where  is the cumulative standard normal (CSD) distribution. Assuming  is normally 
distributed, the above equation is appropriately estimated via probit.
30
 The mean and the variance 
of  are normalized to zero and one, respectively, in the probit model using a CSD distribution. 
Specifically, using the binary probit approach, I estimate the following general equations 
for the probability of the inclusion of each provision of interest: 
(1) Facilities access= + *Alliance payment +*Equity*Same partner 
+*Tacitness +*Knowledge diversity +*Previous experience +* 
Tacitness*Previous experience +*Knowledge diversity*Previous 
experience +  
(2) Non-solicitation= + *Alliance payment +*Equity*Same partner 
+*Tacitness +*Knowledge diversity +*Previous experience +* 
Tacitness*Previous experience +*Knowledge diversity*Previous 
experience +  
 
If standard OLS techniques could be employed, I would expect 4 (the coefficient of the 
variable that measures the degree of tacitness) to be positive and significant in equations (1) and 
(2) when facilities access and non-solicitation equal one according to Hypotheses 1 and 3, 
respectively. That is, an R&D alliance contract is more likely to include these provisions when 
                                                 
30
 The model can also be estimated with a logistically distributed . As the cumulative normal and logistic 
distributions are very similar, except at the tails, the use of probit and logit are unlikely to yield substantially 
different results. Substantial differences are likely observed only where the sample size is quite large, such that the 
number of observations in the tails of the distributions increases, highlighting the differing widths of the 
distributions at the tails (Maddala, 1983: 23). 
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the degree of tacitness of the knowledge contributed by the supplier is high. Similarly, if 
standard OLS was applicable, I would expect 5 (the coefficient of the variable that measures 
knowledge diversity) to be positive and significant in equations (1) and (2) when facilities access 
and non-solicitation equal one according to Hypotheses 2 and 4, respectively. That is, an R&D 
alliance contract is more likely to include these provisions when there is little or no overlap in 
the partners’ knowledge portfolios. The magnitude of the estimated conditional ‘main’ effects of 
these factors, however, is not simply the value of the coefficient associated with the respective 
variables. Rather, in a non-linear model, such binary probit, the magnitude of the effects varies 
depending on the variable of interest’s starting value, the magnitude of the change in that 
variable, and the values of the other variables in the model (Long and Freese, 2006: 171).  
The four interaction terms in equations (1) and (2) correspond to Hypotheses 5a-d, 
respectively. These interactions allow me to examine whether managers and lawyers learn from 
their previous contracting experience, enabling them to design contracts that more accurately 
reflect the hazards present in a given transaction. It is important to note that I have developed 
three different measures of previous contracting experience. Thus, I estimate separate models 
that examine the moderating impact of each partner’s (1) total previous contracting experience, 
(2) previous R&D contracting experience, and (3) R&D contracting experience intensity.  
If OLS techniques were applicable, the sign of the coefficient and the robust standard 
error associated with each interaction would provide direct evidence about the impact and 
statistical significance of the moderator. Unfortunately, I cannot follow this straightforward 
approach because the coefficients and standard errors of interaction terms in non-linear models, 
such as the binary probit models employed in this study, cannot be interpreted in the same way 
as they are in linear models. As noted by Huang and Shields (2000) and Ai and Norton (2003), 
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the sign of the interaction term coefficient need not correspond to the direction of the 
hypothesized conditional effect that motivated the inclusion of the interaction term in the first 
place. In addition, the standard error of the coefficient associated with the interaction term does 
not convey direct information about the statistical significance of the interaction effect. 
To overcome the difficulty of interpreting the results from a probit analysis with multiple 
interaction terms, I followed the simulation-based approach developed by King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg (2000), which was recently introduced in the strategic management literature by 
Zelner (2009). This simulation technique makes it possible to graphically evaluate the change in 
the predicted probabilities associated with an empirically relevant change in the value of the 
independent variable of interest with all other variables held constant at relevant values. In 
addition, this technique makes it possible to present the effects of the interaction terms in 
equations (1) and (2) graphically, allowing for the examination of both the direction and 
magnitude of these effects. The approach also allows for an examination of the statistical 
significance of the interaction terms by specifying an additional test option in Stata. 
4.4.6. Results 
Table 4-8 provides summary and correlation statistics for the dependent, independent and 
control variables used in the analyses. Preliminary analysis of this table provides some insight 
about the determinants of the inclusion of facilities access and non-solicitation provisions. The 
summary statistics indicate that there is moderate heterogeneity in the independent and control 
variables. The correlation statistics also indicate facilities access and non-solicitation (i.e., the 
dependent variables) are positively and statistically significantly correlated with the primary 
independent variables (tacitness and knowledge diversity) in three out of four cases. These results 
tentatively suggest that the inclusion of the provisions of interest is driven by these factors.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
6
3
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There are a moderate number of statistically significant correlations between and among 
the control and independent variables in Table 4-8, suggesting that there may be multicollinearity 
problems, especially when the interaction terms are formed. High levels of multicollinearity can 
lead to problems estimating regression coefficients (Marquardt, 1980). Centering variables often 
helps to minimize such problems (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman, 1996). Thus, I 
mean-centered tacitness, knowledge diversity, and all of the measures of previous contracting 
experience as a precaution before creating the interaction terms, as suggested by Aiken and West 
(1991). I then calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs). All individual VIFs and the average 
VIF for each model are below the recommended threshold of 2.5, which suggests that there is 
little multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980; Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller, 1988). 
Table 4-9: Summary of results for study 1 
Hypotheses (Predicted sign) Sign of result 
Conditional ‘main’ hypotheses 
   Facilities access provision 
     H1: Tacitness (+) 
     H2: Partners’ knowledge diversity (+) 
   Non-solicitation provision 
     H3: Tacitness (+) 
     H4: Partners’ knowledge diversity (+) 
Interactions 
   Facilities access provision 
     H5a: Tacitness x Previous experience (+) 
     H5b: Partners’ knowledge diversity x 
              Previous experience (+) 
   Non-solicitation provision 
     H5c: Tacitness x Previous experience (+) 
     H5d: Partners’ knowledge diversity x 
              Previous experience (+) 
Significant control variables 
     Alliance payment 
 
 
H1: + (p<0.10 or better; Models 3, 5, & 7) 
H2: not supported 
 
H3: + (p<0.10 or better; Models 16, 18, & 22) 
H4: + (p<0.05 or better; Models 16, 18, & 22) 
 
 
H5a: + (p<0.05; Model 7) 
H5b: not supported 
 
 
H5c: not supported 
H5d: not supported 
 
 
+ (p<0.10 or better; Models 3, 5, 7, 9, 16 & 18) 
Note: Statistically significant results in bold 
 
Table 4-9 is presented here to provide the reader with a brief summary of the results for 
this study. A more complete discussion of the results follows. Table 4-9 shows that several of the 
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conditional ‘main’ hypotheses are supported, specifically Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. Very little 
support, however, is shown for the hypotheses that propose interactions; only Hypothesis 5a is 
supported. The table also shows that some support was found for the influence of the control 
variable alliance payment on the inclusion of the provisions of interest. Further discussion of 
these findings is warranted given that several measures were used as proxies for previous 
contracting experience. The interpretation of the results depends on the measure employed. 
Table 4-10 presents the binary probit estimations for when the dependent variable is the 
probability of including a facilities access provision in an R&D alliance contract, while Table 4-
11 presents the estimations for when the dependent variable is the probability of including a non-
solicitation provision.  Model 1 in Table 4-10 and Model 14 in Table 4-11 include only the 
alliance-specific control variables (i.e., alliance payment, equity, and same partner). Models 2, 4, 
6, 8, 10, and 12 in Table 4-10 and Models 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, and 25 in Table 4-11 add the 
primary independent variables of interest (i.e., tacitness and knowledge diversity) and the various 
measures of previous contracting experience. Models 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 in Table 4-10 and 
Models 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, and 26 in Table 4-11 add the interactions between the primary 
independent variables and the various measures of previous contracting experience. 
Of the fully-specified models (i.e., those with interaction terms), the Wald-
2
 statistic is 
significant at the p<0.05 level or better only for Models 3, 5, 7, and 9 in Table 4-10, and Models 
16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11. Thus, I focus on these models in order to examine the hypotheses 
developed in this study. I also conducted tests to determine if these models are statistically 
significant improvements over their respective restricted models (i.e. Model 1 and Model 14). 
The standard likelihood-ratio test cannot be employed in this case because the standard errors are 
generated by clustering observations. To overcome this problem, I used the Wald test, which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-10. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for facilities access provisiona
Independent variables
Constant -0.877* (0.391) -0.928* (0.432) -1.208* (0.484) -0.892* (0.405) -1.040** (0.406) -0.939* (0.401) -1.055* (0.414)
Tacitness 0.152† (0.084) 0.224** (0.074) 0.127 (0.083) 0.143† (0.075) 0.127 (0.089) 0.201* (0.080)
Knowledge diversity -0.186 (0.582) -0.293 (0.697) -0.209 (0.621) -0.319 (0.723) -0.256 (0.635) -0.181 (0.733)
Buyer's total previous contracting experience (BTPCE) -0.011 (0.019) -0.029 (0.025)
Buyer's previous R&D contracting experience (BRDCE) 0.015 (0.040) -0.005 (0.047)
Buyer's R&D contracting experience intensity (BRDCEI) 0.767 (0.521) 0.892† (0.521)
Tacitness x BTPCE 0.009 (0.010)
Knowledge diversity x BTPCE -0.186** (0.069)
Tacitness x BRDCE 0.000 (0.022)
Knowledge diversity x BRDCE -0.310* (0.140)
Tacitness x BRDCEI 0.543† (0.287)
Knowledge diversity x BRDCEI -1.392 (1.787)
Alliance payment 0.742† (0.403) 0.783† (0.431) 1.044* (0.477) 0.734† (0.441) 0.914* (0.451) 0.671† (0.398) 0.765† (0.442)
Equity -0.213 (0.415) -0.266 (0.454) -0.409 (0.444) -0.219 (0.461) -0.304 0.465 -0.053 (0.477) -0.136 (0.541)
Same partner -0.304 (0.569) -0.104 (0.675) -0.180 (0.654) -0.305 (0.605) -0.409 (0.622) -0.170 (0.533) 0.040 (0.470)
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald 2
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
aN = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Table 4-9 cont. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for facilities access provisiona
Independent variables
Constant -0.978* (0.401) -0.994* (0.399) -1.127* (0.477) -1.164* (0.473) -0.916* (0.397) -0.902* (0.397)
Tacitness 0.134 (0.087) 0.160 (0.101) 0.122 (0.085) 0.161 (0.104) 0.139 (0.085) 0.136 (0.487)
Knowledge diversity -0.090 (0.620) 0.036 (0.685) 0.035 (0.678) 0.322 (0.772) -0.129 (0.650) -0.097 (0.683)
Supplier's total previous contracting experience (STPCE) 0.113** (0.019) 0.137† (0.025)
Supplier's previous R&D contracting experience (SRDCE) 0.286** (0.107) 0.347* (0.143)
Supplier's R&D contracting experience intensity (SRDCEI) 0.232 (0.432) 0.215 (0.448)
Tacitness x STPCE 0.025 (0.045)
Knowledge diversity x STPCE 0.134 (0.288)
Tacitness x SRDCE 0.075 (0.088)
Knowledge diversity x SRDCE 0.555 (0.531)
Tacitness x SRDCEI 0.095 (0.196)
Knowledge diversity x SRDCEI 1.253 (1.421)
Alliance payment 0.953* (0.448) 1.020* (0.488) 1.196* (0.566) 1.310* (0.604) 0.801† (0.443) 0.857† (0.440)
Equity -0.255 (0.468) -0.284 (0.481) -0.326 (0.460) -0.369 (0.462) -0.295 (0.479) -0.359 (0.487)
Same partner -0.883 (0.656) -0.825 (0.635) -1.022 (0.631) -0.781 (0.589) -0.273 (0.521) -0.288 (0.516)
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald 2
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
aN = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
6.73
10.50† 3.29 3.72
1.33 1.28
10.61 15.51* 9.43 10.62 6.49
0.48
9.21* 12.16* 9.20*
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
-35.973 -35.747 -35.058 -34.379 -37.390
Model 8 Model 9
-36.847
Model 6
-36.697
7.35
Model 7
-34.552
15.67*
3.62
3.59 11.63*
Model 4
-37.456
6.92
Model 5
-35.630
29.15***
4.97†
3.07 15.89**
3.88 7.30 39.51***
7.85*
3.70 27.36***
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
-39.542 -37.410 -34.119
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Table 4-11. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for non-solicitation provisiona
Independent variables
Constant -1.044** (0.349) -1.561*** (0.443) -1.440** (0.456) -1.268** (0.415) -1.225** (0.443) -1.106*** (0.342) -1.298*** (0.357)
Tacitness 0.296** (0.103) 0.227* (0.104) 0.231* (0.098) 0.176† (0.107) 0.173 (0.111) 0.228* (0.107)
Knowledge diversity 2.313** (0.878) 2.141* (0.930) 1.963* (0.794) 1.716* (0.861) 1.786* (0.770) 2.090* (0.842)
Buyer's total previous contracting experience (BTPCE) -0.083*** (0.443) -0.056* (0.028)
Buyer's previous R&D contracting experience (BRDCE) -0.111* (0.046) -0.076† (0.044)
Buyer's R&D contracting experience intensity (BRDCEI) 0.525 (0.689) 0.736 (0.746)
Tacitness x BTPCE -0.018 (0.013)
Knowledge diversity x BTPCE -0.066 (0.096)
Tacitness x BRDCE -0.044† (0.025)
Knowledge diversity x BRDCE -0.265 (0.200)
Tacitness x BRDCEI 0.429 (0.315)
Knowledge diversity x BRDCEI -2.871 (2.550)
Alliance payment 0.677 (0.465) 1.227* (0.542) 1.285* (0.585) 1.061* (0.507) 1.150* (0.558) 0.725 (0.548) 0.841 (0.591)
Equity -0.199 (0.431) -0.937† (0.562) -0.861 (0.590) -0.995* (0.496) -0.967† (0.566) -0.612 (0.519) -0.684 (0.518)
Same partner -0.585 (0.594) 0.773 (0.855) 0.173 (0.701) 0.322 (0.753) -0.383 (0.606) -0.096 (0.670) 0.215 (0.697)
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald 2
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
aN = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Table 4-10 cont. Results of bionomial probit regression analyses for non-solicitation provisiona
Independent variables
Constant -1.057** (0.367) -1.051** (0.366) -1.068** (0.361) -1.042** (0.372) -1.051** (0.367) -1.015** (0.370)
Tacitness 0.174† (0.103) 0.228* (0.097) 0.173† (0.103) 0.191* (0.095) 0.174† (0.103) 0.167† (0.093)
Knowledge diversity 1.735* (0.770) 2.077** (0.744) 1.767* (0.786) 1.976* (0.810) 1.690* (0.781) 1.776* (0.839)
Supplier's total previous contracting experience (STPCE) -0.010 (0.057) 0.022 (0.089)
Supplier's previous R&D contracting experience (SRDCE) 0.015 (0.129) 0.049 (0.139)
Supplier's R&D contracting experience intensity (SRDCEI) -0.220 (0.431) -0.269 (0.429)
Tacitness x STPCE 0.045 (0.052)
Knowledge diversity x STPCE 0.285 (0.277)
Tacitness x SRDCE 0.032 (0.083)
Knowledge diversity x SRDCE 0.389 (0.456)
Tacitness x SRDCEI -0.015 (0.164)
Knowledge diversity x SRDCEI 0.868 (1.587)
Alliance payment 0.743 (0.538) 0.814 (0.552) 0.778 (0.554) 0.790 (0.561) 0.713 (0.532) 0.678 (0.534)
Equity -0.719 (0.484) -0.785 (0.481) -0.727 (0.492) -0.752 (0.484) -0.687 (0.497) -0.690 (0.490)
Same partner -0.091 (0.778) 0.110 (0.746) -0.178 (0.785) -0.055 (0.749) -0.082 (0.654) -0.070 (0.649)
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald 2
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
aN = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
13.85** 22.57*** 5.82 8.67
6.11 12.79* 5.89 8.37 7.10† 8.11
10.32
Model 26
-30.687 -30.114 -30.692 -30.467
0.34
8.48 15.83* 8.07 10.63 9.32
1.59 0.77
-30.577 -30.452
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25
9.45
3.67 7.33* 3.54
3.72 22.28** 29.81*** 17.51** 27.17*** 8.79
17.16*** 19.79**
Model 20
-34.971 -25.874 -24.906 -28.420 -26.419 -30.350 -28.888
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
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indicates that these models are statistically significant improvements over Model 1 and Model 
14, respectively, at the p<0.05 level or better in all seven cases. 
As noted in Table 4-9, the control variable alliance payment appears to drive the 
inclusion of facilities access and non-solicitation provisions in an R&D alliance contract to some 
extent. The sign of the coefficient is consistently positive and significant at the p<0.10 level or 
better across Models 3, 5, 7, and 9 in Table 4-10. It is also positive and significant at the p<0.05 
level in Models 16 and 18 in Table 4-11. This result is not surprising given that the funding 
committed by the buyer is essentially a hostage. As noted above, the buyer is likely to desire a 
more detailed contract in exchange for this hostage (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). In other words, 
the buyer may demand a contract that contains more provisions in order to protect its investment, 
even if those provisions are unnecessary. Tables 4-10 and 4-11 indicate that none of the other 
control variables have consistently statistically significant effects on the inclusion of facilities 
access and non-solicitation provisions in an R&D alliance contract. 
Turning first to the baseline hypotheses, Hypothesis 1 suggests that when the supplier’s 
knowledge is more tacit, a facilities access provision is likely to be included in an R&D alliance 
contract to enhance knowledge transfer. It would appear that some support is found for this 
hypothesis, as the coefficient for tacitness is statistically significant in the predicted direction at 
the p<0.10 level or better across Models 3, 5, and 7 in Table 4-10. Hypothesis 2 proposes that 
when there is little or no overlap in the partners’ knowledge portfolios, a facilities access 
provision is likely to be included in an R&D alliance contract to prevent misappropriation. No 
support is found for this hypothesis, as the coefficient for knowledge diversity is not statistically 
significant in any of the models estimated in Table 4-10. Hypothesis 3 suggests that when the 
supplier’s knowledge is tacit, a non-solicitation provision is likely to be included in an R&D 
169 
 
 
 
alliance contract to facilitate knowledge transfer. Some support is found for this hypothesis, as 
the coefficient for tacitness is statistically significant in the predicted direction at the p<0.10 
level or better in Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11. Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that when 
the partners’ knowledge portfolios are dissimilar, an R&D alliance contract is likely to include a 
non-solicitation provision to prevent misappropriation. Some support is found for this 
hypothesis, as the coefficient for knowledge diversity is statistically significant in the predicted 
direction at the p<0.05 level or better in Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11. 
As noted above, coefficients in non-linear models are not directly indicative of the 
magnitude of the effect size. The interaction terms in the fully-specified models in Tables 4-10 
and 4-11 further complicate matters. In such cases, the conditional ‘main’ effect of a variable 
depends on the coefficient of the variable it is interacted with in addition to its own coefficient, 
the change in its value, and the values selected for all of the other variables in the model. The 
Stata procedure introduced by Zelner (2009), which utilizes the simulation approach developed 
by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000), allows for a graphical interpretation in order to assess 
the magnitude and statistical significance of such conditional ‘main’ effects. Specifically, the 
procedure produces a plot which shows whether the change in the predicted probabilities 
associated with a change in a variable is statistically significant in the expected direction at 
different values of the variable it is interacted with. An additional option can be included to 
examine whether the interaction effect is statistically significant over a meaningful range of the 
moderating variable as well. Thus, this technique is used to further investigate Hypotheses 1-4 
and to examine if there is any support for the moderation effects proposed in Hypotheses 5a-d. 
Figures 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6, which correspond to Models 3, 5, and 7 in Table 4-10, 
graphically examine the proposed relationship between an increase in the tacitness of the 
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supplier’s knowledge and the likelihood of including a facilities access provision in an R&D 
alliance contract (i.e., Hypothesis 1). To create these graphs, tacitness was changed from two 
standard deviations below to two standard deviations above its mean to investigate the impact of 
a substantial difference on the probability of including a facilities access provision. For the other 
variables in the model, binary variables were set to their mode, while continuous variables were 
set to their mean. The value of the variable that tacitness was interacted with in each model (i.e., 
the three measures of buyer’s contracting experience) was allowed to vary over its entire range. 
Panel A in each figure shows the plot that was generated using Zelner’s (2009) Stata 
procedure, while Panel B shows the plot that was created in Excel. The differences in the plots 
are a function of how they were developed. Zelner’s (2009) procedure runs 1000 simulations in 
order to generate the values of the coefficients used to create the index function that the predicted 
probabilities are calculated from. Thus, these values should be close to their true values, based on 
the principles of statistical sampling. In contrast, to create the graph in Panel B, I simply used the 
original values for the coefficients generated in Stata in order to calculate the index function in 
Excel, which is in turn converted into a predicted probability. 
The resulting Excel plots in Panel B are smoother in appearance than the graphs 
generated by the simulation in Panel A, but the general trends are similar in both panels. I 
include both plots for illustrative purposes, but the statistical significance can only be evaluated 
from the plots generated using the simulation technique. The values along the x-axis are mean-
centered in Panel A, so Panel B is included with the original values for interpretation purposes. 
In Panel A of Figures 4-4 and 4-6, the heavy dots indicate a statistically significant 
change, at the p<0.05 level or better, in the predicted probability of including a facilities access 
provision when the degree of tacitness increases from two standard deviations below the mean to   
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-4. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a facilities access 
provision at various values of the buyer’s total previous contracting experience 
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-5.     Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a facilities access 
provision at various values of the buyer’s previous R&D contracting experience  
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-6.     Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a facilities access 
provision at various values of the buyer’s R&D contracting experience intensity  
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two standard deviations above the mean, holding all other variables constant at meaningful 
values. However, this relationship is not statistically significant across the entire range of the 
experience variables that tacitness is interacted with. In Panel A of Figure 4-4, the change in the 
predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s total previous 
contracting experience ranges from zero to five or is twenty-seven and above.
31
 In Panel A of 
Figure 4-6, the change in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when 
buyer’s R&D contracting experience intensity is between 0% and 30%. Thus, the graphs show 
that statistical significance is conditional on the values selected for the other variables in the 
model, providing only partial support for Hypothesis 1. 
Both figures do appear to show that the change in the predicted probability associated 
with an increase in the value of tacitness increases as the values of the previous contracting 
experience variables also increase. In other words, the figures indicate that there might be a 
positive interaction between tacitness and previous contracting experience, as proposed in 
Hypothesis 5a. An additional option can be specified in the Stata procedure to determine if an 
interaction effect is statistically significant. I tested to see if the interaction effect was significant 
between values of zero and ten for buyer’s total previous contracting experience in Panel A of 
Figure 4-4, and between values of 0% and 50% in Panel A of Figure 4-6. While the change in 
probability did increase in both figures (23% in Panel A of Figure 4-4, 73% in Panel A of Figure 
4-6), the increase was only statistically significant for Panel A of Figure 4-6 at the p<0.05 level 
or better. Panel A of Figure 4-6 corresponds to Model 7 in Table 4-10, in which tacitness is 
                                                 
31
 While the magnitude of the change in the predicted probability remains above 0.7 in Panel A of Figure 4-4 for 
values of buyer’s total previous contracting experience greater than twenty-seven, there is an inflection point in the 
curve at about this value where the change in the predicted probability starts to slightly decline over the rest of the 
range. The same inflection point is not exhibited in Panel B of Figure 4-4, as the change in the predicted probability 
continues to increase over the rest of the range, illustrating the difference between the plots generated by the 
simulation and those created in Excel. Thus, while the simulation suggests that the change in predicted probability is 
not statistically significant at values over twenty-seven, the Excel plot provides some evidence to the contrary. 
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interacted with buyer’s R&D contracting experience intensity. While this finding provides some 
support for Hypothesis 5a, further discussion is required to explain why the proposed interaction 
effect is only significant in Model 7. I offer an explanation in the following section of this study. 
Figures 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9, which correspond to Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11, 
graphically examine the proposed relationship between an increase in the tacitness of the 
supplier’s knowledge and the likelihood of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D 
alliance contract (i.e., Hypothesis 3). The same procedure that was applied above was used to 
generate these graphs. In Panel A of Figures 4-7, 4-8, and 4-9, the heavy dots indicate a 
statistically significant change, at the p<0.05 level or better, in the predicted probability of 
including a non-solicitation provision when the degree of tacitness increases from two standard 
deviations below the mean to two standard deviations above the mean, holding all other variables 
constant at meaningful values. 
The resulting graphs again show that this relationship is not statistically significant across 
the entire range of the experience variables that tacitness is interacted with. In Panel A of Figure 
4-7, the change in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s 
total previous contracting experience is greater than eleven. In Panel A of Figure 4-8, the change 
in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s previous R&D 
contracting experience is greater than three. Finally, in Panel A of Figure 4-9, the change in the 
predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when supplier’s total previous 
contracting experience is less than three or greater than five.
32
 Thus, the graphs again show that  
                                                 
32
 Similar to the issue encountered in Panel A of Figure 4-4, there is an inflection point in the curve in Panel A of 
Figure 4-9 for values of supplier’s total previous contracting experience greater than approximately six where the 
change in the predicted probability starts to slightly decline over the rest of the range. This same inflection point is 
not exhibited in Panel B of Figure 4-9, as the change in the predicted probability continues to increase over the rest 
of the range, illustrating the difference between the plots generated by the simulation and those created in Excel. 
Thus, while the simulation suggests that the change in predicted probability is not statistically significant for values 
greater than six, the Excel plot provides some evidence to the contrary. 
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-7. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a non-solicitation 
provision at various values of the buyer’s total previous contracting experience 
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-8. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a non-solicitation 
provision at various values of the buyer’s previous R&D contracting experience  
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-9. Effect of an increase in tacitness on the probability of including a non-solicitation 
provision at various values of the supplier’s total previous contracting experience 
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statistical significance is conditional on the values selected for the other variables in the model, 
providing only partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
Figures 4-7 and 4-8 show that that the change in the predicted probability associated with 
an increase in the value of tacitness actually decreases as the values of the previous contracting 
experience variables also increase. In other words, these figures indicate that there might be a 
negative interaction between tacitness and the two measures of the buyer’s previous contracting 
experience, contrary to what was proposed in Hypothesis 5c. However, Figure 4-9 appears to 
indicate that there is a positive interaction between tacitness and supplier’s total previous 
contracting experience, as predicted in Hypothesis 5c. 
I used the additional option in the Stata procedure to determine if the interaction effect 
exhibited in any of these plots is statistically significant. I tested to see if the interaction effect 
was significant between zero and ten for buyer’s total previous contracting experience in Panel 
A of Figure 4-7, between zero and five for buyer’s previous R&D contracting experience in 
Panel A of Figure 4-8, and between zero and ten for supplier’s total previous contracting 
experience in Panel A of Figure 4-9. Neither the decrease in the change in the probability in 
Figures 4-7 and 4-8 nor the increase in the change in the probability in Figure 4-9 were 
statistically significant at the p<0.05 level or better over the specified ranges. Thus, it would 
appear from these findings that there is no statistical support for Hypothesis 5c. However, the 
change in the predicted probability in Figures 4-8 and 4-9 is approximately -42% and +36%, 
respectively. From the standpoint of economic significance, these differences warrant further 
discussion. Again, I offer an explanation for these interesting findings in the following section. 
Figures 4-10, 4-11, and 4-12, which correspond to Models 16, 18, and 22 in Table 4-11, 
graphically examine the proposed relationship between an increase in the partners’ knowledge 
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diversity and the likelihood of including a non-solicitation provision in an R&D alliance contract 
(i.e., Hypothesis 4). Again, the simulation procedure was applied above to generate the graphs in 
Panel A of each figure. In Panel A of Figures 4-10, 4-11, and 4-12, the heavy dots indicate a 
statistically significant change, at the p<0.05 level or better, in the predicted probability of 
including a non-solicitation provision when knowledge diversity is varied from one standard 
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean, holding all other variables constant at 
meaningful values. 
The graphs again show that statistical significance is conditional on the value of the 
experience variable that knowledge diversity is interacted with. In Panel A of Figure 4-10, the 
change in the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s total 
previous contracting experience is greater than twelve. In Panel A of Figure 4-11, the change in 
the predicted probability is not significantly different from zero when buyer’s previous R&D 
contracting experience is greater than five. In Panel A of Figure 4-12, the change in the predicted 
probability is not significantly different from zero when supplier’s total previous contracting 
experience is greater than nine.
33
 Thus, the graphs provide only limited support for Hypothesis 4. 
Similar to Figures 4-7 and 4-8, Figures 4-10 and 4-11 show that that the change in the 
predicted probability associated with an increase in the value of knowledge diversity decreases as 
the values of the previous contracting experience variables also increase. That is, these figures 
indicate that there might be a negative interaction between knowledge diversity and the two 
measures of the buyer’s previous contracting experience, which runs contrary to Hypothesis 5d. 
                                                 
33
 Again, there is an inflection point in the curve in Panel A of Figure 4-12 for values of supplier’s total previous 
contracting experience greater than approximately nine where the change in the predicted probability starts to 
slightly decline over the rest of the range. This same inflection point is not exhibited in Panel B of Figure 4-12, as 
the change in the predicted probability continues to increase over the rest of the range, illustrating the difference 
between the plots generated by the simulation and those created in Excel. Thus, while the simulation suggests that 
the change in predicted probability is not statistically significant for values greater than nine, the Excel plot provides 
some evidence to the contrary. 
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-10. Effect of an increase in knowledge diversity on the probability of including a non-
solicitation provision at various values of the buyer’s total previous contracting experience 
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4-11. Effect of an increase in knowledge diversity on the probability of including a non-
solicitation provision at various values of the buyer’s previous R&D contracting experience 
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Figure 4-12. Effect of an increase in knowledge diversity on the probability of including a non-
solicitation provision at various values of the supplier’s total previous contracting experience  
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It does appear, however, that there is a positive interaction between knowledge diversity and 
supplier’s total previous contracting experience in Figure 4-12, as predicted by Hypothesis 5d. 
The additional option in the Stata procedure was again employed to determine if the 
interaction effect exhibited in any of these plots is statistically significant. I tested to see if the 
interaction effect was significant between zero and ten for buyer’s total previous contracting 
experience in Panel A of Figure 4-10, between zero and five for buyer’s previous R&D 
contracting experience in Panel A of Figure 4-11, and between zero and ten for supplier’s total 
previous contracting experience in Panel A of Figure 4-12. Neither the decrease in the change in 
the probability in Figures 4-10 and 4-11 nor the increase in the change in the probability in 
Figure 4-12 were statistically significant at the p<0.05 level or better over the specified ranges. 
Thus, it would appear from these findings that there is no statistical support for Hypothesis 5d. 
However, the change in the predicted probability in Figure 4-12 is approximately +31%. Again, 
from the standpoint of economic significance, this difference warrants further discussion. 
4.4.6.1. Robustness Tests. Logistic regression techniques were employed in place of 
probit as a robustness test. As expected, the results were substantially identical. This is not 
surprising given that the cumulative normal and logistic distributions are very similar, except at 
the tails. Considerable differences between the results of logit and probit are expected only when 
the sample size is large. In such a case, the number of observations in the tails of the distributions 
likely increases, highlighting the differing widths of the distributions at the tails (Maddala, 1983: 
23). The sample size is relatively small in this study (N = 66), suggesting that it is unlikely that 
there is much of a difference between the number of observations in the tails of the distributions. 
Additional robustness tests were conducted that examined the sensitivity of the results to 
the time window for the measures tacitness, knowledge diversity, same partner, and previous 
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contracting experience. Three- and seven-year windows were also investigated. As noted above, 
five years was selected as the ideal window for examining the impact of previous contracting 
experience based on Heimeriks and Duysters (2007). As the variables tacitness and knowledge 
diversity are also essentially measuring capabilities, I used the same time window when 
developing these measures for consistency. The primary argument is that there are stocks and 
flows of capabilities (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Over time, as firms learn new knowledge, some 
of the old knowledge is likely to be displaced. Thus, varying the window between three, five, and 
seven years serves to examine if different stocks and flows of knowledge and capabilities impact 
the relationships proposed in this study. The results are fairly robust for the five and seven year 
windows, while some of the statistical significance is lost when the measures using the three year 
window are employed. These findings suggest that knowledge stocks and alliance capabilities 
may turnover or depreciate at a moderate rate, lending support for the five year window 
suggested in the literature. 
4.4.7. Discussion 
In this study, I set out to examine the impact of various hazards on the design of R&D 
alliance contracts. Specifically, I suggested that in order to overcome knowledge transfer issues, 
R&D alliance contracts should include a provision that creates a mechanism for employees from 
both partners to communicate face-to-face. In addition, I proposed that in order to safeguard 
against ‘learning-by-hiring’, a non-solicitation provision should be included in R&D alliance 
contracts. Four baseline hypotheses were developed to investigate these suggestions. 
I noted that the baseline hypotheses are rooted in the logic of TCE, which assumes that 
managers and lawyers can develop contracts which are relatively responsive to the hazards they 
perceive in a given transaction. TCE also assumes that managers and lawyers learn relatively 
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quickly from their previous experience. If they do not, firm-level performance is expected to 
suffer due to the inability to develop effective contracts. Recent research suggests that this 
learning process is not a quick as TCE assumes (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et al., 
2011). Thus, this study also investigated if and how previous contracting experience impacts the 
inclusion of specific provisions designed to solve problems related to specific transaction 
hazards. Hypotheses proposing a moderating effect of experience were developed. The results 
reported in the previous section provide some support for the baseline hypotheses and limited 
support for the hypotheses proposing a moderating effect for previous experience. A deeper 
investigation of the results is warranted to sort out and interpret the models that were tested. 
The results indicate that experienced buyers are more likely to recognize situations that 
require a facilities access provision to facilitate the transfer of the supplier’s tacit knowledge and 
include such a provision in the contract than buyers with little or no experience. In addition, the 
lack of support for the conditional ‘main’ effect and the moderation effect in the models where 
the measures of the supplier’s previous contracting experience are interacted with tacitness is in 
line with the notion that the inclusion of a facilities access provision is not as salient an issue for 
the supplier. Together, these finding are not surprising given that technical knowledge is often 
only transferred from the supplier to the buyer in an R&D alliance. Because of this one-way flow 
of knowledge, the supplier may not want to include a facilities access provision in an R&D 
alliance contract out of fear that doing so will allow the buyer to quickly learn all of its technical 
knowledge and terminate the alliance. The buyer, however, is likely to possess the leverage to 
demand its inclusion when the situation warrants. Given the substantial size disparity between 
the buyers and suppliers in the sample (as measured by annual sales revenue), the buyers are 
likely to hold a considerable amount of bargaining power. 
187 
 
 
 
An interesting result is that the predicted moderation effect is only statistically significant 
when the buyer’s R&D contracting experience intensity is interacted with tacitness, suggesting 
that it is not simply the total number of previous alliance contracts (or R&D alliance contracts) 
that a firm has drafted that helps it to ‘learn how to contract’ (Mayer and Agyres, 2004), but the 
fraction of its total experience dedicated to R&D alliances. The logic behind this finding is that 
buyers in R&D alliances are more likely than their partners to have an in-house attorney or 
business development manager with previous experience negotiating and designing contracts. In 
addition, some very large buyers, for example F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. (Roche), have a 
dedicated alliance management group. Such a function serves as a repository of the knowledge 
gained from previous contracting experience. Thus, buyers that have engaged in a higher 
percentage of R&D alliances are more likely to possess a greater stock of relevant knowledge 
readily available for use when contracts are drafted for subsequent R&D alliances. This finding 
also provides some support for the notion that all contracting experience is not equal. Rather, it 
appears that the type and intensity of the experience matters as the hazards encountered in R&D 
alliances are likely to be different than those that are of concern in marketing or supply alliances.  
The results also indicate that experienced suppliers are more likely to recognize situations 
that require a non-solicitation provision to prevent ‘learning-by-hiring’ and include such a 
provision in the contract than less experienced suppliers. While the interaction effects in Model 
22 are not statistically significant, the positive change in the probability of including such a 
provision at higher levels of tacitness and knowledge diversity as the supplier’s experience 
increases has economic significance. In addition, the inclusion of a non-solicitation provision in 
an R&D alliance contract is likely to be a more important issue for a smaller, entrepreneurial 
firm, as its employees are its key resource. 
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It is important to note that the moderator in Model 22 is the supplier’s total contracting 
experience, which would seem to indicate that all contracting experience contributes equally to 
learning. Table 4-8 shows, however, that there is a strong correlation between the supplier’s total 
previous contracting experience and its previous R&D contracting experience. An examination 
of the raw data shows that 30% of the suppliers in the sample have not participated in any 
alliances, and 47% have not participated in an R&D alliance. For almost half of the suppliers that 
have participated in at least one R&D alliance, all of their previous experience has been 
dedicated to R&D alliances. This is not surprising given that many of the suppliers in the sample 
are young, entrepreneurial firms, which have most likely spent their formative years focused on 
developing their core technologies rather than engaged in many alliances. However, once these 
firms have developed their technological capabilities, they become sought after R&D alliance 
partners. Thus, it appears that total previous experience is driven by previous R&D contracting 
experience for most suppliers, which tentatively can be interpreted to indicate that suppliers learn 
how to contract as they gain experience drafting R&D alliance contracts. 
Finally, it is worth discussing the magnitude and direction of the interaction between 
tacitness and the buyer’s previous R&D experience. As noted in the results, Panel A of Figure 4-
8 shows that the change in the predicted probability associated with an increase in tacitness 
decreases as the buyer’s previous R&D experience increases, which runs counter to what was 
expected. While the additional test indicates that the interaction effect is not statistically 
significant, the magnitude of the change (-43%) is sizeable. The economic significance of this 
finding is that experienced buyer’s may actually prefer not to include a non-solicitation provision 
in an R&D alliance contract when knowledge is tacit as a way to salvage an alliance if it is 
terminated. In other words, experienced buyers may have learned from past alliances that it is 
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desirable to keep the option to hire the supplier’s talent available, especially when the supplier’s 
knowledge is tacit. Alternatively, large buyers may possess enough leverage over their smaller, 
entrepreneurial partners to prevent the inclusion of a non-solicitation provision when it is 
warranted. For example, in the sample examined in this study, the contracts that govern Roche’s 
alliances with CombiMatrix Corp. and deCode Genetics do not contain a non-solicitation 
provision despite the highly tacit nature of each supplier’s knowledge. 
Overall, the results from this study provide valuable insight into the process of learning 
how to contract. While statistically significant results are limited, the findings lend some support 
to the notion that when a term is relevant to a firm, managers and lawyers with previous 
experience drafting contracts for R&D alliances are more likely to include the term when it is 
necessary than managers and lawyers lacking such experience. The results also offer some 
support for the notion that learning how to contract is not quite as quick as TCE suggests, which 
is in line with evidence from the inter-organizational learning and alliance capabilities literatures. 
4.5. Study 2: The Assignment of Key Control and Decision Rights in R&D Alliances 
4.5.1. Introduction 
In recent years, several studies of contract design have examined the allocation of control 
and decision rights in R&D alliances (e.g., Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner et al., 2003; 
Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Such rights refer to the provisions in alliance 
contracts that allocate ownership of key alliance assets and provide the ability to make decisions 
regarding their use. Based on the logic of incentive-alignment, the assignment of such rights in 
an alliance contract is considered to be a critical factor in eliciting the optimal degree of effort 
from both partners. Thus, determining how to ‘correctly’ assign such rights is important from 
both a theoretical and managerial standpoint. 
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Previous research has primarily examined why one partner ‘wins’ a larger share of the 
rights that are available in R&D alliance contracts. Recent studies suggest, however, that firms 
are more interested in obtaining specific rights rather than simply accumulating as many rights as 
possible (Ariño and Ring, 2010). Other research shows that the incentive-alignment objective 
can only be accomplished by getting the assignment of specific rights correct (Kloyer, 2011). In 
addition, because different rights play different functions, the underlying mechanisms explaining 
their assignment are expected to be different (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Therefore, this 
study deviates from previous research in that it examines the assignment of two rights considered 
key in the context of R&D alliances, namely foreground intellectual property (IP) rights and 
unilateral termination rights. 
Control of IP is considered to be an important issue in R&D alliances (Hagedoorn and 
Hesen, 2007). The division of IP rights is expected to determine how the relational rents 
generated are shared between the alliance partners. According to property rights theory (PRT), 
control over foreground IP is crucial from the standpoint of encouraging each party to contribute 
its resources to the alliance in order to achieve an optimal innovation outcome. Lacking the 
proper incentive, one or both of the partners may shirk on the alliance. Thus, properly assigning 
such rights is particularly important, especially when the partners are likely to develop multiple 
patentable innovations and continue to work together in the future. 
The right to terminate an R&D alliance is also critical given the observability and 
measurement problems associated with R&D that were discussed in Study 1. The lack of 
verifiability gives rise to the threat of ‘project substitution’ or ‘project cross-subsidization’, 
wherein resources allocated to the alliance are diverted to other projects or alliances in order to 
obtain private benefits. The threat of termination can be employed to help align the incentives of 
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the parties, and prevent such problems from occurring. Not surprisingly, termination rights 
appear in many R&D alliance contracts, but only those that provide the right to unilaterally and 
unconditionally terminate the partnership (i.e., severe termination rights) are expected to combat 
the verifiability problem. Together, examining the allocation of these two specific rights 
addresses the following research question: 
 What factors influence the assignment of key control and decision rights in R&D 
alliance contracts? 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly review 
and discuss the theory upon which the conceptual model for this study rests. The model is then 
used to develop a series of hypotheses, the tests and results of which are then detailed. Finally, I 
end by further discussing the results from this study and their implications. 
4.5.2. Theory Development 
PRT suggests that the proper assignment of control rights in an R&D alliance contract is 
critical in order to create an incentive structure that will elicit the optimal degree of effort from 
both partners. Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) model posits that control should be granted to the 
partner whose marginal contribution is critical (i.e., indispensable) to the alliance outcome. The 
model assumes, however, that alignment is achieved via assignment of a single, undifferentiated 
‘ownership’ right. Lerner and Merges (1998) note that in actual alliances, this right is divided 
into several smaller parts that assign control over specific aspects of the residual rights that flow 
from ownership. According to Adegbesan and Higgins (2011), control rights can be further 
differentiated based on the function that they play. For instance, some rights split the returns 
from an uncertain future pie between alliance partners, while others give one partner the ability 
to punish the other partner if it does not comply with the terms of the contract. 
192 
 
 
 
Foreground IP is an example of a right that splits the returns from an uncertain future pie. 
Economic studies of the sources and implications of appropriability (e.g., Levin, Klevorick, 
Nelson, and Winter, 1987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) highlight the importance of protecting the 
returns from innovation. Without such protection, innovators are less likely to invest in R&D at 
an optimal level because their ability to appropriate the returns from their innovations is limited. 
Thus, studies in this area are concerned with how the rights to control the results of innovation 
activities create the proper incentives to encourage innovators to take risks and invest in R&D. 
The notion that IP rights for individual innovators provide an incentive to invest in R&D 
is similar to PRT-logic regarding the assignment of IP rights in R&D alliances. In an alliance 
that results in a single patentable innovation, PRT predicts that the corresponding IP right should 
be assigned to the partner whose marginal contribution is indispensable (i.e., critical to the 
alliance outcome). Thus, if the research firm’s effort is indispensable, it should retain control 
over the IP. Conversely, if the funding firm’s investment is indispensable to the realization of the 
innovation, control should be transferred to the funding firm in exchange for compensation.  
In each case, the incentive is created for the R&D firm to optimally commit its resources 
to the alliance. In the former, retaining ownership of the IP right allows the R&D firm to capture 
the value of its innovation by licensing it to the funding firm (and potentially to other interested 
parties). Licensees typically pay a fee to the R&D firm as well as royalties on any products that 
they sell that include the innovation. In the latter, the payment made by the funding firm in 
exchange for ownership should reflect the discounted value of the R&D firm’s innovation. 
Many R&D alliances, however, result in multiple patentable innovations. Furthermore, 
both partners are often involved in conducting R&D activities. In such cases, Aghion and Tirole 
(1994) suggest that each party should control the IP rights to the innovations where it has a 
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‘comparative advantage’ in creating value. This notion is explored further by Leiponen (2008). 
She notes that if each firm individually tries to maximize its control of IP, the incentives to 
innovate are not necessarily optimized. To restore the proper incentives, she suggests that ‘[i]n 
some instances, both partners are better off when control rights are allocated to the party that is 
best positioned to innovate’ (Leiponen, 2008: 1373). 
Taking this idea further, the assignment of rights should not only take each partner’s 
ability to currently utilize IP into consideration, but also each partner’s ability to build upon it in 
the future. In essence, proactively considering which party is best suited to exploit IP today and 
in the future should lead to an allocation of rights that strategically creates an ideal incentive 
structure for both partners to optimally invest in the alliance. Thus, Figure 4-13 shows that each 
partner’s relative ability to exploit IP influences the assignment of foreground IP rights, 
especially when an alliance is likely to result in multiple patentable innovations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-13. Conceptual model for study 2 
A termination clause is an example of a right that allows one partner to punish the other 
for non-compliance, essentially providing the compliant partner with a means to safeguard its 
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investment in the alliance against opportunistic behavior. Including such a right in an R&D 
alliance contract should create the proper incentives ex ante to discourage non-compliance. 
Determining when one partner is not complying with the contract is not trivial, however, due to 
the potential lack of observability and verifiability in R&D alliances. These factors feature 
notably in agency theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979) and PRT. 
In an R&D alliance, each partner undertakes specific tasks, the inputs of which may not 
be observable, giving rise to the potential of shirking. In response to this threat, provisions can be 
incorporated that clearly describe each partner’s roles and responsibilities, creating a benchmark 
against which their actions can be judged to involve shirking (Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Even if 
a task being performed by one partner is observable, however, it may not be verifiable in a court 
of law. For example, in an R&D alliance between a large firm and a smaller, entrepreneurial 
firm, it is likely that the partners possess different goals. While the large firm is primarily 
interested in developing new products, the smaller firm may have several competing interests. 
On the one hand, the smaller firm’s interests may be in alignment, as developing new 
products for or with its partner ensures future cash flows. Smaller firms may, however, desire to 
enhance their own reputation by bringing products to market on their own. Equity markets view 
this as a sign of the quality of a firm’s research and management acumen (Lerner and 
Malmendier, 2010). Smaller firms with sought after new technology are also likely to be juggling 
multiple alliances. In both cases, the smaller firm may be tempted to shift resources to other 
projects. Thus, while specific individuals can be named and tasks assigned in an R&D alliance 
contract, it may be difficult to verify whether a smaller firm is diverting resources.  
Diverting alliance resources to alternate uses is known as ‘project substitution’ or ‘project 
cross-subsidization’ (Lerner and Malmendier, 2010). In response, a provision that is stronger 
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than assigning roles and responsibilities is required to establish an incentive structure that will 
discourage shirking. Severe termination rights, namely those that can be invoked unilaterally and 
without cause, provide just such a mechanism. The conceptual model in Figure 4-13 shows this 
relationship. It is important to note that while the logic of incentive-alignment guides the 
assignment of severe termination rights, the underlying mechanism is different than the one that 
guides the allocation of IP rights. Rather than the relative abilities of the partners, the assignment 
of severe termination rights is proposed to be a function of the inability to verify that shirking 
has occurred even if observable stipulations can be included in an R&D alliance contract. 
The relationship between bargaining power and the assignment of control rights also 
needs to be taken into consideration. Bargaining power refers to the ability of one party to win 
concessions from another party (Dwyer and Walker, 1981), and to influence the outcome of a 
negotiation (Schelling, 1956). As noted earlier, the allocation of control rights should adhere to 
the logic of incentive-alignment when the research firm holds a strong bargaining position 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1994). However, with the exception of Lerner and Merges (1998), previous 
research has examined the direct effect of bargaining power rather than testing whether it distorts 
or ‘moderates’ the PRT predictions as proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1994). As shown in 
Figure 4-13, I propose that both pathways should be tested to investigate if and how bargaining 
power influences the assignment of key control rights in R&D alliance contracts. 
In sum, the theoretical literature does not differentiate between the different types of 
control and decision rights that can be allocated among alliance partners. Rather, theory speaks 
in general about the assignment of any suitable rights that mitigate the incentive-alignment 
problem. In practice, decision and control rights can take many forms and play many functions. 
In addition, the studies by Ariño and Ring (2010) and Kloyer (2011) indicate that obtaining 
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control over specific rights that address specific, pertinent issues is what is important to firms 
when they negotiate. Thus, the hypotheses that are developed in the next section suggest that 
there are different factors that impact the allocation of different rights due to the functions that 
they play, the problems that they solve, and which party desires to obtain control. I also propose 
that we could still stand to learn more about the influence of bargaining power on the allocation 
of different control rights in R&D alliances. Consequently, hypotheses are developed to 
investigate the pathway through which bargaining power operates. 
4.5.3. Hypotheses 
4.5.3.1. Ownership of Foreground IP in R&D Alliances. PRT offers a relatively 
straightforward solution for assigning IP when the result of an R&D alliance is a single 
innovation – the right should be awarded to the partner whose marginal contribution is critical to 
the alliance outcome. However, when there are multiple innovations, potentially developed by 
each partner, the assignment of the IP rights associated with each innovation is likely to be 
determined by factors other than each partner’s marginal contribution (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). 
In practice, when there are multiple innovations, IP rights are usually divided between 
alliance partners as follows: each partner is assigned the rights to its self-developed IP, and a 
share of the rights to jointly-developed IP (Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007). However, in some 
instances the foreground IP associated with specific innovations is assigned to a specific partner 
regardless of which partner invented it. For example, in the alliance between Boston Scientific 
Corporation (BSC) and NitroMed Inc. (NMI) dated November 20, 2001, ownership of all Device 
Inventions is assigned to BSC, while NMI is granted ownership of all Nitric Oxide Releasing 
Compound Inventions, regardless of the identity of the inventor. 
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The hypotheses developed here examine why IP rights are assigned in this special way in 
some R&D alliance contracts. I suggest that the decision to precisely specify foreground IP 
rights is influenced by the relative ability of each partner to utilize the IP today and in the future. 
The relative bargaining position of each partner is expected to play a role in this decision as well. 
4.5.3.1.1. Relative ability to utilize IP. Firms form R&D alliances in order to gain access 
to the research capabilities of other firms (Tripsas et al., 1995), particularly their expertise in 
specific areas of science and technology. The evolution of a firm’s research capabilities has been 
characterized as a path-dependent process that is constrained by a firm’s initial resource 
endowment (Helfat, 1994; Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, and Klepper, 2000). In addition, 
research capabilities tend to develop in a ‘local’ fashion (Nelson and Winter, 1982), building 
closely upon a firm’s prior stock of knowledge in a particular area of science or technology. 
Firms also invest a significant amount of time, and human and financial capital, developing 
research capabilities. Thus, it is difficult to duplicate another firm’s research capabilities due to 
path-dependence and time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). As a result, a 
firm that is already familiar with a particular area of science or technology should be able to 
build upon technology that capitalizes on its capabilities in that area better than a firm that has 
not made comparable investments. 
In some R&D alliances, the scientific and technological skills of each partner overlap, 
while in other cases each partner specializes in a very distinct area. In the latter case, each 
partner should be best suited to exploit the IP developed during the alliance that is closest to its 
area of expertise because it has already made significant investments in developing the requisite 
capabilities to do so. Taking the future into account, each partner should also be better suited to 
build upon the IP closest to its area of expertise due to path-dependence and time compression 
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diseconomies. As discussed above, these factors limit a firm’s ability to build such capabilities in 
a timely and cost-effective fashion. 
The future utilization of IP is an important consideration in many alliances, as firms 
frequently plan to extend alliances in order to develop next generation products. Assigning 
control over the IP most related to each firm’s respective core areas of technology, especially 
when the partners specialize in different areas, strategically creates an incentive for both partners 
to optimally invest in the alliance today in anticipation of an on-going relationship (Leiponen, 
2008). Thus, I expect that foreground IP rights over specific innovations will be assigned to each 
partner rather than generically assigned when the partners in an R&D alliance each specialize in 
distinct areas of science or technology. I state the hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 6: Foreground IP associated with specific innovations is more likely 
to be assigned to a specific partner, regardless of which partner invented it, when 
the partners specialize in divergent areas of science or technology. 
 
4.5.3.1.2. Bargaining power.
34
 Bargaining power may also play a role in determining 
how IP rights are assigned. In general, bargaining ability refers to a party’s ability to win 
accommodations from another party (Dwyer and Walker, 1981), and to influence the outcome of 
a negotiation (Schelling, 1956). In an R&D alliance, each partner’s bargaining ability is likely to 
be determined by its initial bargaining power, which is a function of several financial and non-
financial factors. One indicator of the supplier’s bargaining power, and thus its ability to 
negotiate favorable contract terms, is its financial health. A cash-constrained supplier is likely to 
be desperate for external funding. As a result, its ability to bargain over the favorable assignment 
of foreground IP rights is diminished because its financial constraints put it in a weaker 
                                                 
34
 Similar to Study 1, I adopt the terminology of a sourcing agreement for the following hypotheses. The larger 
partner typically plays the role of a buyer, while the smaller partner fills the supplier role. 
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bargaining position relative to the buyer. Conversely, when the supplier is not cash-constrained, 
it is in a better position to negotiate a favorable assignment of the foreground IP rights. 
It is important to note that in regard to the assignment of foreground IP rights, the 
supplier typically would prefer to gain control over the IP developed during the alliance that is 
most related to its core area of science or technology. In the literature, patents have been 
suggested to be a signal of a firm’s quality (Spence, 1973). Particularly for an entrepreneurial 
firm, patents serve as an indicator of the value of the firm’s capabilities, which has been shown 
to impact its ability to obtain external funding (Long, 2002). Anecdotal evidence also suggests 
that managers in entrepreneurial firms view their patent portfolios as a measure of performance 
(Lemley, 2000). Thus, gaining control over core IP is critical to entrepreneurial firms that are 
suppliers of technology in R&D alliances, as a growing asset stock signals stronger performance 
(DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999). For these reasons, I expect that an R&D alliance contract is more 
likely to assign ownership of specific IP to a specific partner when the supplier’s bargaining 
ability is enhanced by its financial health. I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: Foreground IP associated with specific innovations is more likely 
to be assigned to a specific partner, regardless of which partner invented it, when 
the supplier’s financial health is strong. 
 
The relative bargaining position of the partners is also likely to be a function of the 
buyer’s initial bargaining power. Large firms, as ‘buyers’ of technology, often simultaneously 
participate in multiple R&D alliances with multiple partners. The rationale for engaging in 
several alliances is that it allows buyers to ‘partially manage the technological uncertainty that 
they face in their competitive environment’ (Alvarez and Barney, 2001: 139), making them less 
dependent on the outcome of any single alliance, especially when those alliances involve 
multiple suppliers engaged in the development of the same technology. As a result, if one 
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supplier’s efforts fail, the buyer has other suppliers to fall back on. Thus, buyers engaged in 
multiple alliances at the outset of a new alliance are likely to possess more bargaining power, 
enhancing their bargaining position relative to any single supplier. In turn, this should strengthen 
the buyer’s ability to negotiate favorable contract terms or at least prevent the supplier from 
obtaining its favorable assignment of the foreground IP rights. As such, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 8: Foreground IP associated with specific innovations is less likely to 
be assigned to a specific partner, regardless of which partner invented it, when 
the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple R&D alliances. 
 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) propose that differences in bargaining power may distort the 
allocation of IP rights rather than directly influence their assignment. In essence, they suggest 
that the logic of incentive alignment may be trumped by bargaining power considerations. Thus, 
because the relative bargaining position of each partner differs from alliance to alliance, it is 
important to examine whether this factor moderates the relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-14. Expected plot to support interaction effect of bargaining power on the assignment of 
IP rights 
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When the buyer’s bargaining power is strong, it is in a position to extract concessions 
from the supplier regardless of what is optimal according to the logic of incentive alignment. 
While resting on a slightly different mechanism, the proposed outcome is similar to the one 
predicted by Aghion and Tirole (1994), which suggests that the relationship in Hypothesis 6 
should weaken when the buyer has a strong relative bargaining position. In addition, the 
relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6 should hold when the supplier’s bargaining position is 
relatively strong. Figure 4-14 depicts an extreme example of what is expected. The buyer’s 
bargaining position is strongest on the left side of the x-axis, while the supplier’s position is 
strongest on the right. The y-axis denotes the predicted probability of assigning specific IP to a 
specific partner, regardless of which partner was the inventor. The top dashed line represents the 
case when the partners operate in highly divergent areas of science and technology, while the 
bottom dashed line represents the case when the partners operate in very similar areas. 
In line with Aghion and Tirole (1994), Figure 4-14 shows that when the supplier’s 
bargaining position is strong, IP is assigned based on the logic of incentive alignment. However, 
when the buyer’s bargaining position is strong, the predicted positive relationship is completely 
negatively moderated. As depicted, the buyer’s strength puts it in a position to dictate the 
contract terms, reducing the probability that specific rights will be assigned to a specific partner 
when the partners’ areas of expertise are divergent. It is important to note that the buyer’s strong 
relative bargaining position may be a result of the supplier’s financial constraints or the power it 
derives from participating in multiple alliances. Thus, the argument outlined here suggests: 
Hypothesis 9a: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6 should be 
weakened when the supplier is financially constrained. 
Hypothesis 9b: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 6 should be 
weakened when the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple alliances. 
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4.5.3.2. Assignment of Severe Termination Rights in R&D Alliances. The right to 
terminate an alliance is an important strategic consideration in many theories of financial 
contracting (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). According to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart 
and Moore (1998), the right of a financier to terminate an entrepreneur’s project at an 
intermediate stage (i.e., before unobservable cash flows arrive) serves as a mechanism to reduce 
the entrepreneur’s incentive to consume private benefits (i.e., act opportunistically). Thus, given 
the ‘project substitution’ or ‘project cross-subsidization’ problem, which entails the possibility of 
the supplier obtaining private benefits by shirking on the focal alliance, it is not surprising that 
many R&D alliance contracts contain termination provisions. 
Termination provisions can take many forms and can often be invoked by either alliance 
partner. For example, provisions that allow either partner to terminate the alliance for breach of 
contract or bankruptcy are nearly ubiquitous in R&D alliance contracts. The provisions most 
relevant to the ‘project substitution’ and ‘project cross-subsidization’ problems, however, are 
severe termination rights that allow the buyer to unilaterally terminate an alliance at will (i.e., 
unconditionally, without cause) after a certain date is reached or at any time, or if the buyer 
determines that continuation of the alliance would be ‘unwise’. Such severe termination rights 
are employed more selectively than those that allow either party to terminate for breach of 
contract or bankruptcy. The hypotheses developed next explore the factors that impact the 
assignment of these rights to buyers in R&D alliances. The lack of verifiability and the relative 
bargaining power of the partners are two important considerations that factor into this decision. 
4.5.3.2.1. Lack of verifiability. R&D alliance contracts often require suppliers to 
undertake observable but difficult-to-verify actions. For example, a contract may explicitly state 
that the supplier should exert the same degree of effort on the alliance activities as it would on an 
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internal project. While the supplier’s alliance-related effort might be easy to observe, it is 
difficult to verify that such effort is comparable to what the supplier would dedicate to one of its 
own projects. As a result, the supplier may be tempted to reallocate personnel or resources that 
are supposed to be devoted to the alliance to internal projects or other alliances in order to 
capture private benefits. This is an example of the ‘project substitution’ and ‘project cross-
subsidization’ problems highlighted above. The supplier’s desire to capture private benefits puts 
the partners’ goals and objectives for the alliance at odds, creating a potential incentive problem. 
Assigning severe termination rights to the buyer is expected to restore the supplier’s incentive 
and prevent it from diverting resources to other projects or alliances. 
A factor that is likely to influence whether there are other projects or alliances for the 
supplier to divert resources to, thus creating a potential verifiability problem, is the range of 
applications for the supplier’s technology. The technology contributed to the alliance by the 
supplier may be applicable in a wide range of fields. Technology that can be adapted for use in 
multiple applications rather than in a single domain is often referred to as general purpose 
technology (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998). Firms that 
possess general purpose technology are likely to be highly sought-after alliance partners. 
When the supplier’s technology is widely applicable, it has an incentive to pursue private 
rents, either by forming multiple alliances or by focusing key resources on internal projects to 
develop and commercialize the technology itself. In such cases, the supplier may provide the 
buyer with signs that it is progressing on the alliance objectives, but it is difficult for the buyer to 
verify that the supplier is exerting its full effort. Granting severe termination rights to the buyer 
serves to restore the supplier’s incentive not to shirk on the alliance. If the supplier is deemed to 
be diverting effort, the buyer can unilaterally and unconditionally invoke its option to end the 
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alliance at an intermediate stage, before any common benefits are recognized. The potential loss 
of such benefits should deter the supplier from seeking private benefits. Thus, I predict: 
Hypothesis 10: The buyer is more likely to obtain severe termination rights when 
the supplier’s technology can be used in a wide range of applications. 
 
4.5.3.2.2. Bargaining power. Bargaining power is also expected to influence the 
allocation of severe termination rights to the buyer in R&D alliance contracts. As noted 
above, the supplier’s financial health is one factor that determines its bargaining position, 
which impacts its ability to influence the outcome of contract negotiations. The supplier 
would prefer that severe termination rights are not granted to the buyer. If the supplier is 
cash-constrained, its bargaining position is weakened, reducing its ability to negotiate for 
terms that it finds favorable. Conversely, if the supplier’s financial health is strong, it is 
likely to be in a better position to negotiate, improving its chances of preventing the 
buyer from obtaining severe termination rights. In essence, a solvent supplier can 
legitimately threaten to break off negotiations unless its terms are accepted, whereas a 
supplier desperate for funding does not possess such leverage. Consequently:  
Hypothesis 11: The buyer is less likely to obtain severe termination rights when 
the supplier’s financial health is strong. 
 
A similar argument can be made for buyers that are simultaneously engaged in multiple 
alliances. As noted above, when a buyer is participating in multiple alliances, it is less dependent 
on the outcome of any single alliance. In addition, if multiple suppliers are working on similar 
projects, the buyer can simply turn to one of the other suppliers if one fails. Consequently, the 
buyer can legitimately threaten to walk away from negotiations unless the supplier concedes to 
its terms. Conversely, the fewer alliances the buyer is engaged in, the more dependent it is on the 
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outcome of specific alliances. As a result, the buyer’s bargaining position is not likely to be as 
strong, reducing its ability to pressure the supplier into accepting its terms. Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 12: The buyer is more likely to obtain severe termination rights when 
the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple R&D alliances. 
 
Another factor that is likely to impact the supplier’s bargaining power is whether it is 
responsible for manufacturing any components of or the entire product resulting from the 
alliance. If it is, the supplier is likely to have a significant amount of leverage over the buyer. 
This argument draws on the idea of resource-based bargaining power in inter-firm relationships 
(Yan and Gray, 1994). Coff (1999) develops this line of reasoning in regards to the nature of the 
bargaining relationship between employers and employees. He suggests that employees with 
difficult to imitate, critical resources hold enormous bargaining power over their employers. 
Applied to an R&D alliance, the supplier’s bargaining position should be strengthened when it is 
conducting downstream value-chain activities that are critical to realizing the alliance objectives, 
enhancing its ability to obtain concessions from the buyer. I can state the hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 13: The buyer is less likely to obtain severe termination rights when 
the supplier is responsible for any manufacturing related to the final product. 
 
While the arguments presented in Hypotheses 11-13 propose that bargaining power 
directly influences whether the buyer is able to obtain severe termination rights, it is possible that 
bargaining power moderates the relationship proposed in Hypothesis 10. Again, drawing on 
Aghion and Tirole (1994), the assignment of rights predicted by the logic of incentive-alignment 
should be distorted when the supplier’s bargaining position is weak. However, because the 
desired outcome this time is favored by the buyer, the moderating impact of bargaining power 
should negate the predicted relationship as shown in Figure 4-15. The buyer’s bargaining 
position is strongest on the left side of the x-axis, while the supplier’s position is strongest on the 
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right in Figure 4-15. The y-axis now denotes the predicted probability of the buyer obtaining 
severe termination rights. The top dashed line represents the case where the supplier’s 
technology is useful in a wide range of applications, while the bottom dashed line represents the 
case where the supplier’s technology is specialized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-15. Expected plot to support interaction effect of bargaining power on the assignment of 
severe termination rights 
 
Consistent with Aghion and Tirole (1994), Figure 4-15 shows that when the supplier’s 
bargaining position is strong, the assignment of severe termination rights is based on the logic of 
incentive alignment. However, when the buyer’s bargaining position is strong, the predicted 
relationship is weakened. As depicted, the buyer’s strength puts it in a position to dictate the 
contract terms, increasing the probability that it will be able to obtain severe termination rights 
when the supplier’s technology is relatively specialized. It is important to note that the buyer’s 
strong relative bargaining position may be a result of the supplier’s financial constraints or the 
power it derives from participating in multiple alliances. In addition, the buyer’s bargaining 
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position may be determined by whether the supplier has any manufacturing responsibilities. 
Thus, the arguments outlined here suggest the following: 
Hypothesis 14a: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 10 should be 
weakened when the supplier is financially constrained. 
Hypothesis 14b: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 10 should be 
weakened when the buyer is simultaneously engaged in multiple alliances. 
Hypothesis 14c: The positive relationship predicted in Hypothesis 10 should be 
weakened when the supplier is not responsible for any manufacturing related to 
the final product. 
 
4.5.4. Measures 
The measures developed here rely on the data set described in Section 4.3.4. 
4.5.4.1. Dependent Variables. To test the hypothesized relationships, I developed two 
dependent variables, specific IP assignment and severe termination. 
An analysis of the contracts in the sample revealed that in most alliances each partner 
will have sole ownership of all independently-developed IP and co-ownership of jointly-
developed IP. Hypotheses 6-9, however, examine why IP associated with specific innovations is 
assigned to a specific partner. Thus, the dummy variable specific IP assignment was created to 
capture when the contract stipulates that foreground IP associated with a specific technology will 
be assigned to a specific partner regardless of the identity of the partner responsible for inventing 
it. For each contract containing such terms, specific IP assignment is set to one, zero otherwise. 
Hypotheses 10-14 examine why buyers are able to obtain severe termination rights in 
R&D alliance contracts. The dummy variable severe termination was created to indicate whether 
such rights are granted to the buyer. This variable is assigned a value of one when any of the 
following severe termination rights appear in an alliance contract: the right to unilaterally 
terminate without cause at any time during the alliance, the right to unilaterally terminate without 
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cause after a specific time period or alliance stage, or the right to unilaterally terminate if the 
buyer determines that continuation of the alliance would be ‘unwise’. 
4.5.4.2. Independent Variables. To test Hypothesis 6, a measure of the partners’ relative 
ability to exploit IP is needed. Using patent data, I developed the measure knowledge diversity to 
determine the degree of overlap in the partners’ knowledge bases. The original measure was 
developed by Jaffe (1986) and has been used recently by Sampson (2004), Oxley and Sampson 
(2004), and Sampson (2007). Each firm’s knowledge portfolio was captured by measuring the 
distribution across 3-digit patent classes of the patents applied for in the five years prior to the 
formation of the alliance. This distribution is described by a multidimensional vector, Fi = (Fi
1
 
… Fi
s
), where Fi
s
 represents the number of patents assigned to partner firm i in patent class s. 
Diversity of partner firm knowledge is then: 
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where i ≠ j. 
The measure knowledge diversity varies from zero to one. A value of one indicates the 
greatest possible diversity between the partners’ portfolios. When this is the case, each partner is 
bringing very specific capabilities to the alliance, making it unlikely that each partner has the 
knowledge about, let alone ability to exploit, IP in fields that are far from its core areas. Thus, it 
is in situations such as these where it is expected that specific IP will be assigned to each partner 
in order to take advantage of their respective expertise, as proposed in Hypothesis 6. 
For Hypothesis 10, a measure is needed that indicates whether the supplier has alternative 
opportunities outside of the focal alliance, which potentially creates a situation where there is a 
lack of verifiability. I used the measure generality of the supplier’s technology to assess this 
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threat. Generality refers to how applicable the supplier’s technology is to other technological 
domains. Using patent data, I determined the average number of 3-digit technological classes 
assigned to all of the supplier’s patents that were filed for in the 5 years prior to the alliance. A 
patent may be assigned to multiple classes if the patent examiner deems that the innovative input 
of the patent relates to a wide variety of domains (Gittelman, 2008). Patents classified into a 
greater number of technological classes are interpreted as having a greater scope of applicability. 
Thus, the more applicable the technology is, the more likely the supplier is to have opportunities 
to form other alliances with other partners. 
Several hypotheses propose that bargaining power is likely to have an impact on the 
assignment of both IP and severe termination rights in R&D alliance contracts. Following the 
convention of previous studies (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and 
Higgins, 2011), supplier’s stockholders’ equity (in millions of dollars) is used to measure the 
supplier’s financial health. A lower value of stockholders’ equity, especially a negative value, 
indicates that a supplier is in need of external funding, which should decrease its bargaining 
power. I obtained this data from Compustat and IPO prospectuses for each supplier in the sample 
in the year prior to which the alliance contract was signed. 
The variable buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio was developed in order to assess the buyer’s 
ex ante bargaining power. As proposed in Hypotheses 8 and 12, buyers with larger alliance 
portfolios are likely to wield more leverage over suppliers than buyers engaged in fewer 
alliances. A count of the R&D alliances each buyer was participating in at the time the new 
alliance was formed was collected from Windhover’s Strategic Transactions database.  
The dummy variable any manufacturing by the supplier is used to capture a non-financial 
measure of the supplier’s ex ante bargaining power. This variable is assigned a value of one if 
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the supplier will be responsible for manufacturing any components of the final product, or the 
entire final product, resulting from the alliance, zero otherwise. According to Hypothesis 13, the 
supplier’s bargaining position is likely to be enhanced when it possesses some manufacturing 
responsibility. Information was gathered directly from each contract to develop this measure. 
4.5.4.3. Controls. I included several control variables in the econometric analyses to 
eliminate the possibility that alternative factors may drive the hypothesized relationships. Using 
information directly from the contract associated with each alliance, a dummy variable is used to 
capture whether the buyer has committed to contribute any capital to the supplier. Alliance 
payment is set to one when the contract indicates that the buyer will make any type of payment 
(i.e., upfront, milestone, R&D) to the supplier, zero otherwise. This measure tracks if the buyer 
contributing any capital to the supplier influences the assignment of rights. 
A dummy variable is used to capture if the buyer takes an equity stake in the supplier as 
part of the alliance. Using information from each contract, equity is set to one if the buyer takes 
any type of equity holding (common or preferred stock), zero otherwise. This variable controls 
for the possibility that ownership may affect the nature of the bargaining between firms. 
I also control for cases where the same partners were involved in a previous alliance. It 
may simply be the case that firms that have worked together in the past utilize the same contract 
template for their subsequent alliances. Alternatively, Adegbesan and Higgins (2011) suggest 
that prior ties may affect the nature of bargaining. Thus, I control for this factor by including a 
dummy variable, same partner, which is set equal to one if there are any earlier alliances 
recorded in the Strategic Transactions database that bring together the same partners in the five 
years prior to the current alliance, zero otherwise. 
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The supplier’s R&D intensity is also included as a control in the tests of Hypotheses 6-9 
to account for the level of investment that the supplier has made in its technology. A supplier that 
has made significant R&D investments is likely to desire to retain control over the IP that it has 
developed. I measure the supplier’s R&D intensity in this study by dividing the supplier’s R&D 
expenditures by the supplier’s total operating expenses (both in the year prior to the alliance). I 
use operating expenses rather than revenue or income because the suppliers in the sample are 
generally entrepreneurial firms that may have not generated any sales or profits in the year prior 
to the alliance. Thus, the ratio calculated here using operating expenses more accurately indicates 
how much of the firm’s available resources are being dedicated to developing new technology. I 
collected the information used to calculate this measure from Compustat and IPO prospectuses. 
I also included the buyer’s total assets (in billions of dollars), collected from Compustat, 
as a control variable. This measure takes into account whether the allocation of rights is simply a 
function of the buyer’s size, which may influence the nature of the bargaining relationship 
between the partners. 
A final control included in the tests of Hypotheses 6-9 is the dummy variable each firm 
manufacturing, which is set to one when both partners will be responsible for manufacturing 
some elements of the final product, zero otherwise. The rationale behind this measure is that 
each firm will need control over the IP rights associated with the technologies that it will be 
manufacturing. The actual contracts in the sample were used to determine the manufacturing 
responsibilities of each partner in each alliance. 
A final control included in the tests of Hypotheses 10-14 is the dummy variable 
employment provisions, which is set to one when the contract either explicitly names technical 
individuals from the supplier’s organization that will be assigned to the project or, at a minimum, 
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designates how many man-hours per quarter the supplier should dedicate to the alliance. Such 
provisions are inexpensive and easy to include in a contract up front. However, while the actions 
requested by such provisions may be observable, they are often difficult to verify. Thus, 
Robinson and Stuart (2007) suggest that pairing severe termination rights with provisions that 
are difficult to verify removes the need to verify them, especially if it is costly to do so. 
Lastly, I control for the fact that some firms have more than one contract in the sample. 
These contracts may not be independent of each other. Firms may use a similar contract structure 
in all of their alliances (regardless of whether it is with a previous or new partner), reflecting an 
organizational norm rather than the actual need to include specific provisions in the contract. To 
control for the possible lack of independence, I cluster observations by firm for the purposes of 
calculating standard errors (Huber, 1967). In the limited number of cases where a contract can be 
assigned to more than one firm (i.e., because both partners have multiple contracts in the 
sample), the contract is assigned to the firm with more contracts in the sample for the purposes of 
correcting the standard errors. As most of the firms in the sample are only involved in one 
contract, fixed effects are not used. 
4.5.5. Methods 
Probit analysis is the appropriate technique to use to test the hypotheses given the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variables in this study. Under the probit model, the 
probability of assigning IP rights associated with specific innovations to specific partners and the 
probability of severe termination rights being assigned to the buyer are modeled in two separate 
equations as functions of alliance-, supplier-, buyer-, and partner-specific variables. Specifically, 
using the binary probit approach, I estimate the following general equations for the probability of 
the assignment of each right of interest: 
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(3) Pr(Specific IP assigned to specific partner)= + *Alliance payment 
+*Equity*Same partner +*Supplier’s R&D intensity +*Buyer’s 
total assets +*Each firm manufacturing +*Knowledge diversity 
+*Supplier’s stockholders’ equity + *Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio+ 
*Knowledge diversity*Supplier’s stockholders’ equity + *Knowledge 
diversity*Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio + 
(4) Pr(Severe termination rights to buyer)= + *Alliance payment 
+*Equity*Same partner +*Buyer’s total assets +*Employment 
provisions +*Applicability of supplier’s technology +*Supplier’s 
stockholders’ equity +*Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio +*Any 
manufacturing by supplier +*Applicability of supplier’s 
technology*Supplier’s stockholders’ equity + *Applicability of supplier’s 
technology*Buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio + *Applicability of supplier’s 
technology*Any manufacturing by supplier +  
 
As in Study 1, the magnitude of the conditional ‘main’ effects estimated from equations 
(3) and (4) is not simply the value of the coefficient associated with the respective variables. 
Rather, in a non-linear model, the magnitude of the effects varies depending on the variable of 
interest’s starting value, the magnitude of the change in that variable, and the values of the other 
variables in the model (Long and Freese, 2006: 171). 
The interaction terms in equations (3) and (4) correspond to Hypotheses 9a-b and 
Hypotheses 14a-c, respectively. These interactions allow me to examine if the logic of incentive 
alignment is distorted by bargaining power. Again, the coefficients and standard errors of 
interaction terms in non-linear models, such as the binary probit models employed in this study, 
cannot be interpreted in the same way as they are in linear models. The sign of the interaction 
term coefficient need not correspond to the direction of the hypothesized conditional effect that 
motivated the inclusion of the interaction term in the first place (Huang and Shields, 2000; Ai 
and Norton, 2003). The standard error of the coefficient associated with the interaction term also 
does not convey direct information about the statistical significance of the interaction effect. 
As in Study 1, I followed the simulation-based approach developed by King et al. (2000), 
which was recently introduced in the strategic management literature by Zelner (2009), in order 
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to overcome the difficulty of interpreting the results from a probit analysis with multiple 
interaction terms. This simulation technique makes it possible to graphically evaluate the change 
in the predicted probabilities associated with an empirically relevant change in the value of the 
independent variable of interest with all other variables held constant at relevant values. In 
addition, this technique makes it possible to present the effects of the interaction terms in 
equations (3) and (4) graphically, allowing for the examination of both the direction and 
magnitude of these effects. The approach also allows for an examination of the statistical 
significance of the interaction terms by specifying an additional test option in Stata. 
4.5.6. Results 
Table 4-12 provides summary and correlation statistics for the dependent, independent 
and control variables used in the analyses. Preliminary analysis of the table provides some 
insight regarding the determinants of the assignment of specific IP and severe termination rights. 
The summary statistics indicate that there is moderate heterogeneity in the independent and 
control variables. The correlation statistics also indicate specific IP to specific partners (i.e., the 
dependent variable in equation (3)) is positively and significantly correlated with knowledge 
diversity. This result tentatively suggests that the assignment of such rights is driven by this 
factor. 
There are a moderate number of statistically significant correlations between and among 
the control and independent variables in Table 4-12, which suggests that there may be 
multicollinearity problems, especially when the interaction terms are formed. High levels of 
multicollinearity can lead to problems estimating regression coefficients (Marquardt, 1980), 
which can be minimized by mean-centering variables (Neter et al., 1996). I mean-centered 
knowledge diversity and the bargaining power measures before creating the interaction terms in
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4-12. Descriptive statistics and correlationsa
Variable Mean S.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Specific IP to specific partner     0.26     0.44     0.00     1.00
2. Severe termination     0.41     0.50     0.00     1.00     0.07
3. Alliance payment     0.67     0.48     0.00     1.00     0.02     0.13
4. Equity     0.38     0.49     0.00     1.00     0.18     0.11     0.55***
5. Same partner     0.12     0.33     0.00     1.00     0.21†     0.12     0.03     0.19
6. Supplier's R&D intensity     0.57     0.24     0.04     0.93     0.07     0.09     0.12     0.19    -0.11
7. Buyer's total assets   22.84   83.61     0.01  673.32    -0.05    -0.06    -0.12    -0.12    -0.01    -0.23†
8. Each partner manufacturing     0.27     0.45     0.00     1.00     0.26*     0.04     0.07     0.22†     0.02     0.19    -0.03
9. Employment provisions     0.15     0.36     0.00     1.00     0.14     0.09     0.12     0.19     0.03     0.19    -0.06     0.03
10. Knowledge diversity     0.60     0.29     0.05     1.00     0.25*     0.07     0.24†     0.41***    -0.27*     0.31*    -0.06     0.22†    -0.08
11. Applicability of supplier's technology     2.02     0.64     1.00     4.00    -0.07     0.02     0.03    -0.10     0.22†     0.26*    -0.09     0.06     0.03    -0.20
12. Supplier's stockholders' equity   38.61   63.32  -41.49  227.06     0.17    -0.03    -0.19    -0.29*     0.37**    -0.01    -0.02    -0.14     0.10    -0.32**     0.23†
13. Buyer's R&D alliance portfolio     0.77     0.42     0.00    17.00     0.00     0.08     0.12    -0.09     0.26*     0.02     0.17     0.11     0.28*    -0.10     0.15     0.41***
14. Any manufacturing by supplier     3.85     4.35     0.00     1.00     0.18    -0.09     0.08     0.17     0.09    -0.10     0.12     0.33**     0.04     0.06     0.12    -0.08     0.18
aN = 66
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
2
1
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equation (3), as suggested by Aiken and West (1991). Applicability of supplier’s technology and 
the measures of bargaining power were also mean-centered before creating the interaction terms 
in equation (4). I then calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs). All individual VIFs and the 
average VIF for each fully-specified model are well below the recommended threshold of 2.5, 
which suggests that there is little multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980; Kleinbaum et al., 1988). 
Table 4-13: Summary of results for study 2 
Hypotheses (Predicted sign) Sign of result 
Conditional ‘main’ hypotheses 
   Assignment of specific IP rights to specific partner 
     H6: Partners’ knowledge diversity (+) 
     H7: Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (+) 
     H8: No. of buyer’s other alliances (-) 
   Assignment of severe termination rights 
     H10: Applicability of supplier’s technology (+) 
     H11: Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (-) 
     H12: No. of buyer’s other alliances (+) 
     H13: Supplier’s manufacturing responsibility (-) 
Interactions 
   Assignment of specific IP rights to specific partner 
     H9a: Partners’ knowledge diversity x 
              Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (+) 
     H9b: Partners’ knowledge diversity x 
              No. of buyer’s other alliances (-) 
   Assignment of severe termination rights 
     H14a: Applicability of supplier’s technology x 
              Supplier’s shareholders’ equity (-) 
     H14b: Applicability of supplier’s technology x 
              No. of buyer’s other alliances (+) 
     H14c: Applicability of supplier’s technology x 
              Supplier’s manufacturing responsibility (-) 
Significant control variables 
   Assignment of specific IP rights to specific partner 
     Alliance payment 
     Equity 
     Same partner 
 
 
H6: + (p<0.01; Model 3) 
H7: + (p<0.01; Model 3) 
H8: not supported  
 
H10: not supported 
H11: not supported 
H12: not supported 
H13: not supported 
 
 
H9a: not supported 
 
H9b: not supported 
 
 
H14a: not supported 
 
H14b: not supported 
 
H14c: not supported 
 
 
 
+ (p<0.10; Model 3) 
+ (p<0.05; Model 3) 
+ (p<0.01; Model 3) 
Note: Statistically significant results in bold 
 
Table 4-13 is presented here to provide the reader with a brief summary of the results for 
this study. A more complete discussion of the results follows. Table 4-13 shows that a limited 
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number of the conditional ‘main’ hypotheses are supported, specifically Hypotheses 6 and 7. 
None of the hypotheses that propose interactions are supported, however. The table also shows 
that some support was found for the influence of the control variables alliance payment, equity, 
and same partner on the assignment of specific IP rights to a specific partner. Further discussion 
of these findings is warranted given the limited supported for the hypotheses in this study. 
Table 4-14 presents the binary probit estimations for when the dependent variable is the 
probability of assigning specific IP to a specific partner regardless of which partner invented it. 
Model 1 includes only the control variables. Model 2 adds knowledge diversity to account for the 
incentive-alignment explanation for the assignment of such rights, while Model 3 adds the 
measures of bargaining power. Finally, Model 4 includes the interactions between knowledge 
diversity and the measures of bargaining power (i.e., the supplier’s stockholders’ equity and the 
number of alliances that the buyers is simultaneously involved in). 
 
As noted in Table 4-14, the Wald chi-square statistic for all models is statistically 
significant at the p<0.01 level or better, indicating that each model is an improvement over a 
model that only includes a constant. Normally a likelihood-ratio test would be used to determine 
Table 4-14. Results of binary probit analysis for assignment of specific IP rights to specific partners a
Independent Variables
Constant   -0.969* (0.470)   -1.792* (0.655)   -2.921*** (0.901)   -1.151 (0.737)
Knowledge diversity (KD)    1.969* (0.866)    3.147** (1.209)    2.903** (1.119)
Supplier's shareholders' equity (SSE)    0.011** (0.004)    0.010* (0.005)
No. of Buyer's other R&D alliances (BOA)   -0.067 (0.056)   -0.080 (0.056)
KD x SSE   -0.004 (0.016)
KD x BOA   -0.226 (0.159)
Alliance payment   -0.952* (0.419)   -1.175* (0.463)   -1.050† (0.612)   -1.050 (0.674)
Equity    1.208** (0.388)    1.030* (0.463)    1.204* (0.557)    1.294* (0.612)
Same Partner    1.248* (0.575)    1.754** (0.683)    1.897** (0.690)    1.897** (0.613)
Supplier's R&D intensity    0.038 (0.773)   -0.440 (0.929)   -0.665 (0.951)   -0.494 (1.019)
Buyer's total assets   -0.001 (0.001)   -0.001 (0.001)    0.000 (0.001)    0.001 (0.001)
Each firm manufacturing    0.669 (0.442)    0.511 (0.498)    0.644 (0.554)    0.784 (0.539)
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald 2
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
aN = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Model 4:
full model
-25.188
38.59***
2.20
14.32*
Model 3:
bargaining power
-25.962
35.07***
8.68*
11.89*
Model 1:
controls only
-31.402
29.58***
Model 2:
incentive alignment
-28.933
20.42**
5.17*
5.17*
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if Models 2-4 are an improvement over Model 1. However, when standard errors are calculated 
by clustering, as is this case here, individual observations are no longer independent and the 
‘likelihood’ measure calculated does not reflect this. Thus, it is recommended that the standard 
likelihood-ratio test should not be used after estimation with clustering (Sribney, 1997 [updated 
2005]). Instead, the Wald test, which is one way of testing whether the parameters associated 
with a group of explanatory variables are zero, is preferred. If the Wald test is significant for a 
particular group of explanatory variables, it is safe to conclude that the parameters associated 
with the variables are not zero. As a result, the variables should be included in the model. 
However, if the Wald test is not significant, the explanatory variables should be omitted from the 
model (Agresti, 1990). 
While the Wald test indicates that Model 4 is a significant improvement over Model 1, a 
separate Wald test that compares Model 4 to Model 3 shows that it is not an improvement over 
Model 3. This result indicates that the interaction terms should be omitted from the model. In 
addition, the coefficients of the interaction terms are not statistically significant in Model 4. 
However, because the model is non-linear, the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
interaction terms cannot be directly interpreted by examining the coefficients and standard errors 
associated with each term. To confirm that the interactions are not significant, I again employed 
the procedure introduced by Zelner (2009). Not surprisingly, the test indicates that none of the 
interactions are significant, corroborating the findings from the Wald test that the parameters 
associated with the interaction terms are equal to zero. Thus, the analyses conducted in this study 
do not provide any support for Hypotheses 9a-b. 
Based on this result, I focus on Model 3 to investigate the other hypotheses developed in 
this study. Before doing so, it is important to briefly examine the control variables. In Model 3, 
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the sign of the coefficient for alliance payment is negative and significant at the p<0.10 level, 
which indicates that this control influences the assignment of specific IP rights to specific 
partners in an R&D alliance contract to some extent. This result is not surprising given that the 
nature of the bargaining relationship between the partners is likely to be impacted when the 
buyer commits to contribute funding to the supplier. The promise of an infusion of capital from 
the buyer is likely to enhance the buyer’s ability to negotiate for favorable contract terms. 
The sign of the coefficient for equity is positive and significant at the p<0.05 level. One 
explanation for this result is that the buyer is willing to relinquish control of specific IP to the 
supplier because it knows that it will be able to capture some portion of the returns from the IP 
through its equity stake in the supplier. The sign of the coefficient for same partner is positive 
and significant at the p<0.01 level, which indicates that firms that have partnered in the past are 
more likely to assign specific IP to specific partners. This may reflect that the partners are using 
the same contract template that they have in the past, or it may indicate something about the 
nature of the bargaining relationship between them (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). However, 
without the previous contracts between the partners, it is difficult to determine which explanation 
is driving this result. None of the other control variables are statistically significant. 
Turning to the main hypotheses, Hypothesis 6 suggests that when the partners specialize 
in divergent areas of science or technology, specific IP is more likely to be assigned to specific 
partners. Support is found for this hypothesis, as the coefficient for knowledge diversity is 
statistically significant in the predicted direction at the p<0.01 level in Model 3. Hypothesis 7 
proposes that when the supplier’s financial health is strong, specific IP is more likely to be 
assigned to specific partners. Support is also found for this hypothesis, as the coefficient for 
supplier’s stockholders’ equity is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level in 
220 
 
 
 
Model 3. Hypothesis 8 suggests that when the buyer is engaged in multiple R&D alliances, 
specific IP is less likely to be assigned to specific partners. No support is found for this 
hypothesis, as the coefficient for buyer’s R&D alliance portfolio is not statistically significant. 
As noted, coefficients in non-linear models are not directly indicative of the magnitude of 
the effect size. In such cases, the effect depends on the coefficient of the variable, the change in 
its value, and the values selected for all of the other variables in the model (Long and Freese, 
2006: 171). Researchers have been encouraged to report the marginal effects of key variables of 
interest for several sets of theoretically interesting or empirically relevant values of the other 
variables in the model (Hoetker, 2007: 335). While this approach is more informative than 
reporting odds ratios or the coefficients alone, Zelner (2009) notes that the utility of a marginal 
effect to answer questions of substantive interest is limited because a marginal effect is a 
derivative. In some cases, particularly when the distribution of the variable of interest is 
characterized by large differences between observed values, focusing on marginal effects may 
give misleading estimates of probability changes (Peterson, 1985; Caudill and Jackson, 1989; 
Kennedy, 2003: 266-267). As a result, it may be more informative to report the difference in the 
predicted probabilities associated with a meaningful change in the variable of interest. The 
simulation approach developed by King et al. (2000) can be used to do this. 
Table 4-15 examines the economic significance of changes in knowledge diversity and 
supplier’s stockholders’ equity on the likelihood of assigning specific IP rights to specific 
partners in an R&D alliance. In this table, I hold all continuous variables at their respective 
means and all dummy variables at their respective modes. Then to obtain the difference in the 
probability of assigning specific IP to specific partners associated with a change in knowledge 
diversity, I vary its value from one standard deviation below the mean (0.30) to one standard 
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deviation above the mean (0.90). Similarly, to obtain the estimated difference in the probability 
of assigning specific IP to specific partners associated with a change in supplier’s stockholders’ 
equity, I vary its value from -$40 million to $200 million. This range was selected to examine 
extreme cases; one where the supplier is in desperate need of funding (-$40 million) and one 
where the supplier’s financial health is particularly strong ($200 million). 
Table 4-15. Estimated change in probabilities associated with changes in knowledge diversity 
and supplier’s stockholders’ equity 
Variable Low High Difference 
Knowledge diversity 0.33% 10.32% 9.99% 
Supplier’s stockholders’ equity 0.25% 33.75% 33.40% 
 
The estimated differences in the probability of assigning specific IP rights to specific 
partners shown in Table 4-15 are both statistically significant at the p<0.01 level based on the 
confidence intervals associated with their respective standard errors. In regards to knowledge 
diversity, the results indicate that there is roughly a 10% higher probability of assigning specific 
IP rights to specific partners when the partners’ knowledge portfolios are highly divergent as 
opposed to when they greatly overlap. In addition, the table shows that specific IP rights are 
33.4% more likely to be assigned to specific partners when the supplier’s financial health is 
strong versus when the supplier is extremely cash-constrained. 
Table 4-16 presents the binary probit estimations for when the dependent variable is the 
probability of assigning severe termination rights to the buyer. Model 1 includes only the control 
variables. Model 2 adds applicability of supplier’s technology to account for the explanation 
based on a lack of verifiability, while Model 3 adds the measures of bargaining power. Finally, 
Model 4 includes the interactions between applicability of supplier’s technology and the 
measures of bargaining power. As noted in Table 4-16, the Wald chi-square statistic never 
reaches a conventional level of statistical significance for any of the models. In addition, the 
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control and independent variables are not statistically significant in any model. These results 
suggest that there is no support for any of the hypotheses proposed in this study regarding the 
assignment of severe termination rights. 
 
4.5.6.1. Robustness Tests. Logistic regression techniques were employed in place of 
probit as a robustness test. As expected, the results were substantially identical. This is not 
surprising given that the cumulative normal and logistic distributions are very similar, except at 
the tails. Considerable differences between the results of logit and probit are expected only when 
the sample size is large. In such a case, the number of observations in the tails of the distributions 
likely increases, highlighting the differing widths of the distributions at the tails (Maddala, 1983: 
23). The sample size is relatively small in this study (N = 66), suggesting that it is unlikely that 
there is much of a difference between the number of observations in the tails of the distributions. 
An additional robustness test was conducted that examined the sensitivity of the 
probability of assigning severe termination rights to the buyer to the aggregation level for the 
technological classifications for the measure applicability of supplier’s technology. In addition to 
Table 4-16. Results of binary probit analysis for assignment of severe termination rights to the buyera
Independent Variables
Constant    -0.357 (0.252)    -0.533 (0.605)   -0.723 (0.901)   -0.387 (0.291)
Applicability of supplier's technology (AST)     0.090 (0.276)    0.049 (1.209)    0.064 (0.330)
Supplier's shareholders' equity (SSE)    0.003 (0.004)    0.003 (0.004)
Buyer's other R&D alliances (BOA)   -0.040 (0.612)   -0.037 (0.041)
Any manufacturing by supplier (AMS)    0.333 (0.056)    0.273 (0.512)
AST x SSE    0.000 (0.006)
AST x BOA   -0.025 (0.072)
AST x AMS   -0.245 (0.736)
Alliance payment     0.332 (0.380)     0.318 (0.386)    0.344 (0.557)    0.340 (0.400)
Equity     0.118 (0.373)     0.135 (0.369)    0.232 (0.690)    0.236 (0.368)
Same Partner    -0.500 (0.480)    -0.523 (0.521)   -0.581 (0.951)   -0.563 (0.589)
Buyer's total assets    -0.001 (0.001)    -0.001 (0.001)   -0.001 (0.001)   -0.001 (0.001)
Employment provisions    -0.481 (0.395)    -0.487 (0.399)   -0.418 (0.554)   -0.488 (0.451)
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald 2
Wald Test (vs. Model 1)
Wald Test (vs. previous model)
aN = 66, For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given with the robust standard error next to it in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Model 4:
full model
-42.041
7.82
0.44
2.84
0.11 1.49
-42.941 -42.879 -42.169
4.34 4.33 6.58
0.11 1.52
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
controls only incentive alignment bargaining power
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determining the average number of 3-digit technological classes assigned to all of the supplier’s 
patents that were filed for in the 5 years prior to the alliance, I also calculated the average 
number of 6-digit classes assigned to each of the supplier’s patents. The results did not change in 
any of the models; none of the models reach a conventional level of statistical significance. 
4.5.7. Discussion 
In this study, I set out to examine the factors that influence the assignment of two 
important control rights in R&D alliance contracts, namely IP rights and severe termination 
rights. I suggested that in order to align the partners’ incentives, the ability to exploit IP today 
and in the future should be taken into consideration when deciding whether to assign specific IP 
to a specific partner, regardless of which partner was responsible for its invention. I also 
proposed that the applicability of the supplier’s technology, which creates a potential verifiability 
challenge, influences the assignment of severe termination rights to the buyer. Two hypotheses, 
rooted in PRT and agency theory, were then investigated. 
I also suggested that bargaining power plays a role in the assignment of both rights. Most 
of the previous research on the role of bargaining power investigates its direct impact (e.g., 
Lerner et al., 2003; Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). According to Aghion and 
Tirole (1994), however, the efficient allocation of control rights is distorted by bargaining power, 
suggesting that it may play a moderating role. With the exception of Lerner and Merges (1998), 
this possibility has not been explored. Thus, this study also endeavored to investigate if and how 
bargaining power impacts the assignment of key rights in R&D alliance contracts. Hypotheses 
were developed proposing both a direct and a moderating effect of bargaining power. 
The results reported in the previous section provide support for the hypothesis that the 
partners’ ability to exploit IP impacts the decision to assign specific IP rights to specific partners. 
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The results also indicate that the supplier’s bargaining power has a direct influence on this 
decision. No support was uncovered, however, for a moderating role for bargaining power. In 
addition, the results do not provide support for the hypotheses that examine the assignment of 
severe termination rights to the buyer. It is important to further investigate and interpret these 
results (and non-results), as there are theoretical and practical implications. 
While the results indicate that the partners’ ability to exploit IP (as measured by their 
knowledge diversity) impacts the assignment of specific IP rights to specific partners, Table 4-15 
shows that the predicted probability of this occurring is rather low even when the partners’ 
knowledge portfolios are highly diverse (10.32%). In addition, the difference in the probability 
associated with a change from a low level of diversity to a high level of diversity is rather small 
(~10%). Thus, even though this result is statistically significant, from a practical standpoint, it 
does not appear as if considerations about the partners’ ability to exploit IP are factored into 
decisions about the assignment of these rights to a large extent. 
In contrast, the predicted probability of IP rights being assigned to specific partners when 
the supplier possesses the bargaining power (as measured by supplier’s stockholders’ equity) is 
higher (33.75%). The difference in the probability of this event occurring associated with a 
change from a low to a high level of supplier bargaining power is also greater (33.40%). Thus, 
the statistical and economic significance of the results appear to suggest that bargaining power 
considerations play a stronger role in the assignment of specific IP rights to specific partners than 
knowledge exploitation considerations. 
It is important to note, however, that the probability of assigning specific IP to specific 
partners never exceeds 50% in Table 4-15. These probabilities are dependent on the values that 
all of the other variables in the model are set to, in addition to the range over which the variable 
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of interest is changed. As noted in the previous section, I set the continuous variables to their 
mean and the dummy variables to their mode in order to obtain the probabilities displayed in 
Table 4-15 from the simulation. For example, the probabilities associated with a change in 
knowledge diversity rely on the mean value for supplier’s stockholders’ equity (~$39 million). 
Based on an examination of the distribution of supplier’ stockholders’ equity in the sample, the 
mean value is much closer to the cash-constrained end of the spectrum rather than the 
financially-strong end. Thus, different results are obtained if the same change from a low to high 
value of knowledge diversity is made for other values of supplier’s stockholders’ equity. 
 
Figure 4-16. Predicted probability of assigning specific IP to specific partners over the entire 
range of supplier’s stockholders’ equity at three levels of knowledge diversity 
 
Figure 4-16 shows this difference over the entire distribution of supplier’s stockholders’ 
equity in the sample. The thick dashed line corresponds to the probabilities associated with a low 
and high level of knowledge diversity at the mean value of supplier’s stockholders’ equity. As 
the bargaining power of the supplier improves (i.e., stockholders’ equity increases from its mean 
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value) in Figure 4-16, the probability of assigning specific IP rights to specific partners increases 
regardless of whether the partners’ knowledge diversity is high, low or average. Importantly, the 
probability of this event occurring exceeds 50% in the high knowledge diversity condition. The 
fanning out of the lines in the figure, however, appears to indicate that incentive-alignment 
considerations are factored in to some extent when the supplier possesses a high degree of 
bargaining power. 
Conversely, as the supplier’s bargaining power further weakens (i.e., stockholders’ equity 
declines from its mean value), the probability of assigning specific IP rights to specific partners 
decreases regardless of the level of knowledge diversity. Specifically, when the supplier is 
extremely cash-constrained, bargaining power appears to completely trump incentive-alignment 
considerations. Note that the three lines indicating the different levels of knowledge diversity 
converge to a probability of approximately 0% in this case. Overall, the results presented in 
Figure 4-16 suggest that bargaining power plays the predominant role in the decision to assign 
specific IP to specific partners. In addition, it appears that incentive-alignment considerations do 
factor into this decision, primarily when the supplier’s financial health is extremely strong. 
From a theoretical standpoint, Figure 4-16 provides some support for Aghion and 
Tirole’s (1994) suggestion that bargaining power distorts the relationship predicted by PRT, 
especially when the supplier is in a weak bargaining position. However, this distortion takes the 
form of a direct effect rather than a moderation effect. As shown in Figure 4-14, for a ‘true’ 
interaction, the probability of assigning specific IP to specific partners should remain at 
approximately 0% at low levels of knowledge diversity even when the supplier’s bargaining 
position is enhanced. This is not the case in Figure 4-16, as the probability increases for all levels 
of knowledge diversity when the supplier’s bargaining power is strong. In addition, the model 
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that examined the proposed interactions between knowledge diversity and the various measures 
of bargaining power was not a statistical improvement over the model that contained only main 
effects, and none of the interaction terms were statistically significant. These results lend further 
support to the notion that the distortion proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1994) manifests through 
the direct effect of bargaining power. 
From a practical standpoint, the results highlight the potential sub-optimization of 
innovation problem discussed by Leiponen (2008). When IP rights are assigned based on 
bargaining power considerations rather than the logic of incentive-alignment, the alliance may 
suffer from underinvestment (both in terms of funding and effort). As a result, Leiponen (2008) 
found that the misallocation of rights leads to a significant reduction in the probability of 
innovation in the context of knowledge-based service industries. While a direct measure of the 
innovative outcome of the R&D alliances in the sample was not collected for this study, this is a 
future avenue to explore. Another extension of this study that would shed some light on whether 
the partners recognize that the ex ante assignment of rights is sub-optimal would be to examine if 
there are renegotiations and amendments to the contract that re-align incentives by changing the 
way that IP rights are assigned. 
A second practical implication of the findings from this study is that suppliers that are on 
financially stable ground are better positioned to negotiate with large buyers over key rights. 
This concurs with the practitioner perspectives presented by Lerner and Merges (1998) for 
biopharmaceutical alliances.
35
 The bargaining ability of financially strong suppliers may purely 
be a function of a lack of cash constraints, but it also may be due to the development of strong 
alliance and contract capabilities (Dyer et al., 2001; Argyres and Mayer, 2007). Financially 
                                                 
35
 This result is also important in light of the fact that none of the resource-based measures of bargaining power 
impact the assignment of IP rights. Thus, in line with the Lerner and Merges’ (1998) anecdotes, the results of this 
study reinforce the notion that managers focus on financial constraints when negotiating R&D alliance contracts. 
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strong suppliers are expected to have participated in more successful R&D alliances, providing 
the experience necessary to build such capabilities over time. Conversely, cash-constrained 
suppliers are more likely to be younger and lack previous R&D alliance experience. In addition, 
even if cash-constrained suppliers have participated in previous R&D alliances, their focus may 
be more on the technical aspects rather than legal or managerial concerns. Future research should 
examine this possibility. 
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, the non-results for the hypotheses that explore the 
assignment of severe termination rights suggest that other explanations should be considered. 
Based on discussions with practitioners, an institutional theory explanation may be viable. Since 
the Supreme Court recognized the government’s right to terminate for convenience in 1875 
(United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Company, 1876), courts and administrative boards have 
placed few limits on this right. Harkening back to the incentive-alignment explanation, it is 
recognized in the law that unilateral termination for convenience provides the terminating party 
with the power to demand contract performance while reserving the right to end the relationship 
if the contract proves undesirable at some later point in time. In support, the District Court of 
New Jersey said that the parties to a contract enjoy ‘considerable discretion in deciding when and 
to what extent a contract may be terminated’ (Linan-Faye Construction Company, Inc. v. 
Housing Authority of the City of Camden, 1994). The question, however, is whether and under 
what conditions can a party opposing termination for convenience attack the enforceability of the 
provision. Different courts may apply different standards, and these standards may change over 
time. Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, it may be more or less costly to incorporate severe 
termination rights in an R&D alliance contract when the cost of possible future litigation is taken 
into consideration. As a result, the inclusion of severe termination rights may be a function of 
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their enforceability in the jurisdiction that the contract is governed by. This is a valuable avenue 
to explore in future research. 
Overall, the results from this study provide insight into the assignment of key rights in 
R&D alliance contracts, specifically IP rights. The findings particularly lend support to the 
notion that ex ante bargaining power is a strong determinant of the assignment of IP rights. The 
results do suggest, however, that incentive-alignment considerations play a role to some extent 
when the supplier is financially strong. Finally, the non-results for the hypotheses that examined 
the assignment of severe termination rights suggest that alternative explanations should be 
explored that draw on perspectives other than PRT and agency theory. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In the first study of this essay, I examine the hazards that plague R&D alliances and the 
contractual safeguards designed to contend with them. I also examine whether managers and 
lawyers are as farsighted as TCE suggests by investigating if and how previous alliance 
experience impacts the design of R&D alliance contracts. In the second study of this essay, I 
examine the assignment of two important decision and control rights in R&D alliance contracts, 
namely foreground IP rights and severe termination rights (i.e., those that can be invoked 
unilaterally and unconditionally). In this concluding section, I summarize the arguments and 
findings from each study, highlight the contributions to the existing literature, and suggest 
managerial implications. Finally, I identify the limitations of the studies in this essay and suggest 
future research directions. 
4.6.1. Summary of Argument and Findings 
Drawing on TCE, I argue in Study 1 that specific contractual provisions can be drafted to 
address the context-specific hazards that arise in R&D alliances. As the level of these hazards 
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rise, the likelihood of including such provisions in the contract similarly rises. In an alliance, 
contractual provisions essentially substitute for the hierarchical governance mechanisms that 
provide the structure and rules through which hazards are dealt with in a vertically integrated 
firm or an equity joint venture. However, because R&D alliances require creativity and 
innovation, such provisions should only be included in the contract if the hazards are severe in 
order to avoid adding unnecessary constraints. Haggling over irrelevant terms is also likely to 
lead to protracted contract negotiations (Weber et al., 2009) and the potential breakdown of trust 
between the partners before the alliance even begins. 
TCE assumes that the managers and lawyers that draft alliance contracts are relatively 
farsighted in their ability to perceive when hazards are present at the outset of negotiations or 
likely to arise as the alliance unfolds. In addition, TCE expects managers and lawyers to learn 
relatively quickly from their experience and incorporate what they learn into subsequent 
contracting situations, allowing them to develop what Williamson (1996) calls ‘responsive 
institutions’. Based on recent case study evidence (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Lumineau et 
al., 2011), however, I suggest that this learning process is not necessarily as fast as presumed by 
TCE. Rather, ‘contract design capabilities’ (Agyres and Mayer, 2007) accumulate slowly over 
time. In addition, such capabilities have a ‘shelf-life’, wherein they atrophy if they are not used. 
Thus, I argue that the relationship between the degree that hazards are present and the likelihood 
of including provisions to contend with them predicted by TCE will be impacted by the previous 
alliance experience possessed by each partner. Furthermore, I propose that the impact of 
experience is likely to depend on the types of alliances that a firm has engaged in. Specifically, 
the challenges and hazards encountered in marketing and supply alliances are likely to be 
different than those faced by firms in R&D alliances. As a result, managers and lawyers that 
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have not drafted an R&D alliance contract may be less aware of the pertinent hazards than their 
counterparts with a wealth of such experience. 
Study 2 draws on the incentive-alignment logic of PRT to examine the assignment of 
decision and control rights in R&D alliance contracts. I deviate from previous research by 
investigating the allocation of two of these key rights, namely foreground IP rights and severe 
termination rights, rather than examining how a larger bundle of rights is divided between 
alliance partners. The rationale for taking this approach is grounded in recent research that shows 
firms are concerned about gaining control over specific rights that are highly relevant to their 
goals and objectives as opposed to simply ‘winning’ the most rights (e.g., Ariño and Ring, 2010; 
Kloyer, 2011). In addition, recent research also proposes that different rights/bundles of rights 
are functionally differentiated, suggesting that the underlying factors that determine their 
assignment are likely to be different (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). Thus, I propose in Study 2 
that the assignment of foreground IP should take into consideration each partner’s ability to 
utilize the IP today and in the future in order to create the proper incentives for each partner to 
optimally contribute to the alliance. I also propose that severe termination rights should be 
assigned to the buyer in order to eliminate the supplier’s incentive to shirk on the alliance when a 
lack of verifiability of the supplier’s actions creates the potential for ‘project substitution’ or 
‘project cross-subsidization’. In addition, I examine if and how ex ante bargaining power 
influences the assignment of rights by testing both direct and moderating effects of several 
factors that determine each partner’s bargaining position. 
Using a sample of 66 R&D alliances in the medical device industry, I find moderate 
support for the hypothesis that previous alliance experience moderates the relationship predicted 
by TCE regarding the inclusion of contractual safeguards to contend with transaction hazards. 
232 
 
 
 
Study 1 indicates that R&D alliance contracts are more likely to include a facilities access 
provision if the supplier’s knowledge is highly tacit when buyers have more previous alliance 
experience. The results do not support a similar outcome when the supplier’s previous alliance 
experience is considered. Taken together, these findings are not surprising given that technical 
knowledge often flows in only one direction in R&D alliances: from the supplier to the buyer 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2001). Thus, while the inclusion of a facilities access provision is salient to 
the buyer, the supplier may find its inclusion less desirable, as such access may hasten the 
buyer’s ability to appropriate the supplier’s proprietary knowledge and abandon the alliance. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that it is not simply the total number of previous 
alliances (or R&D alliances) that a firm has engaged in that helps it to ‘learn how to contract’ 
(Mayer and Argyres, 2004), but the fraction of its total experience dedicated to R&D alliances. 
Again, this finding applies to the buyers in the sample investigated in Study 1, which are 
typically larger firms. Such firms are more likely to have in-house counsel or a business 
development team that possesses experience designing R&D alliance contracts than smaller, 
entrepreneurial firms that are more focused on their survival. This finding also provides some 
support for the notion that the type and intensity of the experience matters, as the hazards 
encountered in marketing and supply alliances are not likely to be as relevant in R&D alliances. 
Study 1 also tentatively indicates that R&D alliance contracts are more likely to include 
non-solicitation provisions if there is a risk of misappropriation when suppliers have more 
previous alliance experience. Again, this finding is not entirely surprising given that protecting 
knowledge from misappropriation is a more salient issue for small suppliers engaged in R&D 
alliances than large buyers. The results only provide tentative support, however, because even 
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though the change in the probability of including a non-solicitation provision as supplier’s gain 
experience has economic significance, the interaction terms lack statistical significance. 
Finally, Study 1 tentatively shows that R&D alliance contracts are less likely to include a 
non-solicitation provision if there is a risk of misappropriation when the buyer has more previous 
alliance experience. This finding runs counter to both the baseline prediction of TCE and the 
proposed interaction hypothesis. It is possible, however, that buyers may prefer not to include a 
non-solicitation provision when the supplier’s knowledge is tacit, especially in the event that the 
alliance expires or is terminated without meeting its objectives. In such a case, the buyer retains 
its option to recruit and hire the supplier’s employees that possess the tacit knowledge, thereby 
salvaging the alliance. Again, even though the magnitude of this result has economic 
significance, the lack of statistical significance suggests that it should be cautiously interpreted. 
Alternatively, this result may simply reflect the buyer’s leverage over the supplier. 
The results reported in Study 2 support the hypothesis that the partners’ relative ability to 
exploit IP impacts the decision to assign specific IP rights to specific partners. The results also 
show that ex ante bargaining power directly influences this decision, rather than moderating the 
incentive-alignment based hypothesis. Deeper investigation of the results indicates that the 
impact of bargaining power overwhelms the influence of the partners’ ability to exploit IP when 
the supplier is cash-constrained at the outset of the alliance. However, when the supplier’s 
financial health is strong, knowledge exploitation considerations play a larger role in the 
assignment of IP rights. 
Unfortunately, Study 2 does not show any support for the hypotheses regarding the 
assignment of severe termination rights in R&D alliances. This lack of results was discussed at 
some length at the end of the study. 
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4.6.2. Contributions 
The idiosyncratic nature of R&D creates the potential for opportunism when firms 
collaborate to conduct an R&D project. Although previous research has focused on examining 
the choice between different collaborative governance forms (i.e., alliances vs. joint ventures) in 
the face of opportunism, the literature has paid limited attention until recently to the contracts 
developed to provide ex post support when the partners decide to form an alliance. Thus, Study 1 
sought to fill this gap and advance research on contract design by studying provisions that are 
included in R&D alliance contracts to provide such support. Drawing on TCE, I argue and show 
that the inclusion of facilities access and non-solicitation provisions in an R&D alliance contract 
is determined by the communication and safeguarding needs presented by an alliance. The 
findings tentatively suggest that contractual provisions provide an alternative to hierarchical 
governance for dealing with the ex post concerns that arise during alliance implementation. 
While the findings from Study 1 suggest that contract design decisions adhere to the logic 
of TCE, the economic rationality of managers and lawyers appears to have its limits, especially 
in light of the results for the moderating influence of previous alliance experience. Theoretically, 
Study 1 shows some support for the notion that managers and lawyers may not be consciously 
applying TCE. In addition, the results suggest that they are not as far sighted and able to design 
‘responsive’ contracts as TCE assumes. Rather, managers and lawyers with little or no 
experience may initially struggle with contract design, as suggested by Lumineau et al. (2011). 
In line with Mayer and Argyres’ (2004) findings, they appear to learn somewhat slowly over 
time and incorporate elements from previous contracts that produced a positive outcome. Thus, 
Study 1 demonstrates to some extent that decisions that conform to the logic of TCE may only 
come about after managers and lawyers have experienced a particular hazard and solved it 
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firsthand. They may not immediately understand why the solution that was implemented worked, 
however, until they have experienced several situations with the same hazard requiring the same 
solution. 
Whereas previous research that has examined ‘learning how to contract’ has relied on 
case studies of single contracts or a series of contracts between the same partners, Study 1 is 
unique in that it utilized a sample that consisted of contracts from multiple companies. In 
addition, information was collected about the alliance history of each individual firm in the 
sample. Thus, I was able to investigate whether the previous findings regarding the relatively 
slow and incremental nature of ‘learning how to contract’ are idiosyncratic to the firms studied 
or generalizable to firms in other contexts/industries. The results of this study lend some support 
to the latter. 
In addition to providing insight into the limitations of economic rationality, the results 
from Study 1 contribute to the inter-organizational learning and alliance capabilities streams of 
the literature. Study 1’s focus on previous alliance experience speaks to the notion of ‘learning 
about alliance management’ found in the inter-organizational learning literature. Studies in this 
literature suggest that firms that have extensive alliance experience learn to manage alliances 
more effectively over time (Barkema et al., 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Tsang, 2002). As 
part of this experience, firms are expected to develop ‘contract design capabilities’ (Argyres and 
Mayer, 2007) as they participate in more alliances. 
Both streams of the literature emphasize that the benefits derived from previous 
experience may be short-lived and depreciate rapidly unless what has been learned is deliberately 
captured (Mayer and Agryres, 2004; Sampson, 2005). In the absence of explicit processes, 
knowledge may go undocumented, making it unavailable to managers and lawyers in subsequent 
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contracting situations. Although a direct measure of the presence of a ‘learning’ process was not 
captured, Study 1 does provide a degree of confirmation for the notion that firms that participate 
in more alliances learn more about alliance management, suggesting that they capture more of 
what has been learned. Specifically, when a firm’s portfolio of alliances is composed of a higher 
ratio of R&D alliances over a five-year period, it appears as if what has been learned is exercised 
enough to prevent the firm’s contract design capabilities from atrophying. 
In Study 2, I sought to examine the assignment of control/decision rights considered to be 
important in the context of an R&D alliance. PRT suggests that control/decision rights should be 
assigned in an economically rational manner in order to create the proper incentive for each 
partner to invest in the alliance at an optimal level. However, in regards to the assignment of 
foreground IP rights, the results suggest that the logic of incentive alignment is overwhelmed by 
bargaining power concerns unless the supplier’s financial health is strong. This finding 
demonstrates that the economic rationality of managers and lawyers has its limits. In addition, 
the results suggest that bargaining power has a strong direct, rather than moderating, impact on 
the assignment of foreground IP rights. The importance of this finding is that it shed lights on the 
mechanism through which the distorting influence of bargaining power, originally proposed by 
Aghion and Tirole (1994), operates. With the exception of Lerner and Merges (1998), previous 
research has not tested whether this distortion manifests itself directly or as a moderator. 
Study 2 also examines Adegbesan and Higgins’ (2011) suggestion that the assignment of 
different rights that play different functions is influenced by different factors. The findings from 
Study 2 tentatively suggest that this is the case. I was able to test this proposal because I 
examined the assignment of individual rights that play different roles, in contrast to many of the 
existing studies that investigate how many rights a particular partner wins. Whereas the 
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assignment of foreground IP rights, which divide the returns from the alliance between the 
partners, is influenced by both incentive alignment and bargaining power concerns, the 
assignment of severe termination rights, which safeguard against private rent seeking behavior, is 
not. Because of the lack of statistically significant results, I speculated that the assignment of 
severe termination rights may be influenced by other factors including the legal standards in 
different jurisdictions. 
4.6.3. Implications for Practice 
While the studies conducted in this essay are based primarily on economic theories, 
managerial concerns also motivated the research questions examined. Thus, the results of these 
studies hold managerial implications in addition to the theoretical contributions discussed. For 
managers of firms that participate in many R&D alliances, these studies demonstrate that it is 
important to capture the lessons from previous alliances in order to design more effective 
contracts in the future. Cultivating contract design capabilities requires conscious effort, which 
may be especially challenging for smaller, entrepreneurial firms. Given their focus on technical 
issues and simply surviving, smaller firms may be hesitant to dedicate scarce resources to the 
establishment of a full-blown alliance function. However, in light of historically high failure 
rates for alliances (Bamford et al., 2004), and the erosion of trust when contract negotiations 
focus on irrelevant issues (Weber et al., 2009), establishing even rudimentary processes to 
capture lessons from previous experience may pay off in future contracting situations. 
An interesting, yet speculative suggestion based on the results of Study 1 to entrepreneurs 
looking to found a new technology-based company would be to include a business development 
and/or legal affairs expert on the founding team, particularly one that has experience formulating 
deal structures and negotiating collaborations in a similar industry context. Having such an 
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expert on the founding team should help to overcome the capabilities gap that many new firms 
face in regards to alliance management. Among the suppliers in the sample investigated in Study 
1, less than a third listed a business development position on its top management team in its S-1 
filing. It is not entirely clear from the descriptions provided, however, but it appears that only a 
handful of the individuals filling these positions possessed any previous business development 
experience at the time the firm was founded. In addition, fewer than a dozen suppliers in the 
sample list someone in a legal affairs or in-house counsel role on its S-1 filing. Thus, despite 
having a business development manager or general counsel, many smaller, entrepreneurial firms 
are likely to lack the capabilities required to manage the alliance life cycle. 
In the absence of a founding team member with such experience, start-up firms may 
consider retaining outside counsel that is familiar with the industry context that the firm operates 
in. This may be a stop-gap measure during the period in which the firm is building its 
technological capabilities, but most likely it is not a long-term solution if top management 
anticipates engaging in numerous collaborative endeavors. In the long run, having personnel 
dedicated to negotiating deals and drafting contracts is more likely to lead to the creation of the 
requisite capabilities. Fostering systems and practices to capture the lessons from experience 
should also help develop such capabilities at the firm level. In the event of employee turnover, 
knowledge that is not codified is likely to leave the firm with the individual that possesses it. 
However, if it is codified, the knowledge is more likely to remain with the firm even if key 
employees leave. 
A final interesting, yet conjectural suggestion based on Study 1 for managers and lawyers 
in smaller firms is to learn as much as possible about contract design and alliance management 
from their large firm counterparts during the contract development and implementation stages of 
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the alliance lifecycle. Alvarez and Barney (2001) note that in the classic race situation, smaller 
firms often lack the capabilities to learn organizational practices from their larger partners. 
However, knowing that this is the case in advance may allow the smaller partner’s managers and 
lawyers to better prepare for learning opportunities, especially if the firm has personnel dedicated 
to playing this role and rudimentary learning processes in place.   
Turning to Study 2, the results highlight the potential sub-optimization of innovation 
problem that is likely to occur when bargaining power considerations overpower the logic of 
incentive-alignment. If the assignment of IP is determined by the relative bargaining positions of 
the partners, the alliance may suffer from underinvestment (both in terms of funding and effort), 
reducing the probability of innovation (and profits). Leiponen (2008) suggests that contracts 
could be proactively and strategically written in a manner that creates incentives for each partner 
to invest at the optimal level. Kloyer (2011) demonstrates the importance of properly assigning 
IP rights in order to control the threat of moral hazard, and thus restore each partner’s incentive 
to exert optimal effort. One implication for practice is that assigning IP to the partner best suited 
to exploit it today and in the future may heighten the assigned partner’s motivation to continue to 
invest in the IP, which is likely to improve innovative and financial performance in the long run. 
A second managerial implication related to the finding that bargaining power concerns 
often overwhelm the ideal assignment of IP is that managers and lawyers need to be aware of the 
balance of power between the alliance partners. As noted, Lerner and Merges (1998) provide 
anecdotal evidence that pharmaceutical firm business development experts use the imbalance of 
power to capture more key rights in R&D alliance contracts. This practice may lead to 
contentious ex ante haggling and costly ex post renegotiations, which in turn likely harms the 
alliance outcome. Thus, managers and lawyers are encouraged to proactively take the balance of 
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power into consideration when negotiating over foreground IP rights. A frank and honest 
discussion between the partners about their respective bargaining positions may help to prevent 
strong arm tactics over such rights. Rather, the partners can focus on establishing a framework 
that will encourage each firm to exert its optimal amount of effort, while promoting cooperation 
and collaboration between the firms. 
4.6.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
First, caution must be exercised when generalizing the results from the studies in this 
essay to other contexts. The arguments about the inclusion of specific contractual provisions and 
the assignment of key control rights are examined here in the context of R&D alliances. The 
pooling of resources and capabilities in this context gives rise to specific hazards, which factor 
prominently in the choice of the contractual safeguards employed and how rights are assigned. 
Alliances involving marketing or supply activities are likely to involve different hazards, 
implying that the relationships examined for R&D alliances may not be relevant in other 
contexts. Thus, similar analyses for alliances involving other value chain activities are required 
to determine what the key hazards are in those contexts and what provisions are appropriate to 
contend with them. 
The empirical results may also be sensitive to the industry analyzed. Many of the 
previous studies of contract design and the allocation of control rights have examined 
biopharmaceuticals. Despite sharing many characteristics, the medical device industry differs 
from this setting in several ways. Whereas R&D is driven by basic science in biotechnology, 
R&D in the medical device industry relies more on advances in relatively established areas of 
technology. In addition, there is a difference in the volume of R&D alliances in each setting. 
While recent trends are driving the development of convergence devices that are pushing the 
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limits of traditional device manufacturers, there have been fewer R&D alliances in the medical 
device industry than in biopharmaceuticals over a comparable period of time. Thus, with the 
exception of very large medical device firms, most entrepreneurial firms possess a relatively 
small amount of previous alliance experience. Considering that the hypotheses regarding the 
impact of contracting capabilities rely on measures of previous alliance experience, very 
different results may be found in the biopharmaceutical setting compared to the results 
uncovered in Study 1. 
A final empirical limitation to consider is the size of the sample of contracts used to test 
the hypotheses developed in each study. A direct consequence of fewer alliances taking place in 
the medical device industry is that fewer alliance contracts are available. Windhover’s Strategic 
Transactions database is the most complete source of information on alliances in the medical 
device industry, so I have some degree of confidence that the contracts employed in the studies 
in this essay represent a fairly thorough collection of the contracts that were filed with the SEC 
per the materially relevant transaction standard. Nonetheless, the limited number of contracts 
available hinders the power of the analysis. Particularly in cases when the sample size is small, a 
Type II error is more probable than a Type I error (Wuensch, 1994). This problem is further 
exacerbated when there are several independent variables, as demonstrated by Monte Carlo 
simulations conducted by Hart and Clark (1999) that explore the behavior of Maximum 
Likelihood estimates in probit models across differing sample size and with varying numbers of 
independent variables. 
Beyond extensions of the studies conducted in this essay to other industry settings and 
value chain contexts, an important direction for future research would be to examine the 
relationship between innovation, performance and the assignment of IP rights. Despite evidence 
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that contracts are frequently renegotiated due to changes in bargaining power (Lerner et al., 
2003), we still know very little about whether eventually correcting contracts that initially assign 
IP rights ‘incorrectly’ results in better innovative outcomes and more successful alliances. 
Another fruitful avenue to pursue, which was mentioned in the discussion at the end of 
Study 2, would be to examine alternative explanations for the lack of results regarding the 
assignment of severe termination rights to the buyer when verifiability problems exist. Despite 
previous research in the biopharmaceuticals setting that shows that this relationship is valid (e.g., 
Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Lerner and Malmendier, 2010), it is worth exploring other rationales. 
Also, while the lack of results may be due to a Type II error, the institutional arrangements may 
differ between the industry settings, suggesting that industry norms rather than incentive 
alignment impacts the assignment of severe termination rights in the medical device industry. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, contract clauses may substitute for more hierarchical 
mechanisms in alliances. Recent research, however, has investigated the use of committees to 
contend with the same hazards that were identified in Study 1 (Reuer and Devarakonda, 2012). 
Thus, it would be interesting to examine whether contractual clauses and alliance committees are 
used simultaneously or if they are actually substitutes. Speculatively, contractual clauses may be 
more appropriate in situations where the response to a hazard can be specified in detail before the 
alliance begins. In contrast, committees may be better suited to dealing with hazards that arise 
after the alliance begins when the response cannot be specified or the hazard foreseen during 
contract negotiations. 
Finally, it would be valuable to capture an actual measure of previous contracting 
experience in place of the counts of previous alliances used to proxy for contract design 
capabilities. It is nearly impossible to collect fine-grained information about the experience 
243 
 
 
 
possessed by the actual managers and lawyer who negotiated a contract, such as how many 
contracts they have drafted and for what types of alliances. However, 10-K reports and IPO 
prospectuses provide information about the general experience possessed by members of the top 
management team, and whether any members hold the title of business development director or 
have any previous business development experience. Ideally, it would be valuable to determine if 
a firm has an alliance function but this information is not frequently disclosed publicly. 
4.6.5. Concluding Remarks 
The studies in this essay provide evidence that contracts are consistently designed that do 
not conform to the predictions of economic rationality. TCE predicts that firms that fail to learn 
from their previous mistakes and continue to design inadequate contracts will perform poorly, 
and eventually be forced to exit the market (Williamson, 1985). However, because it is 
empirically difficult to control for all of the factors that could potentially impact firm 
performance, we do not have much evidence that indicates that poorly designed contracts lead to 
unsuccessful alliances or poor firm performance (Weber et al., 2009). 
What we do witness is that contracts are frequently renegotiated (Reuer and Ariño, 2002; 
Lerner et al., 2003). From a managerial standpoint, haggling over irrelevant terms can be 
frustrating, resulting in the breakdown of trust between partners, which may contribute to the 
failure of an alliance. Getting caught up in constantly renegotiating terms in an R&D alliance is 
especially likely to prevent the partners from focusing on creativity and innovation, activities 
required for success. Thus, the studies in this essay suggest that if managers can be made aware 
of why certain provisions are appropriate or worth negotiating about in specific situations, they 
are more likely to be better equipped to use their knowledge to positively influence the contracts 
that they design, leading to better alliance and firm performance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPREHENSIVE CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to draw together the findings from the three 
essays in this dissertation. Despite the different levels of analysis covered in each essay, there are 
several connections that can be made that provide valuable insights for both theory and practice. 
In addition, some interesting research questions and opportunities arise from a consideration of 
how these essays relate to each other. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I begin by recapping the common 
themes that unify the essays in this dissertation. This is followed by a discussion of how the key 
findings from each essay are linked. I then touch upon key implications for both theory and 
practice based on these linkages. Finally, I present potential extensions and offer some new 
directions that could be explored based on the connections between the findings. 
5.2. Common Themes: Technological Creativity and the Shifting Boundaries of R&D 
One common theme that unifies the three essays in this dissertation is the pursuit of 
technological creativity. As noted in the introduction, Mokyr (1990) suggests that technological 
creativity is one of the most potent forces in history and a key driver of economic progress. He 
goes on to state that technological creativity has provided society with a ‘free lunch’ in that the 
returns from innovation are greater than the increase in effort and the cost necessary to bring 
about the output. Despite the importance of technological creativity to the advancement of 
society and the improvement of living standards, the process of innovation has been less than 
systematic throughout much of human history. The widespread adoption of the ‘method of 
invention’ in the late-19
th
 century played an important role in systematizing this process 
(Whitehead, 1985[1926]), advancing the pursuit of new scientific knowledge from the realm of 
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ad hoc testing to an endeavor based on the use of rigorous and repeatable procedures to test 
hypotheses. 
The second theme drawing the essays in this dissertation together is the shifting 
boundaries of R&D. For much of the 19
th
 century, R&D was conducted outside of the boundaries 
of the firm. However, in the first half of the 20
th
 century, firms increasingly brought R&D in 
house with the establishment of corporate labs, as control over the process of innovation 
promised to be a pathway to and a source of competitive advantage. The boundaries of R&D 
remained fairly stable in the U.S. for a relatively long period of time, only to become fluid again 
in the last few decades of the 20
th
 century. This period has witnessed the relatively rapid 
adoption of collaborative forms of R&D that bring together entities from both the public and 
private sector to develop and commercialize new technology. Chesbrough (2003) has 
characterized this current shift as a transition from a closed to an open innovation paradigm. As 
the boundaries continue to blur, some researchers have called into question our conceptions of 
firms, suggesting that these new collaborative arrangements are in essence networks that allow 
for the efficient and reliable exchange of scientific and technological knowledge (Powell, 1990). 
Collectively, the broad themes that connect the three essays in this dissertation bring up 
several interesting and important questions. For example, why did the pursuit of technological 
creativity shift from an activity mainly conducted outside of the boundaries of the firm to one 
performed in-house in the first half of the 20
th
 century? In addition, what factors caused the 
boundaries to blur in the last few decades of the 20
th
 century, leading to the collaborative pursuit 
of technological creativity? Also, how do firms decide whether to conduct R&D internally or 
rely on an external R&D source? Finally, what types of formal arrangements are established to 
manage relationships with external sources of R&D in order to promote technological creativity? 
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These questions and several others were examined in the three essays in this dissertation. The 
following section briefly summarizes how the main findings from each essay are linked. 
5.3. Connections between Key Findings from Each Essay 
The first two essays in this dissertation examined the fluidity of the boundaries of R&D 
from an historical perspective and at the level of a single project. An important finding in these 
essays is that formal and informal institutions have had a major impact on the transition to and 
the acceptance and use of collaborative forms of innovation. Specifically, as discussed in the first 
essay, institutions act as shift parameters. In essence, institutions impact the costs of engaging in 
transactions. The range of organizational options available may be wider or narrower depending 
on whether institutions decrease or increase such costs. 
A second key finding that cuts across essays is that the adoption of new organizational 
forms often has little to do with economic rationality. Rather, firms engage in mimetic 
isomorphism to gain legitimacy among peers, adopting practices because they are fashionable. In 
addition, institutions often exhibit a great deal of inertia, especially if powerful actors are deeply 
invested in maintaining the status quo. As a result, the institutional setting may be stable over a 
long period of time, greatly limiting experimentation with different organizational forms. In 
order to overcome such inertia, a triggering event or change in leadership is often required to 
help entrenched actors envision new alternatives and to break down informal beliefs. New formal 
institutions are often also required to reinforce a shift in informal norms. Such feedback and feed 
forward loops help to explain how institutional change is initiated. 
A key observation is that the institutional changes discussed in the first essay helped to 
shape the environmental factors introduced in the second essay that have contributed to the shift 
from the closed to the open innovation paradigm. It is important to note that many of these 
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factors are interrelated. For example, the rise of the venture capital market in the U.S. is a result 
of a change in the interpretation of a law that governs how retirement funds can be invested (i.e., 
the Department of Labor’s 1979 ruling regarding the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974). In turn, the availability of venture capital made it possible for highly mobile knowledge 
workers to launch entrepreneurial ventures. Concurrently, the government enacted laws that 
encouraged collaborative research (e.g., the Federal Technology Transfer Act, the National 
Collaborative Research Act), resulting in the emergence of a robust market for technology that 
connected entrepreneurial and established firms, facilitated by advances in information and 
communication technology. 
While the boundaries of R&D have become more fluid, firms have far from abandoned 
the internal pursuit of technological creativity in the face of these institutional and environmental 
changes. Rather, the current era exhibits an extraordinary amount of diversity in regards to how 
firms pursue technological creativity. Even within the same industry, different firms have 
adopted different approaches to innovation. An example discussed in the second essay is that of 
Lucent and Cisco. In the late-20
th
/early-21
st
 century, Lucent (formerly Bell Labs) had a fairly 
insular position regarding R&D, whereas Cisco performed little internal R&D, preferring instead 
to scan for promising new technologies developed by start-ups and to make toe-hold investments 
in such firms (Chesbrough, 2003: xviii). Thus, a framework was developed in the second essay 
to help explain some of the intra-industry variation in the approach to innovation. 
An important take-away from the second essay is that not all situations call for 
collaborative R&D. Rather, managers evaluating whether an external partner is required should 
take firm-, transaction-, and project-level characteristics into consideration in conjunction with 
the environmental factors that are present in the industry their firm operates in. Of particular 
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importance is recognition of being caught in the Not-Invented-Here (NIH) mindset identified by 
Katz and Allen (1982). Firms that exhibit the NIH mindset are likely to disregard the transaction- 
and project-level characteristics that suggest an external partner may be required. Cognizance of 
this problem may help managers to overcome this mindset and consider the full array of options 
for organizing innovation in light of all of the factors at each level of the framework presented in 
the second essay. 
Whereas the first two essays primarily examine the boundaries of R&D and questions 
regarding whether firms should enter into collaborative R&D arrangements, the third essay 
focuses on the formal governance of such arrangements after the decision to form an R&D 
alliance has been made. As the main findings from the two studies conducted in the third essay 
were discussed in extensive detail in the final section of the previous chapter, I instead focus here 
on presenting the key connections between these studies and the first two essays. 
The institutional setting in which inter-firm transactions are embedded again plays an 
important role in the studies conducted in the third essay. Formal institutions provide the legal 
framework that sets the parameters for managing collaborative endeavors. For example, R&D 
alliance contracts frequently include clauses that divide the returns from the alliance between the 
partners through the assignment of IP rights. In the U.S., the IP system (which is a formal 
institution) secures such rights against infringement and theft, helping the partners to realize the 
value of the innovation(s) resulting from the alliance. In the absence of such a formal institution, 
an alternative contractual solution would need to be devised in order to provide the same 
protection. Informal norms and practices appear to play a role in the use (or non-use) of other 
contract terms, as evidenced by the results obtained in the second study of the third essay 
regarding severe termination rights. Anecdotally, practitioners suggest that industry norms and 
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concerns about reputation play an important role in determining whether or not the granting of 
such rights is commonplace. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1. The three essays in relation to the model of the economics of institutions 
 
Figure 5-1, reproduced from the opening chapter, provides an ideal way to visualize the 
connections between the essays that were just discussed. The placement of the first two essays in 
the figure shows that the essays are connected by their common interest in how institutions 
impact decisions about the boundaries of R&D. The first essay provides an explanation based on 
institutional theory for the major shifts in the boundaries of R&D over the last century and a half 
at the level of the economy as a whole. An important conclusion from the first essay is that the 
current era does not represent a simple reversion to the boundaries of R&D observed in the late-
19
th
/early-20
th
 century. Rather, in the dual-path era, firms engage in internal R&D while also 
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taking advantage of the robust market for technology through licensing and collaborative 
organizational forms. 
The focus of the second essay shifts from the level of the economy as a whole to that of 
an individual project in order to explain discrete R&D sourcing decisions. Again, the impact of 
institutions, acting through the major environmental factors discussed, is a key element of the 
model developed in the second essay. In addition, the model takes into account the influence of 
several firm-level considerations along with the transaction- and project-level characteristics 
traditionally examined. The final essay in this dissertation further shifts the level of analysis 
down in order to examine the formal governance mechanisms that firms employ, in the form of 
contracts, once they have selected an external R&D source. While this essay is shown to be 
directly linked to Level 3 in the figure, it is again connected to the first two essays by the 
constraints that institutions place on managers and lawyers regarding contract structure. 
5.4. Implications for Theory and Practice 
Rather than recapping the implications for theory and practice presented in each of the 
essays in this dissertation, I discuss implications based on the connections between the essays in 
this section. In regards to theory, an important implication that cuts across the three essays is that 
the ability of TCE to explain phenomena related to the boundaries of R&D is limited. The essays 
in this dissertation demonstrate the limits of TCE alone to provide an explanation for the 
historical evolution of the boundaries of R&D, the variance in project-level decisions made by 
firms facing similar transaction characteristics, and the inclusion of specific clauses in R&D 
alliance contracts. To overcome this limitation, all three essays rely on the integration of TCE 
with other theoretical perspectives. While strategy research has always been multidisciplinary, 
the major disciplines (e.g., economics, sociology, and psychology) have largely been called upon 
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in isolation (Agarwal & Hoetker, 2007). However, recent research has taken steps to combine 
insights from the resource-based view and TCE in order to explain differences in sourcing and 
governance mode decisions (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Sampson, 2004b; 
Mayer and Salomon, 2006). 
The framework developed in the second essay of this dissertation follows in this tradition 
through its inclusion of technological and relational capabilities, which are suggested to play a 
role in initiating the decision to seek an external R&D source. The third essay also calls on the 
capabilities literature, specifically in the first study which examines the moderating impact of 
contracting capabilities on the relationships drawn from TCE regarding the inclusion of specific 
clauses. The adoption of this approach in both essays echoes Williamson’s (1998: 48) suggestion 
that strategy scholars should be examining how firm A should organize a transaction of 
characteristics X in light of its strengths and weaknesses (i.e., capabilities and rigidities). The 
second and third essays tentatively demonstrate that factoring in a firm’s pre-existing resources 
can help to improve the predictive power of TCE when examining R&D boundary decisions and 
the structure of R&D alliance contracts. 
In regards to the first essay, TCE is actually embedded in Level 3 of the model of the 
economics of institutions (Williamson, 1998: 29). The institutional factors operating at Level 2 
act as shift parameters which directly shape the transaction environment at Level 3. These rules 
of the game impact the play of the game (i.e., governance decisions). Scholars in the New 
Institutional Economics tradition have long seen the value of integrating TCE with other 
perspectives in order to better explain historical trends. In fact, institutional theory itself actually 
encompasses ideas from several disciplines including economics and sociology. Thus, the first 
essay demonstrates that combining insights from multiple streams of institutional theory leads to 
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a more complete understanding of historical trends. By augmenting TCE with economic and 
cognitive views of institutions, the first essay is able to go beyond suggesting why a particular 
firm selects a specific technology development mode to explaining the adoption of technology 
development practices at the economy-wide level. 
From a practical standpoint, the connections between the findings from the first and third 
essays suggest that familiarity with the informal norms and practices that are prevalent in an 
industry may help to alleviate some of the haggling that takes place in contract negotiations. At 
the end of the day, the development and commercialization of new products is the desired 
outcome of an R&D alliance. Partners may lose trust in each other and the project may be 
delayed if negotiations become contentious. Although the relationship is complex, speed-to-
market is a key determinant of the success of new product development along several dimensions 
of performance (Stanko, Molina-Castillo, and Munuera-Aleman, 2012). Thus, familiarity with 
industry norms should help the lead negotiators for each partner to identify terms that are likely 
to hold up the contract design process. In turn, acknowledging that some terms are vital to each 
partner at the outset can help negotiators to focus on drafting a contract that promotes 
cooperation in order to avoid costly delays and the erosion of trust. 
A related implication for practice is that learning about industry norms is often slow and 
costly owing to time-compression diseconomies. As a result, an entrepreneurial firm entering 
into an alliance for the first time may lack familiarity with such norms until it has participated in 
several alliances. To overcome this deficiency, the founding team might consider hiring industry 
veterans, especially those with alliance experience, to fill the business development and in-house 
counsel roles. While establishing a full-blown alliance management function may be out of the 
question for many smaller firms, the founding team might also consider how it can use 
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technology to capture what the firm has learned about industry norms and practices so that 
negotiators have a ‘playbook’ that can be used as a guide in subsequent alliances. The 
improvements in information and communications technology discussed in the second essay 
have not only contributed to the shift from closed to open innovation, but also to the 
advancement of knowledge management within firms. 
5.5 Future Research Opportunities 
In this final section, I present several interesting questions and future research 
opportunities that arise from the connections drawn between the essays in this dissertation. First, 
the current period is characterized as the dual-path era in the first essay. The implication of this 
characterization is that firms are not relying solely on in-house R&D or external sources of 
R&D. Rather, at the aggregate level, firms are observed to utilize both modes. However, as noted 
in the second essay, some firms are observed to rely on one mode or the other to a greater extent. 
This brings up an interesting question that connects the first essay to the studies conducted in the 
third essay: are the contracting practices of firms that frequently outsource R&D and engage in 
R&D alliances different from those of firms that rarely do so? An examination of this question 
would help to delve deeper into the origins and evolution of contracting capabilities. 
A second related research opportunity arises from the connection between the second and 
third essays. Both essays highlight the importance of relational/contracting capabilities. While 
the second essay does suggest that the knowledge held by managers from different levels of the 
firm should be combined in order to make sound sourcing decisions, neither essay delves very 
deeply into a discussion of which functional backgrounds are better suited to take the lead in 
regards to making decisions about specific contractual issues. The inability to address this in the 
third essay is partially due to the firm-level proxy used for previous contracting experience. 
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To overcome this limitation, case studies could be conducted to investigate Argyres and 
Mayer’s (2007) dual-alignment principle, which suggests that different employees, due to their 
functional backgrounds, possess different knowledge with respect to various types of contract 
terms. Such studies would help to further our understanding of when different employees get 
involved in contract negotiations and what terms they are brought in to take the lead on. This 
research would also help to unpack the contract design capabilities construct. Contract design 
capabilities were treated as if they reside at the firm-level in the third essay. Delving deeper into 
the role played by different employees would shed light on if and how the knowledge held by 
individuals is aggregated to form a firm-level capability. 
In addition to managers and lawyers, engineers and other technical employees are 
expected to play a role in sourcing decisions and contract design. The second and third essays 
did not discuss this possibility explicitly, presenting another avenue to explore related to the 
concept of contract design capabilities. While such employees are likely to have a hand in 
shaping technical specifications and project milestones and timelines, future research could 
examine if there are other aspects of R&D alliance contracts where their knowledge is of value. 
Another research opportunity is to investigate the role that technology plays in the 
evolution of the boundaries of R&D. In the first essay, institutions were shown to play a major 
role in shaping the transaction environment, leading to the boundary shifts observed. The impact 
of new technology, however, was not discussed in much detail. Several interesting questions 
arise if technology is taken into account: What is the relationship between technology and 
institutions? Do institutions shape technology or vice versa? Is technology simply a facilitator or 
does it have a direct impact on the evolution of the boundaries of R&D? An investigation of 
these questions could draw on the rich literature that discusses technological determinism. 
255 
 
 
 
The impact of technology on sourcing decisions and contract design was also not 
examined in much detail in the second or third essays. TCE’s discriminating-alignment 
hypothesis (Williamson, 1991: 277) assumes that the key to success is matching the 
characteristics of a particular transaction to the ideal governance mode. Contractual 
arrangements may still fail, however, even if the most appropriate governance form is selected. 
Could such failures be attributed to the characteristics of the technology under development? 
How important is it to develop an ‘ideal’ contract when a transaction involves cutting-edge 
science? The focus on contractual issues and discriminating alignment may actually be obscuring 
the role that technology itself plays in the ultimate outcome of a transaction. Thus, a final 
research opportunity to explore is if and how the nature of the technology under development 
impacts the predictions of the discriminating-alignment hypothesis. 
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